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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to and purpose of the dissertation 
The dissertation examines information disclosure1 in company reports in four 
different essays. Information disclosures in company reports are important to in-
formation users including investors, researchers, creditors, financial analysts, 
debtors, government and security consultants because they provide them with 
information that is useful when making investment and regulatory decisions 
(Cooke 1989; FASB 2010). Concerns regarding the relationship between the in-
formation disclosed and the role of corporate directors have been on the rise in the 
last decade. Such concerns have partly arisen as a result of corporate failures that 
have revealed companies to have disclosed insufficient and unrepresentative in-
formation on their operations and performance, consequently the role of company 
directors in such companies has been brought into question. Given this back-
ground, very few disclosure studies conducted in recent years have taken an ap-
proach which examines the information providers’ characteristics that affect in-
formation disclosures in company reports (e.g. Zarzeski 1996; Chau and Gray 
2002; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Matsunaga and Yeung 2008). Moreover, prior 
literature has noted that disclosure is an “…accounting activity involving both 
human and non-human resources or techniques as well as the interaction of the 
two” (Perera 1994: 268).  
Bearing in mind the above discussion, a study on both the information and the 
information providers is important in creating a better understanding of infor-
mation disclosures. Corporate governance (used interchangeably with information 
providers in this thesis) is worth considering since it is company directors that 
manage information disclosures in annual reports (Gibbins 1990) and therefore 
disclosure may be a function of the composition of the board. In this thesis, cor-
porate governance related issues believed to influence directors’ decision-making 
during the information disclosure process are examined (essays 2, 3 and 4). The 
selection of the corporate governance related issues investigated in this thesis is 
supported by Hopwood’s (2000) acknowledgement that the focus of accounting 
research gradually moved towards an interest in how the functioning of account-
ing is related to wider cultural practices. This acknowledgement highlights that it 
is not only the information disclosed in company reports and accounting systems 
                                               
 
1  This thesis uses two concepts of information disclosure namely mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure (see definitions in section 1.3.)    
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that are of interest but also the information providers. In this context, a study on 
both the information and the information providers is important in creating a bet-
ter understanding of information disclosures.  
In relation to the above, this dissertation takes a step further to study how compa-
ny related factors particularly corporate culture2 and performance affect the deci-
sions of the information providers and hence the information disclosed (essays 1 
and 3 respectively). The corporate cultural aspect (essay 1) is important for two 
reasons: (1) Because accounting is a socio-technical activity involving the interac-
tion of both human and non-human resources, accounting practices cannot be 
culture-free (Violet 1983) particularly in the case of information disclosure. (2) At 
corporate levels, values3 clearly help companies and their members determine 
work-related attitudes (since the traditions of the company are instilled in its 
members) in addition to presenting essentials criteria for work related behavior 
and therefore (depending on how companies and their members view their work 
and its importance) certain values and ways of working will be emphasized. 
Moreover, the performance aspect investigated together with gender diversity and 
disclosure (essays 2 and 3) focuses on investigating how director characteristics, 
and in particular gender diversity influence both the extent of disclosure and 
company performance (which is evaluated in terms of financial distress) and how 
this company performance affects the disclosed information. The view in essay 3 
is that company successes and failures have been linked to management charac-
teristics  for  example  gender  diversity,  which,  in  this  dissertation,  is  one  of  the  
director characteristics investigated to assess its effect on the extent of infor-
mation disclosure.  
Based on the above discussion, the figure below illustrates the various constructs 
examined in this dissertation. On the left are the four independent variables 
grouped into two namely 1. The governance characteristics including: gender di-
versity and Audit committee composition and 2. The company characteristics 
including: corporate culture and financial distress. On the extreme right is the 
dependent variable disclosure examined in all essays. The control variables exam-
ined in the different essays are shown at the top of the independent variable in the 
                                               
 
2  Corporate culture is used interchangeably with organizational culture. 
3  The definition of values is broad for example, in accordance with Hofstede’s (1980)’s ‘social 
programming’ values are seen as ‘abstract social cognition’ that help people’s adaptation to 
the environment (Claxton and Mclntyre 1996). This thesis uses this definition partly to identi-
fy values that organizational members believe are important within the organization – for ex-
ample, that it is important to seek opportunities, identify problems, and make improvements, 
or maintain the status quo and stay out of trouble. 
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figure and these include company size, profitability, company age, ownership 
structure, multinationality, leverage, industry type, liquidity, board size and board 
meetings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Examined constructs in the dissertation 
1.2 Contribution of the dissertation 
This dissertation contributes to accounting literature through its four inter-related 
essays on information disclosure. The first essay contributes to the growing ex-
tensive literature examining disclosure in relation to corporate culture. Specifical-
ly, several recent studies provide evidence that the environment in which the 
company operates affects financial reporting and disclosure (e.g. Mueller et al 
1991; Gray 1988; Jaggi and Low 2000; Zarzeski 1996). The environmental ele-
ment looked at in these studies has been culture but specifically national culture. 
Corporate culture not been extensively studied in disclosure studies even though 
recent authors recognized that corporate culture is linked to organization theory in 
a way that not only are organizations culture-bound, theories about organizations 
are equally culture-bound (Hofstede 2001). This essay therefore extends this line 
Independent variables 
Control variables 
 
- Company size 
- Profitability 
- Company age 
- Ownership structure 
- Multinationality  
- Leverage 
- Industry type 
- Liquidity  
- Board size 
- Board meetings 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Disclosure 
Governance characteristics 
 
 Gender diversity 
 Audit committee composition 
Company characteristics 
 
 Corporate culture 
 Financial distress 
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of research and thus provides new evidence on disclosure in relation to corporate 
culture from a competing-values perspective. 
The second essay contributes to disclosure literature on the determinants of the 
extent of disclosure in company annual reports by providing a new and economi-
cally logical explanation for the extent of information disclosure in relation to 
gender diversity in the work place. In other words, this is the first study to exam-
ine gender diversity as an explanation for information disclosure, and thereby 
corroborates the notation by Perera (1994: 268). Further still, this study contrib-
utes to: (1) existing literature by presenting support for the existence of gender-
based difference in performance, ethics and managerial behavior, (2) the continu-
ing debates and regulatory policy implementations regarding gender issues for 
example in the work place. 
The third essay contributes to disclosure literature in the following ways. First, 
while prior research documents the existence of a relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the life cycle of enterprises (Wright 2000) and also 
the constraints financial distress imposes on management’s abilities during infor-
mation disclosure (Holder-Webb and Cohen 2007), no study has examined the 
potential for an association between disclosure, financial distress and corporate 
governance. The results of this essay therefore shed light on these two study areas 
of interest in this dissertation. Second, the essay extends the prior finance and 
accounting literature on financial distress (e.g. Altman 1993; Wruck 1990; 
Laitinen 2005; Whitaker 1999; Beller 2003; Laitinen and Kankaanpää 1999; Alt-
man and Hotchkiss 2006; Balcaen and Ooghe 2006; Lensberg et al. 2006; Holder-
Webb and Cohen 2007). Studies in this area usually focus on prediction of finan-
cial  distress.  The  results  of  this  essay  contribute  to  this  stream  of  literature  by  
highlighting an administrative procedure that can be applied in mitigating occur-
rences of financial distress and increasing the extent of disclosure.  
The fourth and final essay of the dissertation contributes to earlier literature in the 
following ways. First, the study is the first to examine disclosures related to audit 
committees (hereafter AC) following (1) the requirement by the European Di-
rective for all public-interest entities in the European Union to have an AC and 
(2) the imposition of AC disclosure requirements by the Combined Code on Cor-
porate Governance and the Financial Services Authority’s Disclosure and Trans-
parency Rules particularly in the United Kingdom. Second, while Carcello et al. 
(2002) examine AC disclosures with a particular focus on AC activity and only 
one corporate governance characteristic of director independence, this study ex-
tends their study by investigating AC disclosures with a focus on AC member-
ship, activity and findings in addition to investigating both director independence 
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and financial expertise. The essay also contributes to AC and corporate govern-
ance literature by extending earlier work on AC responsibilities through docu-
menting the current state of AC responsibilities and activities (DeZoort 1997) and 
providing more insights into the relation between corporate governance mecha-
nisms and company characteristics (Beasley et al. 2000). Finally, some important 
issues in the corporate governance debate from both academicians and practition-
ers have for a long time been related to issues regarding the role of ACs and how 
to improve AC performance. The findings of this study contribute to this debate 
by highlighting what the ACs are currently doing through the analysis of AC dis-
closures. 
In general, following the notation by Gibbins et al. (1990) that disclosure is a 
managed activity which can be explained by a study of the specific context in 
which it occurs, this dissertation contributes to information disclosure studies by 
identifying variables from various theoretical perspectives which include econom-
ics, organization theory and institutional theory which can be used for studying 
and measuring disclosure related behavior (why companies disclose the infor-
mation they disclose) and corporate disclosure. In addition, this dissertation con-
tributes  to  several  disclosure  frameworks  attempting  to  deal  with  the  growing  
concern that financial reporting policies are inadequate and the approaches taken 
by policy makers and researchers concerning the relevance of information for 
decision making (e.g. ICAEW 2003) 
1.3 Theoretical fundamentals  
Corporate disclosure has been defined by different writers (Wallace 1988; Mars-
ton and Shrives 1991; Gibbins et al. 1990; Botosan 1997; Owusu-Ansah 1998) as 
the release of information concerning the economic performance, position or pro-
spects of the organization. The theoretical framework underlying this release of 
information referred to as information disclosure in the current research, origi-
nates from the market forces perspective and school of the regulatory theory. 
Market forces theory argues that it is in the interest of managers to maximize the 
information disclosed to the market in order to maximize the firm’s investment 
resources. This is mainly so because the managers are considered to be competing 
for limited resources in the prevailing market.  The advocates of regulatory theory 
on the other hand argue that markets are more likely to fail.  Regulation is there-
fore necessary to smooth the imperfections of a free market system by regulating 
information disclosure by companies. The regulation theory includes public inter-
est theory, the interest group “capture” theory and economic theory (Jackson and 
Price 1994). Under the public interest approach, an argument for regulation is that 
6      Acta Wasaensia 
firms are monopolistic suppliers of information about themselves4. The second 
argument for regulation under the public interest approach is to reduce the chanc-
es of misleading information disclosures (that may arise as a result of the compet-
itive nature of the market) by companies at least in the short term5. Under the cap-
ture theory approach, the group being regulated is seen as using the regulatory 
process as a means of promoting its own interest. In the event of this occurring, 
the regulatory process is considered captured and thus regulation becomes an in-
strument for protecting the regulated group as the interests of the regulator and 
regulated converge. 
Corporate information disclosure involves not only measurement, adjustment, 
qualification and application of accounting and disclosure rules but also data and 
information organizing and interpretation prior to its release. Disclosure takes two 
major forms namely, mandatory and voluntary. Mandatory disclosure is the min-
imum standard of disclosure in corporate reports that is expected by the regulato-
ry forces. Mandatory disclosure implies the presentation of a minimum amount of 
information in corporate reports, sufficient to permit a reasonable evaluation of 
the relative risks facing an organization (Owusu-Ansah 1998). Regulatory forces 
have been identified as consisting of the stock market, legislation and accounting 
practice (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). Voluntary disclosure on the other hand re-
fers to the additional information that is disclosed over and above the mandatory 
disclosure requirements which are defined by national accounting regulations 
(Gray et al. 1995). Unlike mandatory disclosure where companies are obliged to 
provide certain information, with voluntary disclosure, companies are seen as 
voluntarily providing information for a number of reasons. The next discussion in 
this dissertation is related to the above.  
It is worth noting that voluntary disclosure, in theory as well as practice, has been 
discussed intensively. One of the theories considered important in encouraging 
sufficient disclosure of information by companies to society as well as other users 
by companies is the legitimacy theory. This is because this theory is seen to re-
quire companies to show and also convince society that the activities in which 
they are involved are acceptable by and have contributed to society (e.g. Watts 
and Zimmerman 1979; Rousseau 1975). Watts and Zimmerman (1979) argue that 
companies might disclose voluntary information as a way of proving to the socie-
                                               
 
4  According to Wolk et al. (2001), this constitutes market failure and it is therefore cheaper for 
society to demand mandatory free disclosure, rather than to have investors privately contract-
ing for the same information, and paying monopolistic prices. 
5  This is done in such a way that company managers are penalized for manipulating and thus 
disclosing misleading information. 
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ty that they are operating and acting as society needs. Rousseau (1975) also ar-
gues that organizations are bound by a social contract with society, and in order 
for the organizations to fulfill this contract, their actions and activities have to be 
legitimized and enhance social welfare. Another theory is the information asym-
metry theory. The theory argues that firms have various incentives to disclose 
information voluntarily. One of the incentives of voluntary disclosure is to reduce 
the cost of capital by reducing the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders/stakeholders (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). 
1.3.1 Economic view of disclosure 
This dissertation looks into the economic view of disclosure and thereby suggests 
that a firm’s information disclosures are explained by asymmetric information 
(Verrecchia 2001; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Disclosure attempts to mitigate 
the problem of unequal distribution of information referred to as information 
asymmetry6 (Hendriksen and VanBreda 1992) between firm management and 
investors (Bushman and Smith 2001). As noted by Fields et al. (2001), the infor-
mation asymmetry problem crops up as a result of differences in information be-
tween the management (well informed managers) of the firm and the investors 
(less informed investors). This is because managers, relative to investors, have 
superior information about the firm’s business. Furthermore, under normal condi-
tions investors do not have information about management’s work and so cannot 
control management directly (Mathews and Perere 1996). As noted by Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991), information asymmetry impairs the efficient allocation of 
capital and also entails higher costs of capital (Botosan and Plumlee 2002). Re-
ductions in information asymmetry soften communication between firm manage-
ment and information users for example shareholders, lenders, and financial ana-
lysts and that allows investors to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of 
the company managers. This would result in increased disclosures which in turn 
will lead to reductions in cost of equity capital (Verrecchia 2001), debt (Clarkson 
et al. 1996; Sengupta 1998), agency and political costs that might otherwise arise 
(Bushman and Smith 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001). 
                                               
 
6  For a comprehensive discussion see Akerlofs (1970) work on information asymmetry using 
the market for lemons as an example. 
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1.3.2 Motives for disclosure 
Companies disclose information that allows information users to compare num-
bers and other information with other companies and between years by describing 
the company’s accounting policies and practices, unusual transactions, the effects 
of an unusual transaction in a prior year, or portion of a period (e.g. Barth and 
Murphy 1994). This enables information users to become aware of the economic 
environment surrounding their investments thereby further enabling them to make 
quick and timely investment decisions. Although companies provide voluntary 
disclosures describing a company’s accounting policies especially when employ-
ing complicated and/aggressive accounting methods that require more clarifica-
tions and explanations, Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) note that firms employ-
ing conservative accounting policies need not provide extensive and/or costly 
voluntary disclosures.  
Management in possession of “good news” (resulting, for example, from better 
performance) is more likely to disclose more information since this news can lead 
to increases in share price valuations on the stock market, and can support a con-
tinuance of the company’s positions, remuneration and ultimately their stock-
related compensation plans (e.g. Inchausti 1997; McKnight and Tomknis 1999). 
Previous studies have noted that managers appear to plan the timing of disclosing 
good and bad news in order to maximize their compensation (Aboody and Kaznik 
2000). For example, Dye (1998) points out that in order for managers to avoid 
extreme variability in stock returns and their compensation during periods of un-
certainty, managers tend to provide earnings forecasts as a way of reassuring and 
restoring the confidence of their investors.  On the other hand however, Owusu-
Ansah (1998) argues that unprofitable companies are also inclined to release more 
information in order to defend their poor performance. 
Companies are inclined to provide voluntary disclosures in order to reduce the 
monitoring costs for creditors. Managers particularly of those companies with 
public debt are more likely to voluntarily disclose information about the compa-
ny’s level of indebtedness because in the event of high leverage, creditors will 
urge the firm to disclose more information to help them handle their own credit 
risk (Hossain et al. 1994). Furthermore, when companies have high levels of pub-
lic debt, the debt-holders are more likely to have close relationships with the firms 
and consequently require detailed information disclosure to ensure observance of 
the terms of debt contracts.  
Managers are more likely to disclose adequate and extra information in their re-
ports in order to mitigate risks and costs (for example in form of penalties) of liti-
gation (e.g. Skinner 1994). In relation to the above, firms that pre-disclose bad 
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news  may  be  subject  to  lower  litigation  costs  than  firms  that  do  not  (Skinner  
1994) implying that litigants would concentrate on whether there are deliberate 
delays in disclosure of bad news (Healy and Palepu 2001).  
1.3.3 Prior studies on corporate disclosure 
There is an extensive amount of accounting literature on information disclosure in 
company reports. Most of the studies have explained variations in the extent of 
disclosure using corporate-specific factors while others have introduced corporate 
governance and corporate environmental (for example national culture) factors. 
Some of the corporate-specific factors investigated are company size, profitabil-
ity, company age, leverage, listing status, liquidity, audit firm size and industry 
type (e.g. Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Raffournier 1995; Jaggi and Low 2000; 
Owusu-Ansah 1998; Hossain 2000; Archamdault and Archamdault 2003; Akhta-
ruddin 2005).  
Studies have documented six main findings: (1) a positive association between 
company size and disclosure extents (e.g. Hossain 2000; Archamdault and 
Archamdault 2003; Akhtaruddin 2005). This finding can be explained by agency 
theory which postulates higher agency costs for larger companies as a result of 
operating in more complex organizational structures causing them to resort to 
more information disclosures as a measure to reduce the agency costs. Moreover 
larger firms have high competitive cost advantages (Lang and Lundholm 1993; 
Lobo and Zhou 2001) which motivates them to disclose more information in their 
reports. (2) Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Hossain (2000) reported a positive associa-
tion between disclosure and a firm’s profitability. (3) Company age was found to 
be associated to disclosure by Owusu-Ansah (1998). (4) Jaggi and Low (2000) 
and Wallace et al. (1994) reported that leverage leads to disclosure level increas-
es. On the other hand, Zarzeski (1996) argues that disclosure declines with lever-
age (5) Raffournier (1995) revealed that manufacturing firms disclose more in-
formation than companies in other industrial groups. (6) Belkaoui and Kahl 
(1978) revealed that companies that are able to meet their short-term obligations 
without  recourse  to  liquidation  of  their  assets  desire  to  make  that  fact  known  
through increased disclosures.  
Other studies have explained the extent of disclosure through corporate govern-
ance factors such as the number of independent directors and the existence of an 
AC (e.g. Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Cheng and Courtenay 2005; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2002; Chen and Jaggi 2000). In the study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
the relationship between corporate governance, culture and disclosure are exam-
ined. They document that a greater extent of disclosure is associated with having 
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a non-executive chairperson and boards dominated by family. Chen and Jaggi 
(2000) find a positive association between the ratio of independent directors and 
mandatory disclosure. Cheng and Courtenay (2005) also provide evidence of a 
greater extent of voluntary disclosure by companies with higher proportions of 
independent directors as compared to those with balanced boards. Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) investigate the association between corporate boards, ACs and 
management earnings and find that effective corporate governance is associated 
with higher financial disclosure quality. Since the board and AC behave consist-
ently towards shareholders benefits, findings of research on disclosure and corpo-
rate boards also hold for characteristics of the AC on disclosure. 
A number of studies have explained disclosure variations in relation to culture. In 
studying work-related values at a societal level, Hofstede (1980) identified four 
dimensions of culture: power distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty 
avoidance, and masculinity. The general finding was an existence of national cul-
tural differences across countries. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions serve well in 
explaining the differences in the values of different countries (Routamaa et al. 
2007) and have thus been used in accounting research among other research dis-
ciplines. Jaggi and Low (2000) suggest that there is a positive association be-
tween disclosure and individualistic societies as individuals in these societies are 
seen to care for themselves in addition to having competitive and less secretive 
environments.  They further argue that companies operating in countries which 
rank high in masculinity will be likely to disclose higher levels of information 
since such societies are more business oriented with individuals valuing the 
achievement of goals. Gray (1988) applies Hofstede’s (1980) societal values to 
his model and notes that managers in countries with strong uncertainty avoidance 
are expected to be more secretive implying a negative relationship between uncer-
tainty avoidance and disclosure. Zarzeski (1996) suggests a negative relationship 
relating to information disclosure in societies ranking high in power distance. 
This is because these societies are likely to have fostered businesses that discour-
age extensive information sharing because people recognize an unequal and hier-
archical distribution of power. 
 Acta Wasaensia     11 
  
1.4 Summary of the essays  
1.4.1 Corporate disclosure practices by business firms: a corporate cultural 
approach 
There has been increasing interest in investigating the relationship between ac-
counting and culture. Existing literature recognizes that corporate culture is linked 
to organization theory in that not only are organizations culture-bound, theories 
about organizations are equally culture-bound (Hofstede 2001) and cultural as-
pects are related to accounting practices (Jaggi and Low 2000; Zarzeski 1996; 
Salter 1995; Jaggi 1975; Gray 1988; Sudarwan and Fogarty 1996). While the in-
fluence of culture on accounting has been extensively examined, very few studies 
have examined the impact of culture on disclosure (e.g. Zarzeski 1996; Jaggi 
1975). Interestingly, most of these studies have adopted a general focus on na-
tional culture. This research on the other hand focuses on showing how compa-
nies with different corporate cultures respond to disclosures. 
The first essay of the collection investigates corporate disclosure practices in rela-
tion to corporate culture. This essay elaborates on disclosure by examining how 
specific corporate cultural types in addition to corporate characteristics impact the 
amount of information disclosures in company annual reports. The essay postu-
lates that disclosure levels are dependent on and thus driven by corporate cultures 
and corporate characteristics in addition to other factors. To investigate the study 
aim, the essay utilizes two corporate culture variables (flexibility and control val-
ues) operationalized by Henri (2006) and eight corporate characteristic variables 
(company size, multinationality, leverage, company age, profitability, company 
ownership liquidity and industry type).  
Using a sample of companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange and data 
from company reports for the fiscal year 2005, the results reveal systematic dif-
ferences in the extent of disclosure by firms with different corporate cultural 
types. The empirical findings indicate that managers of companies with corporate 
cultures reflecting flexibility values tend to disclose more information in the 
company reports, while those belonging to companies with corporate cultures 
reflecting control values tend to disclose less information. These results are con-
sistent with literature on organizational culture which highlights that control val-
ues promote tight control of operations, restricted flows of information and highly 
structured channels of communication throughout the organization while flexibil-
ity values promote loose and informal controls, open lateral communication 
channels and free flow of information. The findings further reveal that with the 
exception of multinationality, company size and profitability, other corporate 
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characteristics such as age, liquidity, leverage, shareholders and industry type do 
not affect the disclosure levels of the sample companies. 
1.4.2 Impact of gender diversity on the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports 
The second essay examines the impact of gender diversity within corporate 
boards on the extent of information voluntarily disclosed in corporate reports. 
Literature shows that differences do indeed exist between men and women re-
garding decision-making, risk taking, managing, ethical behavior, leading, infor-
mation processing, communicating and general performance in business enter-
prises (e.g. Johnson and Powell 1994; Peni and Vähämaa (2010); Pierce and 
Sweeney 2010; Powell and Ansic 1997; Rose 2007; Schmitt et al. 2008; Chell and 
Baines 1998; Peterson et al. 2010; Burke 1999; Peterson and Philpot 2006; Walt 
and Ingley 2003). Among other reasons, this could be part of the explanation for 
the increases in both female representation and the number of women in top man-
agement and corporate boards. Moreover, gender diversity literature emphasizes 
that diversity may for example benefit the board’s decision making process as 
new perceptions on various issues are presented and combined with a mutual ex-
change of ideas stemming from board members having diverse backgrounds and 
experience (e.g., Alvarez and McCaffery 2000) and enhances board strategic in-
volvement (Nielsen and Huse (2010). This may broaden the knowledge base, cre-
ativity and innovation, and therefore become a competitive advantage (Watson et 
al. 1993).  
The essay proposes that because gender diversity leads to improvements in com-
pany performance (e.g. Erhardt et al. 2003; Siciliano 1996) and that better com-
pany performance leads to increases in the number of disclosures (e.g. Owusu-
Ansah 1998), then gender diversity should have a positive impact on the extent of  
disclosure. This essay specifically investigates this proposition and thus examines 
whether information disclosure increases when there are more female directors on 
corporate boards. The impact between gender diversity and disclosure is exam-
ined using the 2005 to 2007 annual reports of 108 companies listed on the Helsin-
ki Stock Exchange during the fiscal year 2008. The main findings of the essay 
suggest that the female Chief Financial Officer (CFO) measure is significantly 
positively associated with the extent of disclosure. Further still, no association 
between disclosure extents and the other two gender diversity measures of female 
board of directors and female Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)is observed.  
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The negative sign revealed on the finding of female CEOs on disclosure although 
not significant can be explained by the differences in corporate roles performed 
by CEOs in comparison to CFOs during the information disclosure process. This 
finding may therefore indicate that company CEOs as compared to CFOs are 
more involved in corporate strategic planning matters than they are with prepara-
tion of company reports and therefore have less influence on the information dis-
closed in the reports.  
1.4.3 Association between disclosure, financial distress and gender diversity: 
Finnish evidence 
The results from essay 2 give some partial explanation for the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by revealing that despite the lack of association between the extent of 
disclosure and the number of women on the board of directors and as female 
CEOs, female CFOs are significantly positively associated with the extent of dis-
closure. The results do not however provide an answer as to whether the results 
would be the same in situations where information is negative or performance is 
poor. According to Holder-Webb and Cohen (2007), in such situations where in-
formation is negative or performance is poor, management is faced with difficul-
ties in abiding by the ethics of their obligation to disclose sufficient and full in-
formation. Moreover, a stream of psychology research has been directed to the 
differences evident between men and women in risk perception and tolerance. 
Most of these studies have examined relationships between gender differences in 
relation to financial decision-making and reported women as having lower prefer-
ences for risk (example when making investment decisions) than men (e.g. Meier-
Pesti and Penz 2008; Eckel and Grossman 2002; Powell and Ansic 1997; Johnson 
and Powell 1994; Stinerock et al. 1991), Extant research also indicates that wom-
en have a reduced willingness to accept financial risk (Barsky et al. 1997), have a 
higher degree of anxiety when making financial decisions and a stronger desire to 
use financial advisors (Stinerock et al. 1991). Since these differences between 
men and women influence decision-making in general and financial decision-
making in particular as well as risk perceptions and tolerance, it is likely that they 
affect disclosure and financial distress. 
The aim of the essay is to investigate the association that may exist between dis-
closure, financial distress and gender diversity. This essay is based on three main 
assumptions. First, a negative relationship between annual statement information 
disclosure and financial distress is assumed. Second, it is assumed that a negative 
relationship exists between gender diversity and financial distress. Third, a posi-
tive relationship between gender diversity and disclosure is assumed. The hypoth-
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eses are presented in a form of a structural equation model (SEM) estimated by 
the maximum likelihood (hereafter ML) method. The results show that disclosure 
is strongly negatively affected by financial distress. The female CEO dummy has 
a positive effect on financial distress, which contradicts the research hypothesis 
but supports the female underperformance hypothesis. It is worth noting that the 
positive finding on the female CEO dummy and financial distress can also be ex-
plained by the literature on the “glass cliff” which argues that women are often 
more likely to be appointed into leadership positions in periods when organiza-
tions are already facing poor performance (Bujaki and McConomy 2010; Ryan 
and Haslam 2005, 2007). However, female members on the board and a female 
CFO  have  a  positive  effect  on  disclosure.  In  addition,  female  members  on  the  
board  diminish  the  probability  of  distress.  Thus,  what  holds  for  a  female  CEO,  
may not hold for the participation of women on the board. 
1.4.4 Association between audit committee composition and the extent of 
disclosure: UK evidence 
The essay examines the association between audit committee (AC) composition 
and AC related disclosures. The impact of corporate governance as a whole on 
disclosure has been extensively investigated in existing literature (e.g., Haniffa 
and Cooke 2002; Lim et al. 2007). In general, the studies in this line of research 
have focused on corporate boards with very limited emphasis on the link between 
disclosure and board committees such as the AC (Carcello and Neal 2003; Carcel-
lo et al. 2002; Ho and Wong 2001) and these committee disclosures (Carcello et 
al. 2002). Existing literature suggests that ACs are monitoring mechanisms that 
enhance the audit attestation function of external financial reporting (e.g., Brad-
bury 1990) in addition to enhancing transparency. Furthermore, ACs convey im-
portant signals to the market about the company’s monitoring of the financial 
reporting and audit process.  
The main aim of the essay is to investigate the relationship between AC composi-
tion in terms of director independence and financial expertise on disclosures per-
taining to ACs. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest a greater proportion of inde-
pendent directors on corporate boards results in more effective board monitoring 
and hence limits managerial opportunism. Forker (1992) also suggests that the 
inclusion  of  independent  directors  is  seen  to  improve  a  firm’s  compliance  with  
regulations on disclosure and hence the comprehensiveness and quality of disclo-
sures. Moreover, directors with financial experience are viewed to be more proac-
tive in their monitoring, control and oversight activities, putting them in a better 
positions to reduce occurrences of information asymmetry as well as leading to 
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improvements in the quality of information flow between corporate owners and 
managers, especially in the financial reporting environment where the two have 
disparate information levels. 
Using a sample of 332 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange during 
the fiscal year 2008, the essay reveals the findings summarized below. First, the 
findings document that in general the sample companies have responded ade-
quately to the disclosure requirements by the Combined Code on Corporate Gov-
ernance and the Financial Services Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency 
Rules. Second, the results document support for the view that AC independence is 
significantly positively associated with total, required and voluntary information 
disclosures pertaining to ACs. This finding is consistent with Forker (1992) who 
suggests that the inclusion of independent directors is seen to improve a firm’s 
compliance with regulations regarding disclosure and hence the comprehensive-
ness and quality of disclosures. The finding implies that AC disclosures in rela-
tion to compliance with disclosure regulations improve trust and confidence in 
corporate governance, the financial reporting process and the audit functions. 
Third, it is found that AC expertise is significantly positively associated with total 
and required information disclosures pertaining to ACs. 
1.5 Design of the dissertation  
1.5.1 Data sources and collection methods 
This section details the sources of the data used in the dissertation and the data 
collection methods employed. The only primary source7 of data employed in the 
dissertation is the questionnaire by Henri (2006) that is used to measure corporate 
culture (see Appendix 3). The questionnaire and cover letters (see Appendices 1 
and 2) were sent out to the respondents who include company board members, 
using the E-Form program. The cover letter sent out to the respondents has a 
number of objectives. First, to provide respondents with brief information about 
what they were being requested to respond to. Second, to motivate them to partic-
ipate in the survey. Third, to provide them with a uniform resource locator (URL) 
as  well  as  the  username  and  password  which  give  them  access  to  the  question-
naire. The responses were received through the same program. After three weeks 
                                               
 
7  In this dissertation referred to as data collected directly from first-hand experience. 
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from the date of the first contact, a reminder letter (see Appendix 2) was sent out 
to the respondents who had not answered.  
The two main secondary data sources used in all essays of the dissertation are 
company annual reports (fiscal years 2005 for essay 1, 2005 to 2007 for essays 2 
and 3, and 2008 for essay 4) and the Thomson Financial Worldscope database. 
The annual reports are used mainly because they are considered the main source 
of disclosing information for different parties (Akhtaruddin 2005; Deegen and 
Rankin 1997) and are viewed as the major official and legal document that a firm 
produces on a regular basis and acts as a significant forum for the presentation of 
the firm’s communication with political, social and economic systems (Gray 
1995). The annual reports are used for collection of data used in scoring the dis-
closure indices for all  the essays of the study (see Appendix 4,  5 and 6),  gender 
diversity data (essay 2 and 3), and AC composition data (essay 4). The Thomson 
Financial Worldscope database is on the other hand used for collection of compa-
ny financial information (used as measures of financial distress for essay 3 and 
control variables in all essays) and industry related information. Financial infor-
mation is not collected directly from the annual reports for two reasons namely, 
(1) To save time and therefore be more efficient (i.e. since data used in scoring 
the indices, gender diversity and AC composition were hand collected), (2) Fi-
nancial information on the sample companies is available in the database and thus 
facilitating a more efficient and flexible way of retrieving the large amounts of 
this kind of information. 
1.5.2 Motivation for the sample selection 
In general, the European Union (hereafter EU) as an economic and political union 
has grown in size through the accession of new member states (from 6 member 
states in 1952 to 27 in 2007. This number still holds as of 2012). The EU member 
states have recently attracted increasing interest both from researchers and practi-
tioners. It is worth noting that both unique features and similarities exist amongst 
these member states. Despite the growth in literature relating disclosure and cor-
porate governance and developments in legislation governing the Union, there is 
still very limited research is conducted on EU member states in the field. From 
the above, both research and assessments of the similarities and differences in 
disclosure behavior are likely to be insightful. Taking the above into considera-
tion, this dissertation uses two countries from the EU namely Finland and the UK.   
Why  Finland  and  the  UK  as  well  as  Finnish  and  UK  data?  First  and  foremost,  
these two countries are selected because both are members of the EU and are be-
lieved in the context of this study to exhibit some of the differences and similari-
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ties that can be found in other EU member states. In other words, these two coun-
tries act as a representative sample of other EU member states in this dissertation 
and therefore the results from either sample country are considered representative 
of other countries with features that are to some degree similar. Second, all com-
panies in the sample are public companies and are therefore by law (with effect 
from the year 2005) to prepare their annual financial statements in accordance 
with the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter IFRS). Using 
these countries as samples for this dissertation suggests that the results reported 
are representative not only to EU member states in particular but also to the rest 
of the world in cases where similarities exist in regulations relating to disclosure 
of information. 
On the other hand, these two countries are different in the following ways (it  is  
important to mention that these differences have an impact on disclosure levels): - 
First, in comparison to Finland, the UK is one of the biggest developed European 
markets. Second, accounting in the UK has a longer tradition driven by profes-
sionalism. As noted by Gordon et al. (2005), in the UK, unlike in most of the Eu-
ropean countries, the accounting profession and professional accounting bodies 
set the accounting regulations. Third, according to Hofstede’s (1980) cultural di-
mensions, Finland is rated low on power distance (score of 33), low on masculini-
ty  (score  of  26),  high  on  individualism  (score  of  63)  and  high  on  uncertainty  
avoidance  (score  of  59).  On the  other  hand,  the  UK is  rated  low on  power  dis-
tance (score of 35), high on masculinity (score of 66), high on individualism 
(score of 89) and low on uncertainty avoidance (score of 35).  It  is  worth noting 
that these differences are common within other EU countries. This implies that 
the two countries as mentioned earlier act as a suitable sample for the generaliza-
tion of the findings of this thesis. 
In the dissertation essays, there are no assessments of the similarities and differ-
ences in disclosure behavior made by the two sample countries. This is because 
legislation on the disclosures under investigation varies, and that variation runs 
from marginal to complete (as indices are constructed on a particular country’s 
legislation) making it difficult to combine the samples for comparison purposes. 
1.5.3 The disclosure index 
The four essays of this dissertation investigate voluntary disclosure of information 
while required information disclosure is investigated in only the fourth essay. 
Four different approaches have been identified as measures of corporate disclo-
sure in company annual reports. The choice of any particular approach is deter-
mined by two factors: First the appropriateness of the technique in relation to the 
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data at hand and second, the objective for which the measurement is being under-
taken. These approaches are (1) the perceived disclosure deficiency approach 
measuring perceived deficiencies in accounting information needs of users of 
annual reports. This approach was first employed by Carpenter et al. (1971). (2) 
The content approach used to assess the adequacy of information presented in 
annual reports based on the number of words used to describe an information 
item. This approach was employed by Copeland and Fredericks (1968). (3)The 
frequency distribution approach measures the information that appears most 
commonly in the company annual report. The approach was developed by Morris 
(1984). (4) Finally, the index approach applied in this study measures the extent 
of information disclosed in an annual report.  
In all the essays, the level of each firm’s disclosure was measured using the dis-
closure index approach8. The disclosure index approach combines several varia-
bles of interest into one single measure. Two index types have been used in prior 
disclosure studies for measuring disclosure, namely the self-constructed index and 
the pre-developed index. The self-constructed index is however the most common 
index used in disclosure studies (e.g. Cooke 1989; Camfferman and Cooke 2002) 
and is used in this dissertation. Although time consuming to construct, this index 
type is advantageous and thus the most appropriate choice for this dissertation in 
such a way that it specifically seizes the information the researcher wants allow-
ing the researcher to feel confident in the reliability of what is being measured. 
The indices were constructed in two main stages. First, the items were selected 
for inclusion in the indices from several descriptive studies which refer to the 
amount of information provided in company annual reports was done. This in-
volved two steps the first being to follow reviews and examinations of previous 
disclosure indices (e.g. Lim et al. 2007; Akhtaruddin 2005; Chau and Gray 2002) 
and the second being to thoroughly reviewing the regulations stipulated in the 
laws applicable to the studies in question. Those laws included Finnish laws (i.e. 
for essays 1,  2 and 3) such as the Limited Liabilities Companies Act of Finland 
(2007) and the rules of the Helsinki Stock Exchange (2006) and the UK laws on 
ACs (requirements under both the Combined Code on Corporate Governance and 
the Financial Services Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules) and vol-
untary information (essay 4). The next stage was the assignment of weights to the 
items in the indices. This involved carefully reading the annual reports and scor-
                                               
 
8  In  this  dissertation,  essays  1  uses  a  different  index than  essays  2  and 3  mainly  because  the  
index used in essay 1 necessitated revision and expansion to reflect the factors examined in 
essays 2 and 3. 
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ing  them  in  order  to  obtain  a  level  of  disclosure  for  each  company.  Scoring  of  
disclosure communication vehicles like annual reports can be either weighted or 
unweighted. The weighted approach is based on the assumption that the users of 
the annual reports attach different importance to the different items in the index. 
An item is therefore weighted for example on a Likert-type scale on the basis of 
its importance as perceived by the information user or author. This approach has 
been criticized for introducing the problem of subjectivity. The unweighted ap-
proach  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  all  items  are  of  equal  quality  and  im-
portance to the information users. This means that an item is scored 1 if disclosed 
and 0 if not. The approach has been credited for accruing less measurement error 
(e.g. Adrem 1999). Accordingly, this dissertation employs the unweighted ap-
proach to measure disclosure. 
1.5.4 Reliability and validity of disclosure indices 
A disclosure index is dependent on replication–that is, whether the results it gen-
erates can be replicated by another researcher. This is not usually considered a 
problem given the fact that the contents of the annual reports do not change much 
over time. However, the problem that has been noted in review studies is that of 
partial scores arising from the researchers subjectivity as to whether an item is 
disclosed or not (e.g. Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Marston and Shrives 1999) in 
addition to making decisions as to whether an undisclosed item was applicable to 
a particular company. This interpretation depends totally on the judgement of the 
researcher using the index and could lead to difficulties in replicating the results. 
Ways of solving the reliability issue are:- to use indices that are understood with-
out difficulty and items that are easy to interpret,  provide instructions on problem 
areas (Buzby 1974) and last but not least provide rules for determining whether a 
specific item is relevant or not (Cooke 1989). This dissertation tried to address the 
subjectivity issue by using items that are free from ambiguity. Further still, other 
researchers are free to gather the data (upon request) for replication purposes. 
The validity9 of a disclosure index is dependent on whether it measures what the 
research intends to measure. There are different types of validity. This disserta-
tion takes into consideration two types of validity namely, content validity10 and 
                                               
 
9  Validity is defined as “the extent to which any measuring instrument measures what it is in-
tended to measure” (Carmines and Zeller 1999). 
10    Content validity is assessed through seeking subjective judgment from non-experts and/ or 
       professionals on how well the instrument measures what it is intended to measure. 
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context validity11. Because the self-constructed index is constructed by the re-
searcher, it is designed on the basis of the researcher’s needs and so brings ad-
vantages in the sense that it measures exactly what the researcher intends to 
measure. The researcher therefore does not need to depend on other researchers 
for information on for example problem areas and relevance of the items included 
in the index. To ascertain content validity of the disclosure indices used in this 
dissertation, self-constructed indices (in all essays) were employed. In the fourth 
essay, content validity was further ascertained by sending the preliminary list of 
selected items for screening to three individuals for screening. These individuals 
were identified and selected on the basis of their knowledge and expertise in addi-
tion to working with or being members of institutions influencing issues related to 
the subject under investigation. This also aided in the evaluation of the relevance 
of the index to the disclosure requirements on AC’s related issues (content validi-
ty). On the other hand, testing for construct validity involves an investigation of a 
correlation between a measure of disclosure quantity and a number of company 
characteristics. Further still, testing for construct validity of a disclosure measure 
requires  a  pattern  of  consistent  findings  with  prior  studies.  In  this  dissertation  
therefore, a test used by earlier disclosure studies in which one or more determi-
nants of disclosure are regressed as control variables is employed (e.g. Lang and 
Lundholm 1996; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). Since prior studies have proven a 
correlation between company size and disclosure, company size is used as a con-
trol variable for this purpose in this dissertation. 
1.6 Limitations of the dissertation and directions for 
future research  
1.6.1 Limitations of the dissertation 
The communication tool used in this dissertation relies on disclosure being pro-
vided by the company annual reports. Disclosures provided by the sample com-
panies in other forms such as magazines, press releases and company web pages 
were not taken into consideration. The omission of information released in such 
forms and communication tools may limit the findings somewhat. 
                                               
 
11  Construct validity focuses on the extent to which a measure works in accordance with the 
underlying theoretical expectation. According to Carmines and Zeller (1991), “if the perfor-
mance of the measure is consistent with theoretically derived expectations, then it is concluded 
that the measure is construct valid”. 
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This dissertation investigates disclosures specifically from public companies in 
Finland and the United Kingdom and consequently does not take into account 
private companies as well as those outside the European Union. This could affect 
generalization of the results. However, the samples used from public firms con-
sisted of over half  of the population of companies and, therefore,  the results are 
likely to be accurate presentations of the entire population.  
The approach used in scoring disclosure may have affected the results. This re-
lates to the probability of introducing subjectivity when evaluating the adequacy 
of disclosure for the companies. Moreover, each disclosure was scored 1 if dis-
closed and 0 if not, and so the scoring assumes that all items carry the same im-
portance and quality to information users. It is important to recognize however 
that, specific items might and/or are clearly of more importance to some infor-
mation users than others. Thus, a weighting approach could have been employed 
to resolve this issue regarding importance. However, it is difficult to decide on the 
equality of the items. Therefore, in order to avoid the risk of introducing more 
subjectivity, the quality of each item was not measured (e.g. Rimmel 2003). 
The  study  could  have  suffered  from  the  issue  of  design.  For  the  subject  of  this  
dissertation, a more appropriate design would have been one that enabled the re-
searcher  to observe how organizational members involved in the disclosure deci-
sions relate to the disclosure processes. Such an approach would have at least 
reduced and perhaps eliminated, any bias that might have been introduced by 
such issues as respondents trying to answer the questionnaire favorably for exam-
ple even when their organizations had not achieved an appropriate level of flexi-
bility (essay 1).  
As noted by Henri (2006) that even if measurement instruments have reflected 
satisfying reliability and validity, organizational culture is a broad concept for 
which richness cannot fully be captured by a survey instrument. It is worth men-
tioning that this study is no exemption and therefore organizational culture was 
not fully captured by the survey instrument used.    
The gender related essays looked at female executives. Because the number of 
female executives and thus observations are small and low respectively, the re-
sults may not be applicable to companies operating in countries with higher num-
bers of female executives in management and the statistical power of the conduct-
ed tests may reduce. It should however be noted that the female executives popu-
lation of the sample companies appears to be as was measured in the study and 
could therefore not have been changed.     
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1.6.2 Directions for future research 
The empirical findings, experience gained from compiling the current disserta-
tion, and the limitations identified above, gave rise to some suggestions for future 
research which are outlined below. First, this dissertation, like many studies on 
disclosure, uses a statistical approach to investigate those factors affecting disclo-
sure levels by companies and also focuses on general disclosure. The first sugges-
tion is the application of a different approach employing case studies. This ap-
proach has not been commonly applied in this area of research and it seems an 
interesting avenue for future research. This is because it will allow for observa-
tion of those factors studied in this dissertation during the disclosure decision 
making process to ascertain if the results from this dissertation might be found in 
the case study approach. The second suggestion is navigating away from a gen-
eral disclosure outlook to an investigation of the information types disclosed by 
companies with more female, independent and financially experienced directors. 
This is important as there might be differences among the different information 
types; for example, in terms of financial and non-financial information.  
Another important area for future research suggestions is one of a comparative 
study (on disclosure behavior) especially when investigating issues of specific 
disclosure regulations outside those investigated in the fourth essay. An example 
for this future research suggestion is an elaboration using the first three essays of 
this dissertation. These three essays studied voluntary disclosures of firms listed 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. As country-specific differences are likely to ex-
ist because of differences in institutional and cultural settings (Hope 2003; Hof-
stede 2001), it would be interesting to find out if the findings reported in this dis-
sertation can be applied to other countries through a comparative study for exam-
ple by looking at a number of countries in the EU or the Nordic countries.  
The reported results in essays 2 and 3 raise some questions and thus avenues for 
future research regarding gender-based differences and performance as well as 
behavior. For instance, the negative empirical findings reported on female Chief 
Executive Officer and distress as well as disclosure provide possibilities for future 
research examining (1) whether the management style needed and/or required 
differs during distress times (2) how female Chief Financial Officers and Chief 
Executive Officers differ in terms of their qualifications, and (3) whether female 
Chief Executive Officers are responsible for distress or are brought in during 
times of distress. 
Essay 3 focused on public companies, it would be interesting to conduct a study 
using data on private and small-sized companies to see whether the results are 
consistent with a sample of companies of a different size. It would also be inter-
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esting to investigate changes in disclosure before and during distress as well as 
during recovery from distress and compare what happens to disclosure during all 
the three periods.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1. The cover letter of the email sent to the questionnaire  
respondents. 
 
Dear respondent,  
 
This contact is an invitation to participate in my doctoral dissertation research 
project titled, “corporate disclosure practices by business firms: a corporate cul-
tural approach” under the supervision of Professor Erkki K. Laitinen at the Uni-
versity of Vaasa. 
 
My research project endeavors to generate knowledge to be utilized in under-
standing information disclosures by companies in annual reports. The research 
specifically focuses on determining how organizational culture among other fac-
tors can be used to explain corporate disclosures by companies. As a representa-
tive of your company, your views are of importance in this research area. 
 
At the extreme end of this page is the link, your user name (tunnus) and password 
(salasana)  which  will  enable  you  to  have  access  to  the  questionnaire  to  which  I  
kindly request your response as soon as possible. Responding to the questionnaire 
will take approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. 
 
Information provided in this questionnaire will be kept confidential without any 
form of it being revealed anywhere and to anyone in whatever form to enable 
identification of any individual company.  
 
I will be delighted to respond to any inquiries regarding the questions and any 
related issues. so please feel free to contact me. 
 
Thanks for your time and contribution to my research. I shall be pleased to send 
you a copy of the findings of the study if you desire so. 
 
Best Regards, 
 
Aminah Nalikka 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
University of Vaasa 
Email: aminal@uwasa.fi 
Tel: (GMS) +358407088037 
 
http://forms.uwasa.fi/lomakkeet/207/lomake.html  
 
tunnus:  
salasana:  
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APPENDIX 2. The cover letter of the reminder sent to the questionnaire  
respondents. 
 
Dear recipient, 
 
This is a follow-up reminder to my email of November requesting for your assis-
tance in responding to my doctoral dissertation research project on corporate dis-
closure by companies and their organizational cultures. Perhaps you have a calen-
daring implementation and have not yet got time to respond. 
 
I hereby kindly contact you for the second time as every response is very im-
portant to the success of my research project. Please find the questionnaire to 
which I kindly request you to complete with regards to your company at the fol-
lowing link: http://forms.uwasa.fi/lomakkeet/210/lomake.html. Please also find at 
the extreme end of this page your user name (tunnus) and password (salasana) 
which will enable you to have access to the questionnaire. 
 
In case of any difficulties regarding your username and password as well as the 
link to the questionnaire, please contact me and I send you either of them by 
email. Your prompt response will be highly appreciated, not later than 31st Janu-
ary 2008. 
 
I look forward to your participation in my doctoral research project. 
 
Best Regards, 
 
Aminah Nalikka 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
University of Vaasa 
Email: aminal@uwasa.fi 
Tel: (GMS) +358407088037 
 
http://forms.uwasa.fi/lomakkeet/207/lomake.html  
 
tunnus:  
salasana:  
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APPENDIX 3. Corporate culture survey questionnaire (Source: Henri 2006). 
 
These questions relate to the type of organizations that your firm most resembles. Each of these 
items contains four descriptions of firms. Please distribute 100 points among the four descriptions 
depending on how similar the description is to your business. None of the descriptions is any bet-
ter than the others; they are just different. You may divide the points in any way you wish. Most 
businesses will be some mixture of those described. 
 
For example: In question 1, if the organization A seems very similar to yours, B seems somewhat 
similar, and C and D do not seem similar at all, you might give 70 points to A and the remaining 
30 points to B. 
 
1. Institutional characteristics (please distribute 100 points) 
 
Organization A is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. People see to share 
a lot of themselves.  
Organization B is very dynamic and entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick their 
necks out and take risks. 
Organization C is very formalized and structured place. Bureaucratic procedures generally 
govern what people do. 
Organization  D  is  a  very  production  oriented.  A  major  concern  is  with  getting  the  job  
done. People are not very personally involved. 
 
2. Institutional leader (please distribute 100 points) 
 
The head of Organization A is generally considered to be a mentor, a sage, or a father or 
mother figure. 
The head of Organization B is generally considered to be an entrepreneur, an innovator, or 
a risk taker. 
The head of Organization C is generally considered to be a coordinator, an organizer, or 
an administrator. 
The head of Organization D is generally considered to be a producer, a technician, or a 
hard-driver. 
 
3. Institutional cohesion (please distribute 100 points) 
 
The glue that holds Organization A together is loyalty and tradition. Commitment to this 
organization runs high. 
The glue that holds Organization B together is commitment to innovation and develop-
ment. There is an emphasis on being first. 
The glue that holds Organization C together is formal rules and policies. Maintaining a 
smooth-running organization is important here. 
The glue that holds Organization D together is the emphasis on tasks and goal accom-
plishment. A production orientation is commonly shared. 
 
4. Institutional emphasis (please distribute 100 points) 
 
Organization A emphasizes human resources. High cohesion and morale in the organiza-
tion are important. 
Organization B emphasizes growth and acquiring new resources. Readiness to meet new 
challenges is important. 
Organization C emphasizes permanence and stability. Efficient, smooth operations are 
important. 
Organization D emphasizes competitive actions and achievement. Measurable goals are 
important. 
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APPENDIX 4. Disclosure index (used in essay 1) 
 
General corporate information 
1. A brief history of the company 
2. The country of incorporation and address of the registered office 
3. Main events by month/quarter for the calendar year 
4. Main events of geographical segments by year 
5. Organizational structure 
6. Changes in organizational structure 
 
Employees 
7. Geographical distribution of employees 
8. Business segment distribution of employees 
9. Employees by function 
10. Categories of employees by sex 
11. Education levels of employees 
12. Age structure of employees 
13. Number of employees for a period five years 
14. Reasons for changes in employee numbers or categories 
15. Nature of training 
16. Amount of time spent on training 
17. Number of employees trained 
18. Geographical location where training was conducted 
19. Categories of employees trained  
 
Board structure 
20. Educational qualifications of Board members 
21. Commercial experience of board members 
22. Age/ date of birth of board members 
23. Position of office held 
24. Other board memberships held  
25. Fees paid to the board of directors 
 
Segment information 
26. Brief description of the business segments 
27. Geographical expenditure 
28. Geographical net assets 
29. Market share analysis 
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Financial review 
30. Financial key indicators for two years with percentage change 
31. Financial history (key figures) of over three years  
32. Break down of sales by activity/function 
33. Break down of sales by geographical area 
34. Break down of sales by business segment 
35. Disclosure of other intangible assets valuations except for goodwill 
 
Information about Executive Directors 
36. Photo display 
37. Age/ date of birth of directors 
38. Educational qualifications 
39. Commercial experience 
40. Period of employment in company 
41. Salaries, fringe benefits and incentive plan based payments for the executive team(quantitative) 
 
Research and development (R&D) 
42. Description of R&D 
43. Company policy on R&D 
44. Location of R&D activities 
45. Phase in R&D  
46. Number of employees in R&D 
47. Expenditure on R&D 
 
Social policy 
48. Charitable donations 
49. Community programs 
50. Environmental protection programs 
 
Others 
51. Ways of interacting with stakeholders 
52. Quality information 
53.  Information related to Advertising and publicity 
54. Customer groups 
55. Contact information by geographical location 
56. Information relating to the general outlook of the economy 
57. Company's contribution to national economy 
58. Information relating to competition in the industry 
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Future prospects 
59. Forecast of market growth  
60. Forecast of growth capacity (both qualitative and quantitative) 
61. Factors predicted to affect future performance 
62. Planned expenditure on publicity 
63. Planned expenditure on research and development 
64. Disclosure of more than 20 major shareholders 
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APPENDIX 5. Disclosure index (used in essays 2 and 3) 
 
Strategic information 
General Corporate Information  
1. Brief history of the company 
2. Organizational structure 
 
Corporate Strategy 
3. Statement of strategy and objectives – general 
4. Statement of strategy and objectives – financial 
5. Statement of strategy and objectives – marketing 
6. Statement of strategy and objectives – social 
7. Impact of strategy on current results 
8. Impact of strategy on future results 
 
Acquisitions and Disposals 
9. Reasons for the acquisition/s 
10. Reasons for the disposal/s 
 
Research and Development 
11. Corporate policy on research and development 
12. Description of research and development 
13. Location of research and development policies 
14. Number of employees in research and development 
 
Future Prospects 
15. Qualitative forecast of sales 
16. Quantitative forecast of sales 
17. Qualitative forecast of profits 
18. Quantitative forecast of profits 
19. Qualitative forecast of cash flows 
20. Quantitative forecast of cash flows 
 
Non-financial information 
 
Information about directors 
21. Age/date of birth of directors 
22. Educational qualification of directors 
23. Position of office held 
24. Commercial experience of directors 
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25. Other directorships held by executive directors 
26. Period of employment in the company by executive directors 
 
Employee Information 
27. Geographical distribution of employees 
28. Business segment distribution of employees 
29. Employees by function 
30. Categories of employees by sex 
31. Education levels of employees 
32. Age structure of employees 
33. Number of employees for a period five years 
34. Reasons for changes in employee numbers or categories 
35. Identification of senior management and their functions 
36. Nature of training 
37. Amount of time spent on training 
38. Number of employees trained 
39. Categories of employees trained 
40. Geographical location where training was conducted 
41. Categories of employees trained 
 
Social Policy and Value Added Information 
42. Safety of products 
43. Environmental protection programs 
44. Charitable donations 
45. Community programs 
 
Financial information 
 
Segment Information 
46. Geographical capital expenditure – quantitative 
47. Geographical production – quantitative 
48. Competitor analysis – qualitative 
49. Competitor analysis – quantitative 
50. Market share analysis – qualitative 
51. Market share analysis – quantitative 
 
Financial Review 
52. Financial key indicators for two years with percentage change 
53. Financial history (key figures) of over three years  
54. Break down of sales by activity/function 
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55. Break down of sales by geographical area 
56. Break down of sales by business segment 
57. Profitability ratios 
58. Liquidity ratios 
59. Cash flow ratios 
60. Advertising information – qualitative 
61. Advertising information – quantitative 
 
Stock Price Information 
62. Market capitalization at year end 
63. Market capitalization trend 
64. Size of shareholders 
65. Type of shareholders 
 
Others 
66. Ways of interacting with stakeholders 
67. Quality information 
68.  Information related to Advertising and publicity 
69. Customer groups 
70. Contact information by geographical location 
71. Information relating to the general outlook of the economy 
72. Company's contribution to national economy 
73. Information relating to competition in the industry 
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APPENDIX 6. Disclosure index (used in essay 4) 
 
MEMBERSHIP 
 
Membership Required 
1. At least one independent member 
2. At least one member with competence in accounting and/or auditing 
3. Committee composition of at least three Independent non-executive members 
4. At least one committee member with recent and relevant financial experience 
5. List/names of committee members 
 
Membership Voluntary 
6. Details on qualifications and/or financial & Accounting experience of committee members 
7. Date of appointment and/or period on committee of at least  one member 
8. Date of expiration of/resignation from committee membership of at least one committee mem-
bers 
9. Outline of the areas the board expects the committee members to be familiar with 
10. Information regarding periods of appointments on committee membership 
 
ACTIVITY 
 
Activity Required 
11. Disclose which body carries out the audit committee functions (it could be the full board or 
another body) and how it is composed. 
12. Summary of the key roles of the committee 
13. Availability of the terms of reference of the committee 
14. An overview of the actions taken by the committee to discharge its duties (i.e. a summary of 
the work undertaken by the committee) 
15. Information regarding whistle blowing i.e. review of arrangements by which company staff 
raise concerns about improprieties in financial reporting and other matters 
16. Information regarding the audit committee's monitoring and reviewing of the effectiveness of 
the internal audit process and explanation regarding the reasons for the absence of such a func-
tion 
17. Description of the procedures adopted and applied in reviewing the independence of the exter-
nal auditors, including disclosures of the policy on the provision of non-audit services 
18. Information regarding external auditor appointment, reappointment and removal 
19. Number of meetings held during the financial year 
20. Meeting attendance by each committee member 
 
Activity Voluntary 
21. Meeting attendance by the executive committee members e.g. Chairman, CFO etc 
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22. Meetings with external auditors in the absence of management 
23. Frequency of meetings held by the committee with external auditors 
24. An overview of the main areas of focus in general during the meetings 
25. Description of the activities carried out during the financial year in order to monitor the integ-
rity of the financial statements. 
26. Description of the activities carried out during the financial year in order to review the integri-
ty of the company's internal financial control, and where requested to do so by the board, risk 
management systems 
27. Description of the oversight of the external audit process and confirmation that an assessment 
of the effectiveness of the external audit was made 
28. Specifications regarding external auditors scope of work and non-audit services 
29. Information on audit and non-audit service fees 
30. Report/details on the effectiveness of the external audit function 
31. Reasons provided for decision made regarding reappointment or removal of external auditor 
32. Information on induction of committee members 
33. Form of induction and training provided 
34. Information relating to training of committee members 
35. Committee performance evaluation/assessment 
36. Information regarding the review of the committee's own effectiveness/ findings from the 
committee's performance evaluation 
37. Confirmation by the committee on meeting the requirements of the combined code [ confirma-
tion by the board not the committee] 
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE PRACTICES BY 
BUSINESS FIRMS: A CORPORATE CULTURAL 
APPROACH* 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on corporate culture and corporate disclosures in the annual reports of compa-
nies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The primary objective of the study is to examine the 
effect of the corporate cultures of the sample companies besides other corporate characteristics 
such as corporate size, age, liquidity, leverage and profitability on corporate disclosures in the 
annual reports.  The results of the study reveal that in addition to corporate characteristics such as 
profitability, size and multinationality, corporate cultures associated with flexibility values are 
positively associated with corporate disclosure while those associated with control values are 
negatively associated with corporate disclosure. Other attributes such as age, liquidity, leverage, 
shareholders and industry type are found to be insignificant to corporate disclosure. The study 
therefore contributes to earlier literature by considering corporate culture as another attribute in-
fluencing corporate disclosures in annual reports. 
Key words: Corporate disclosure, corporate culture, disclosure practices, annual reports, listed 
companies. 
1 Introduction 
The essence of corporate disclosure is to ensure that users are provided with suf-
ficient explanations to enable them to assess the performance and financial posi-
tion of a company. Existing literature on corporate disclosure is filled with studies 
based on the research that uses structural performance and market-related varia-
bles such as firm size, listing status, sales, audit firm status, leverage, profitability 
and liquidity to explain the extent of disclosure in annual reports.  Most of these 
studies have proceeded from a market or regulatory theories’ standpoint which 
postulates that disclosure is a function of the incentives or disincentives that it 
generates (Owusu-Ansah 2000). The role of organizational culture in explaining 
corporate disclosure has not been addressed in disclosure literature given the fact 
that disclosure is an “…accounting activity involving both human and non-human 
resources or techniques as well as the interaction of the two” (Perera 1994: 268).  
__________________ 
 
*  Revised paper, published in the original form in the International Journal of the Academic 
Business World (2:2, 9-19). The essay was presented at the Academic Business World Inter-
national Conference (received a best paper award). This essay has been modified (with per-
mission from the publishers) to meet the University of Vaasa style requirements of the publi-
cation series. The author is grateful for all comments and contributions from Professor Erkki 
K. Laitinen, the anonymous referees, participants at the Business World conference, 2008 
Workshop on Auditing and Financial Accounting, seminars organized by the Graduate School 
of Accounting and the Department of Accounting and Finance at the University of Vaasa. 
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This paper therefore investigates the relationship between corporate culture, dis-
closure and corporate characteristics such as corporate size, profitability, compa-
ny age, ownership structure, multinationality, leverage, industry type and liquidity 
on corporate disclosures in the corporate annual reports of companies listed on the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange.  
Understanding why certain companies disclose the information they disclose and 
the cultures behind these companies is potentially useful to the users of this in-
formation and for the policy makers involved in specifying the form and content 
of accounting and reporting by companies. For example, it is important to the 
information users as they form expectations about the information provided by 
companies and for policy makers such as the stock exchanges and the Internation-
al Accounting Standards Committee who set disclosure rules and regulations in 
targeting the efforts of disclosures and thus find possible ways of enhancing com-
pany disclosures.  
Hofstede (2001) recognized that corporate culture is linked to organization theory 
in a way that not only organizations are culture-bound, theories about organiza-
tions are equally culture-bound. Organizations are specific collectivities of people 
whose activities are coordinated and controlled in and for the achievement of de-
fined  goals  (Ashkanasy  et  al.  2000:  58).  The  emphasis  here  is  on  the  socio-
cultural qualities that develop within an organization, even though organizations 
themselves are fixed in a wider cultural context which has a bearing on organiza-
tional qualities. This conception of culture can be based on a structure in which 
patterns of dependent relationships are expressed to explain corporate disclosure 
as an alternative for survival. Organizations exist in a largely dependent relation-
ship with their environment which presents essentials for behavior that managers 
perform in their organizations and later contributes to its overall systemic balance 
and effectiveness. If this study can identify how culture influences corporate dis-
closure, then it should be able to predict organizations with strong or weak task 
environments that enhance or reduce corporate disclosure. This study therefore 
contributes to accounting literature particularly on corporate disclosure by intro-
ducing corporate culture as another attribute influencing corporate disclosure. It 
also contributes to the general accounting literature by proving the argument 
raised by Violet (1983) that accounting practice cannot be culture-free since ac-
counting is a socio-technical activity involving the interaction of both human and 
non-human resources.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews earlier liter-
ature on corporate culture, corporate characteristics and disclosure. Additionally 
the research hypotheses are drawn on the basis of this literature review. Section 3 
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presents the methodology and data employed in the study. Section 4 reports the 
results of the study and finally Section 5 provides the conclusions of the study. 
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Earlier studies combining accounting and culture have found that cultural aspects 
are related to accounting practices (Jaggi and Low 2000; Salter 1995; Jaggi 1975; 
Gray 1988; Hofstede 1990; Zarzeski 1996). Jaggi (1975) examined the impact of 
the cultural environment and individual value orientations on the reliability of 
information disclosures and thus hypothesized that the reliability of disclosure is 
not expected to be high in developing countries unless legal disclosure standards 
are set. Another study is that associated with Gray’s (1988) theorization of a con-
nection between Hofstede’s (1990) cultural values and accounting values. Gray 
identified four accounting values; namely, professionalism, uniformity, conserva-
tism and secrecy. He hypothesized that societies which have strong power dis-
tance and uncertainty avoidance cultures are bound to display low levels of pro-
fessionalism as opposed to highly individualistic cultures. Those societies exhibit-
ing strong power distance and uncertainty avoidance cultures are however bound 
to be highly secretive.  He further hypothesized that the higher a country ranks in 
terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance, and the lower it ranks in 
terms of individualism and masculinity, then the more likely it is to rank highly in 
terms of secrecy. Hofstede (2001) quoted Salter and Niswander (1995) to have 
operationalized and tested Gray’s hypotheses on data from 29 countries and found 
that secrecy was positively related to uncertainty avoidance but negatively related 
to individualism. 
Sudarwan and Fogarty (1996) examined the relationship between the cultural 
characteristics and reporting practices of Indonesian firms. They found that an 
empirical relationship exists between cultural values and accounting values.  
Power distance, uncertainty avoidance and individualism were found to have sig-
nificant relationships with one or more accounting values. Specifically, uncertain-
ty avoidance was found to be significantly associated with secretive accounting 
practice. Individualism is negatively and significantly associated with secrecy – a 
decreasing trend in individualism was found to be associated with an increasing 
trend in secrecy. 
At a cultural level, values clearly help organizations and their members determine 
work-related attitudes and behavior and, therefore, depending on how organiza-
tions and their members view their work and its importance will place emphasis 
on certain value types. Organizational culture is a very important aspect within 
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companies because the corporate values are instilled in its workers and these help 
in explaining why certain things are done the way they are done. Different organ-
izational cultures are associated with particular value types in relation to disclo-
sure of information. These cultures are, rational culture (which reflects an orienta-
tion toward efficiency and profit with an emphasis towards planning, productivity 
and goal clarity), hierarchical culture (reflects bureaucracy and stability and em-
phasizes the enforcement of roles, rules and regulations), developmental culture 
(relies on adoptability and readiness to attain growth, innovation, and creativity) 
and group culture (which sees cohesion, team work and morale as a means of 
increasing development, empowerment and commitment of human resources). 
Rational and hierarchical cultures are associated with control values (referring to 
predictability, stability, formality, rigidity, and conformity) while developmental 
and group cultures are associated with flexibility values (referring to spontaneity, 
change, openness, adaptability and responsiveness). Control and flexibility values 
represent two competing values which are considered to be attributes of organiza-
tional culture (Quinn 1988; Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983). As described in the ex-
isting literature, control values promote tight control of operations, restricted 
flows of information and highly structured channels of communication through-
out the organization. It is from this description therefore that this study considers 
control values to be an indicator of less information disclosure. On the other hand 
however, flexibility values promote loose and informal controls, open lateral 
communication channels and free flow of information throughout the organiza-
tion and thus this study considers them to be associated with high disclosures. It is 
hypothesized from the above discussion that: 
H1a: Organizations operating under cultures associated with flexibility values 
disclose more information in their annual reports. 
H1b: Organizations operating under cultures associated with control values dis-
close less information in their annual reports. 
Corporate attributes have been used by a number of writers as a basis for explain-
ing disclosure levels in corporate annual reports.  As predictors of disclosure 
comprehensiveness, Wallace et al. (1994) classified them into three categories. 
The categories are structure related, performance related and market variables.  
Structure related variables describe a firm on the basis of its underlying structure 
(size and gearing).  Corporate size variables commonly studied are total assets 
and sales.  Performance related variables vary from time to time and represent 
information that may be of interest to accounting information users.  These varia-
bles include liquidity, earnings return, and profit margin.  Market related variables 
are qualitative in nature (Wallace et al. 1994) unlike the previous two categories 
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which are quantitative.  Market related variables might be time-period specific 
and/or relatively stable over time.  They refer to a firm’s behavior which results 
from its association with other firms in its operational environment.  Variables 
identified in this category include industry type, listing status and auditor type.  In 
the accounting context these corporate attributes are demand-side variables be-
cause they are a function of the need to report desirable or undesirable results. 
These attributes are discussed in the following text. 
1. Corporate size 
Prior studies have indicated that the size of a firm has a strong influence on cor-
porate annual reports disclosures (e.g. Archamdault and Archamdault 2003; Akh-
taruddin 2005; Hossain 2000; Low 1998; Wallace and Naser 1995; Zarzeski 
1996; Inchausti 1997; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; 
Cooke 1989, 1992; Raffournier 1995; Owusu-Ansah 1998). The size variables 
considered in these studies include sales, total assets and number of employees. It 
has been argued that, in comparison to small firms, large firms are more motivat-
ed to provide higher disclosure levels in their annual reports because of such rea-
sons as having high competitive cost advantages (Lang and Lundholm 1993; Lo-
bo and Zhou 2001), having the expertise and resources for producing sophisticat-
ed reports, having a broad-based ownership and finally having the desire of en-
hancing their value (Lobo and Zhou 2001. This study therefore follows the hy-
pothesis that larger firms disclose more information than smaller firms. 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between the size of the company and the 
extent of disclosure. 
2. Profitability 
The association between corporate disclosure in annual reports and profitability 
has been of attention to many previous studies (Wallace and Naser 1995; Inchaus-
ti 1997; Hossain 2000; Akhtaruddin 2005; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Wallace et al. 
1994). These studies have used net profit of sales, return on assets and return on 
equity as proxies for profitability to measure disclosure. Form the agency theory 
perspective, Inchausti (1995) argues that management of a very profitable com-
pany will use information to obtain personal advantages. Therefore, they will dis-
close more detailed information as a way of justifying their position and compen-
sation package (Singhvi and Desai 1971). Other studies have argued that profita-
ble companies are more likely to signal to the market its superior performance by 
disclosing more information in its annual reports than those with lower profitabil-
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ity (e.g. Owusu-Ansah 1998; Wallace and Naser 1995; Hossain 2000). However, 
a counter argument is that poorly performing companies are inclined to release 
more information to defend their poor performance (Owusu-Ansah 1998; Wallace 
et al. 1994). Wallace et al. (1994) on the other hand found no relationship be-
tween profitability and corporate disclosure.  Lang and Lundholm (1993) sug-
gested that the direction of the relationship between profitability and disclosure is 
not clear. However, it is more likely that management when in possession of 
“good news” will voluntarily disclose more information to the market to enhance 
the value of the company, as this leads to an increase in share price valuation on 
the stock market and also supports a continuance of companies’ positions and 
remuneration. In light of the above discussion, the following hypothesis is exam-
ined: 
 
H2b: There is a positive relationship between the profitability of the company and 
the extent of disclosure. 
3. Company age 
The age of a company has also been considered as one of the corporate attributes 
influencing corporate disclosure. Owusu-Ansah (1998) in his study argues that 
older, more experienced and well-established companies are likely to disclose 
more information in their annual reports in order to enhance their reputation and 
image in the market than younger companies. He states that younger companies 
may suffer competitive disadvantage if they disclose certain items such as infor-
mation on research expenditure, capital expenditure and product expenditure 
which may then be used by other competitors to disadvantage them. He further 
highlights that older companies may alternatively be motivated to disclose such 
information as their presentation may not affect their competitive position. Con-
trary to other studies, Akhtaruddin (2005: 410) found no support for age as an 
attribute influencing disclosure levels. The current study follows the hypothesis 
that older companies disclose more information in their annual reports than 
younger companies. 
H2c: There is a positive relationship between company age and the extent of dis-
closure. 
4. Ownership structure 
Distribution  of  ownership  is  assumed  to  be  associated  with  disclosure  of  infor-
mation. Investors owning large percentages of a company are more in position to 
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obtain information directly from the company. Thus, a wider dispersion of share 
ownership is assumed to be associated with more disclosure (Cooke 1989; 
Owusu-Ansah 1998).  This assumption is based on agency theory of accounting 
in which companies are characterized by a separation of ownership and manage-
ment.  This generates agency costs resulting from conflicting interests between 
management and owners and across classes of owners. Agency costs tend to be 
higher for companies with a large number of shareholders as they press for more 
adequate information for monitoring purposes.  Such companies also employ pro-
fessional managers who have an incentive to make adequate information disclo-
sures.  This professionalism also comes with the technical ability to produce such 
information disclosures as shareholders may demand.  A contrary argument to the 
agency theory postulation above was expounded by Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) 
cited in Owusu-Ansah (1998). They argue that dispersed individual shareholders 
are not a frightening influence on corporate outcomes including disclosure poli-
cies and practices, even if the net benefits are great enough to provide significant 
incentives to become informed.  Individual public shareholders, where share 
ownership is widely dispersed, do not have the power to access internal infor-
mation of the company.  Thus the following hypothesis is set. 
H2d: There is a positive relationship between the number of shareholders and the 
extent of disclosure. 
5. Multinationality of the firms 
Multinational corporation status is yet another attribute believed to have an influ-
ence on corporate disclosure level. Multinational companies are expected to de-
mand more information because as a result of the internationalization of business-
es and of capital markets, firms are being challenged to meet the information 
needs of diverse groups of investors with different cultural backgrounds and in 
order to do so, firms will be required to disclose more detailed information. Re-
lated to the above, Depeors (2000) also highlights that, operating in a number of 
geographical areas including countries other than the country of incorporation 
increases the amount of information controlled by a company.  Further still Cooke 
(1989) noted that, the more international the operations of a company, the greater 
the amount of information necessary for the mangers’ bonding activities. This 
attribute has had mixed results from earlier researchers. Some studies have re-
vealed that multinationality increases disclosure levels (e.g. Depeors 2000; Raf-
fournier 1995; Cooke 1992, 1989) while others have found no relationship be-
tween multinationality and disclosure levels (e.g. Garcia-Benau and Monterrey-
Mayoral 1992).  This study therefore follows the preceding arguments as to why 
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multi-national companies are inclined to provide more disclosures and assumes a 
positive association between multi-nationality and disclosure. 
H2e: There is a positive relationship between the multinationality of a company 
and the extent of disclosure. 
6. Leverage 
Corporate information disclosure is often considered an instrument to reduce the 
monitoring costs for creditors. Because of this, there is an expectation of a posi-
tive link between a firm’s disclosure level and its indebtedness because, in the 
event of high leverage, creditors will urge the firm to disclose more information 
to help them handle their own credit risk (Hossain et al. 1994). Leverage as one of 
the corporate attributes influencing disclosure levels has had mixed results. A 
positive relationship between leverage and corporate disclosure levels has been 
reported in a number of previous disclosure studies (e.g. Ahmed and Courtis 
1999: 51; Prencipe 2004; Jaggi and Low 2000; Wallace et al. 1994). Most of the 
studies in the above category have analyzed the influence of agency theory and 
highlighted that companies with more debt have greater agency costs and in order 
for  these  companies  to  reduce  their  agency  costs  and  any  possible  conflicts  of  
interest between owners and creditors they increase the amount of information 
disclosed in their reports. Zarzeski (1996) however argues that disclosure de-
creases with leverage on the ground that debtors would have direct access to in-
formation. This argument would however be valid if firms have private debt ra-
ther than public debt because in cases where firms have a higher level of public 
debt, debt-holders are more likely to have close relationships with the firms, con-
sequently leading to an agency problem and hence requiring detailed information 
disclosure to ensure observance of debt contracts. Based on the above discussion, 
this study therefore hypothesizes as below. 
H2f: There is a negative relationship between leverage and the extent of disclo-
sure. 
7. Industry type 
Association between the level of disclosure and industry type also provides mixed 
results. The relationship between industry type and disclosure was not found to be 
significant in many disclosure studies (e.g. Raffournier 1995; Watsonet al. 2002; 
Owusu-Ansah 1998). On the other hand, Cooke (1992) found a significant rela-
tionship between industry type and disclosure and reported that manufacturing 
 Acta Wasaensia     53 
industries disclose more information in their annual reports than other industries. 
In the case of Finland, the key economic industry in respect to foreign trade is 
manufacturing. In 2004 for example, technology manufacturing in Finland ranked 
second after Ireland in the European Union. Further still, the industry employees a 
significant number of about 400,000 people (Source: Statistics in Finland, Labor 
Force Survey). Since manufacturing is of fundamental importance to Finland, it is 
possible that the levels of disclosure in the annual reports of manufacturing com-
panies may differ from those of non-manufacturing companies.  Accordingly, 
companies included in this study are categorized as manufacturing or non-
manufacturing. Based upon the above discussion and previous research findings 
by cooke (1995), this study assumes that manufacturing companies disclose more 
information in their reports than those companies in the non-manufacturing indus-
try.  
H2g: There is a positive relationship between the industry type and the extent of 
disclosure. 
8. Liquidity 
Wallace et al. (1994: 49) have argued for an association between liquidity and the 
level of disclosure in the corporate annual report.  According to Wallace and Na-
sar (1995), regulatory bodies, investors and lenders are particularly concerned 
with the going-concern status of companies. Companies that are able to meet their 
short-term obligations without recourse to liquidation of their assets, desire to 
make this fact known through disclosure in their annual reports (Belkaoui and 
Kahl 1978).  Liquidity is usually measured by the quick ratio as it is a more strin-
gent measure of corporate liquidity (Owusu-Ansah 1998). This study follows the 
same discussion on disclosure and liquidity above and hypotheses as below. 
H2h: There is a negative relationship between liquidity and the extent of disclo-
sure. 
3 Methodology  
3.1 Selection of the sample 
The research population of this study is based on companies listed on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. The total number of companies listed on the exchange is 135. 
Following prior research (e.g. Owusu-Ansah 1998; Akhtaruddin 2005), this study 
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is limited to non-financial companies and therefore excludes companies in bank-
ing, insurance, and service as well as real estate industries which by law have 
different disclosing requirements. The number of companies is therefore reduced 
to 117. The study further excludes nine companies with missing (insufficient) 
data to estimate the research variables, hence reducing the total to 108. Further-
more, 58 companies from which no questionnaire responses were obtained are 
excluded from the study. The remaining 50 companies representing a significant 
proportion of 46% of the total population of non-financial companies listed on the 
stock exchange, are the final sample for this study.  
The two main data sources for the study are the company annual reports for the 
year 2005 used for data collection on company characteristics and the survey 
questionnaires used for the collection of data on the corporate cultural aspect of 
the study. The study uses annual reports mainly because, as stated by Gray 
(1995), the annual report is viewed as the major official and legal document that a 
firm produces on a regular basis and acts as a significant forum for the presenta-
tion of the firm’s communication with political, social and economic systems. For 
the sampling method used in the survey on corporate culture, respondents were 
selected on the basis of their expert knowledge in the subject under investigation 
(Sekaran 2000: 237; Saunders et al. 1997). To ensure homogeneity, sampling fo-
cused on those persons responsible for reporting any form of information in the 
annual reports which comprised members of top management of the companies in 
question. The cultural dimension scores were gathered from the cultural question-
naire used by Henri (2006).The questionnaire was issued to the respondents via 
their email addresses. The addresses of the respondents to the cultural aspect of 
the study were obtained from their company web pages and the questionnaires 
were sent to two top management team members of each company using the E-
lomake program. 
3.2 The disclosure score 
In related accounting research, both weighted (Botosan 1997; Buzby 1974; Chow 
and Wong-Boren 1987; Eng et al. 2001) and unweighted (Akhtaruddin 2005; 
Archambault 2003; Cooke 1989; Hossain et al. 1994; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Raf-
fournier 1995) disclosure indexes have been used to measure the extent of disclo-
sure in annual reports. Both approaches to measuring disclosure have their weak-
nesses for example, using an unweighted disclosure index has been criticized for 
its fundamental assumption that all items are equally important to all information 
users and the use of a weighted disclosure index has been criticized because it 
may introduce a bias towards a particular user-orientation. 
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Following the view by Wallace (1988) that all disclosed items are equally im-
portant to the average users, this study uses the unweighted disclosure index ap-
proach. Under this approach, attention is given to all users of annual reports rather 
than particular user groups. It has also been argued that unweighted scores reduce 
subjectivity and may be considered the norm in annual report studies (Ahmed and 
Courtis 1999: 36). In this study therefore, voluntary information disclosures in 
annual reports for the year 2005 are considered and an item is scored one if dis-
closed  and  0  otherwise.  The  total  disclosure  (TD)  score  for  company j is there-
fore: 
 
¦
 
 
m
i
ij dTD
1
   (1) 
where di is 1 if an item is disclosed and 0 if not; m is the number of voluntary 
items disclosed in the annual reports (here m=64). 
3.3 The organizational culture score 
Organizational culture is measured using the measurement method applied in the 
study of Henri (2006) where respondents1 were asked to distribute 100 points 
among four cultural types along the different cultural dimensions. The cultural-
type score is collected for each culture by averaging the ratings obtained on the 
four cultural dimensions. The value score is then calculated for the con-
trol/flexibility continuum.  From the results, a positive score then represented a 
flexibility dominant type while a negative score represented a control dominant 
type. 
3.4 Statistical analysis 
The study uses univariate and multivariate analysis to assess the extent to which 
variability in the extent of voluntary disclosure is explained by the independent 
variables and hence hypotheses testing. The study employs the regression analysis 
method using the enter and the stepwise model selection procedures. The stepwise 
procedure has been applied by some earlier studies examining disclosure (e.g. 
Watson et al. 2002; Depoers 2000; Giner 1997; Raffournier 1995).  This regres-
                                               
 
1  Respondents and thus company representatives in the survey were assured that their responses 
were to be kept confidential without any form of it being revealed anywhere and to anyone in 
whatever form to enable identification of any individual company. 
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sion procedure is useful in determining explanatory variables which are most cor-
related with dependent variables but less correlated among themselves (Depoers 
2000). This study therefore uses the stepwise procedure in order to avoid colline-
arity problems between the two value variables measuring culture. Collinearity in 
this study is tested by the use of the Variance of Inflation Factors (VIF). The re-
gression models below are used to explain the effect of the explanatory factors on 
corporate disclosure using the two model selection procedures. Model 1 uses the 
enter selection procedure while models 2 and 3 use the stepwise selection proce-
dures with each of them including only one cultural dimension.  
Model 1. TDj = Į + ȕ1FLEX + ȕ2CONT+ ȕ3MULT + ȕ4LEV+ ȕ5AGE +  
  ȕ6PROF + ȕ7LIQD + ȕ8IND + ȕ9LNSALES + ȕ10LNSHRS + İi 
Model 2. TDj  =  Į + ȕ1FLEX + ȕ3MULT + ȕ4LEV+ ȕ5AGE + ȕ6PROF +  
  ȕ7LIQD + ȕ8IND + ȕ9LNSALES + ȕ10LNSHRS + İi 
Model 3. TDj  = Į + ȕ2CONT+ ȕ3MULT + ȕ4LEV+ ȕ5AGE + ȕ6PROF +  
  ȕ7LIQD + ȕ8IND + ȕ9LNSALES + ȕ10LNSHRS + İi 
where TDj represents total disclosure, FLEX is the flexibility value, CONT is the 
control value, MULT is multinationality, LEV is the leverage2,  AGE  is  age,  
PROF denotes profitability, LIQD is the liquidity, IND represents industry type, 
LNSALES denotes size, and LNSHRS represents shareholders. 
 
  
                                               
 
2  This study uses the equity to total assets ratio as a measure for leverage mainly because in 
Finland this is considered to be one of the most important leverage measure by the Company 
Analysis Advisory Board (For details see www.yritystutkimuksen.fi). 
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Table 1. Operational definitions of variables. 
 
 
 
4 Results and discussion  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for both the dependent and explanatory 
variables employed in the study. These findings reveal that companies listed on 
the Helsinki Stock Exchange disclose large amounts of voluntary information 
(mean of 47.44) in their annual reports. These findings are in comparison with 
earlier studies such as Depoers (2000) who obtained a mean of 29.02 and Chau 
and Gray (2002) who obtained means of 12.23 for Hong Kong and13.83 for Sin-
gapore respectively.  
 
  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notation    Variable   Measurement  Expected  
                       investigated     sign 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable 
TD           Total Disclosure  Number of items disclosed 
    score      in the annual report. 
Independent variables 
Corporate culture 
FLEX     Flexibility values  Group + Developmental 
           Organizational cultures  (+) 
CONT     Control Values  Rational + Hierarchical 
                               Organizational cultures            (-) 
Corporate  
characteristics 
LNSALES    Sales   Logarithm of sales  (+) 
MULT     Multinationality  Foreign sales ratio  (+) 
LEV    Leverage  Equity/Total assets ratio  (-) 
AGE    Company age  Number of years in operation  (+) 
PROF     Profitability  Return on invested capital       (+) 
LNSHRS   Corporate ownership Logarithm of shareholder  (+) 
LIQD     Liquidity  Quick ratio   (-)  
IND     Industry   1 if manufacturing and  
       0 otherwise   (+) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of variables. 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study respectively where 
TD (the dependent variable) is the total number of items voluntarily disclosed by the firm, FLEX 
is Group + Developmental Organizational cultures, CONT is Rational + Hierarchical Organiza-
tional  cultures,  LNSALES  is  Logarithm  of  sales,  MULT  is  Foreign  sales  ratio,  LEV  is  Equi-
ty/Total assets ratio, AGE is Number of years in operation, PROF is Return on invested capital, 
LNSHRS is Logarithm of shareholder, LIQD is Quick ratio, IND is 1 if manufacturing and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
TD 50 47.440 9.807 
FLEX 50 47.010 20.130 
CONT 50 52.465 20.406 
MULT 50 0.659 0.293 
LEV 50 46.196 49.251 
AGE 50 60.550 45.862 
PROF 50 10.443 72.861 
LIQD 50 1.447 1.447 
IND 50 0.180 0.388 
LNSALES 50 19.543 2.142 
LNSHRS 50 8.560 1.303 
4.2 Correlation 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the dependent and independent varia-
bles used in the empirical test. The correlations between the dependent and inde-
pendent variables are as predicted for example, corporate disclosure level is posi-
tively correlated with corporate size as measured by logarithm sales, multination-
ality, leverage, profitability, logarithm of shareholders and industry type and sig-
nificantly negatively correlated with liquidity. The results also reveal that age is 
not correlated to corporate disclosure. Furthermore, these results show that corpo-
rate disclosure is significantly correlated with corporate culture as reflected by the 
positive and negative relationships between flexibility and control values respec-
tively. The correlation results show that collinearity is evident between the ex-
planatory variables associated with the organizational culture dimensions. 
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4.3 Regression tests 
Table 4 reports regression results of independent and dependent variables used in 
the study. Panel A of Table 4 reports regression results from the enter procedure 
(Model 1. which includes all independent variables of the study). The results indi-
cate that the model is significant at 0.003 with an R2 = 0.461. The results in this 
table however reveal that despite the significance of the model, none of the inde-
pendent variables dominate the effect on disclosure as depicted by the signifi-
cance values all above the three significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. This ta-
ble also proves multicollinearity between the cultural dimension variables high-
lighted by the correlation matrix. A serious multicollinearity problem exists be-
tween these two variables as shown by the very large values of Variance of Infla-
tion Factors (VIF) which are 81.088 for the flexibility values and 83.088 for the 
control values. 
In the first regression (Table 4 Panel B), all variables of the study are included 
except the control values variable (CONT). When all other independent variables 
except CONT are examined together, the results show that the regression model is 
significant (at 1% level with an R2 = 0.370) with only flexibility values (FLEX), 
size (LNSALES) and multinationality (MULT) variables dominating the regres-
sion  and  therefore  having  a  significant  impact  on  the  extent  of  disclosure.  This  
result reveals that of all variable examined, only companies dominated by flexi-
bility values, those larger in size and multinationals are inclined to disclose more 
information in their annual reportsThe results of the VIF also indicate that there 
are no collinearity problems in this model. It is also observed that the effect of all 
Table 3. Correlations matrix of variables. 
 
The table reports the correlations matrix for the variables used in the study respectively where TD (the 
dependent variable) is the total number of items voluntarily disclosed by the firm, FLEX is Group + 
Developmental Organizational cultures, CONT is Rational + Hierarchical Organizational cultures, 
LNSALES is Logarithm of sales, MULT is Foreign sales ratio, LEV is Equity/Total assets ratio, AGE is 
Number of years in operation, PROF is Return on invested capital, LNSHRS is Logarithm of shareholder, 
LIQD is Quick ratio, IND is 1 if manufacturing and 0 otherwise.  
** and * represent 1% and 5% significance level respectively. 
  FLEX CONT LNSALES MULT LEV AGE PROF LNSHRS LIQD IND 
 TD 0.490** -0.508** 0.439** 0.280* 0.280* 0.079 0.306* 0.291* -0.284* 0.317* 
 FLEX 1.000 -0.993** 0.317* 0.001 0.171 0.145 0.035 0.182 -0.263 0.273 
 CONT  1.000 -0.334* -0.018 -0.172 -0.134 -0.034 -0.192 0.272 -0.286* 
    LNSALES   1.000 0.279 0.217 0.359* 0.376** 0.557** -0.546* 0.144 
 MULT    1.000 0.288* 0.054 0.184 0.276 0.016 0.205 
 LEV     1.000 0.039 0.820** 0.037 0.000 0.070 
 AGE      1.000 0.187 0.213 -0.215 0.187 
 PROF       1.000 0.060 -0.218 0.051 
    LNSHRS        1.000 -0.122 0.036 
 LIQD         1.000 -0.096 
 IND          1.000 
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other variables except for those entered into the model disappears simultaneously. 
The first variable entered into the stepwise regression procedure is the flexibility 
values variable which explains corporate voluntary disclosure by 24% and is sig-
nificant at 0.002. The second variable entered into the regression is the size varia-
ble significant at 0.059 and which when added results into an increases the R2 to 
0.33. The last variable entered into this regression is multinationality (significant 
at 0.093) which when added to the first two variables entered into the regression 
results into an increases the R2 to 0.370. It is therefore observed from this regres-
sion that these three variables (flexibility values, size and multinationality) ex-
plain 37% of corporate voluntary disclosure but with flexibility values having the 
most influence, at 24%. These findings on disclosure are comparable to earlier 
studies such as Raffounier (1995) who applied the stepwise method in his study 
and found that the same variables (size and multinationality) had an influence on 
disclosure. 
 
In the second stepwise regression presented in Table 4 Panel C, all variables ex-
cept flexibility values were added to the model. The results report that the model 
is significant at a 1% level with an R2 = 0.391 and with no collinearity problems. 
In this regression, apart from multinationality (which is significant at the 10% 
level) also entered in the panel B regression, the control value (CONT) and prof-
itability (PROF) variables are the only variables entered into the regression. The 
control value variable dominates this model with an R2 = 0.258 and significant at 
the 1% level. An addition of profitability (significant at the 5% level) to the mod-
el creates an increase in the R2 by about 10% to 0.391. 
 
These results show that a number of variables are significant in explaining corpo-
rate disclosures. Companies operating under cultures with flexibility values 
(p<.05) disclose more information while those companies operating under cul-
tures related to control values (p<.01) disclose less information in their annual 
reports. The positive association between flexibility values and corporate disclo-
sure can be explained by the openness and the free flow nature of information 
aspects. Contrary, the negative association related to control values is probably a 
result  of  the  restrictive  and  highly  structured  flow of  information.  Based  on  the  
results of the study, the two hypotheses on culture are therefore supported. 
 
As hypothesized in H2a, company size has a positive significant relationship with 
the extent of disclosure. This hypothesis is supported at p<.1.  Companies that are 
larger in size as measured by logarithm of sales disclose more information com-
pared to smaller companies. This positive relationship is consistent with prior 
studies (e.g. Owusu-Ansha 1998; Wallace et al. 1994; Lang and Lundholm 1993).  
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Similarly, the multinationality of a company is also found to be significant and 
positively related to corporate disclosure and thus providing support for H2e. 
Hence companies with a more multinational affiliations disclose more infor-
mation in their annual reports. This result is consistent with prior studies such as 
Depoers (2000) and Raffournier (1995). Hypothesis H2b is also supported by the 
results  from the  study.  It  is  therefore  evident  that  companies  with  higher  profits  
disclose more information than those with lower profits.  
 
From the results, it is reported that other variables such as leverage, age, profita-
bility, liquidity, industry and shareholders are not significant and therefore hy-
potheses H2c, H2d, H2f,  H2g and H2h are not supported.  Some of these results 
are consistent with earlier studies such as Depoers (2000), Raffournier (1995) and 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) who found leverage to be an insignificant attribute 
to  corporate  voluntary  disclosure,  and  Patton  and  Zalenka  (1997)  who found no  
significant relationship between industry type and disclosure. 
 
 
Table 4.  Regression results. 
 
Panel A. Regression results based on the enter method. 
         Regression coefficient             t             Sig.        VIF 
R2: 0.461 
Adjusted R2: 0.323 
F-value: 3.341 
Sig.: 0.003 
 
Variables in equation. 
(Constant) 67.022 1.204 0.236  
FLEX -0.241 -0.468 0.642 81.088 
CONT -0.446 -0.866 0.392 83.088 
MULT 5.514 1.188 0.242 1.392 
LEV -0.034 -0.667 0.509 4.668 
AGE -0.029 -1.043 0.303 1.255 
PROF 0.051 1.472 0.149 4.717 
LIQD -0.307 -0.289 0.774 1.780 
IND 4.092 1.239 0.223 1.238 
LNSALES 0.305 0.336 0.739 2.860 
LNSHRS 0.941 0.802 0.428 1.760 
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Table 4. Regression results. Continued. 
 
 
  
Panel B. Results based on the stepwise method with all variables except CONT. 
 
The table reports the regression results based on the stepwise method for all study variables with the 
exception of CONT measured as Rational + Hierarchical Organizational cultures.  where TD (the 
dependent variable) is the total number of items voluntarily disclosed by the firm, FLEX  is  Group  +  
Developmental Organizational cultures, LNSALES is Logarithm of sales, MULT is Foreign sales ratio, 
LEV is Equity/Total assets ratio, AGE is Number of years in operation, PROF is Return on invested 
capital, LNSHRS is Logarithm of shareholder, LIQD is Quick ratio, IND is 1 if manufacturing and 0 
otherwise. 
 
    Regression coefficient                  t          Sig.            VIF 
Results from and variables entered in step 1.  
R2: 0.240 
Adjusted R2: 0.224 
F-value: 15.177 
Sig.: 0.000 
Constant     36.215  11.572      0.000  
FLEX       0.239    3.896      0.000          1.000 
 
Results and variables entered in step 2.  
R2: 0.330 
Adjusted R2: 0.301 
F-value: 11.550 
Sig.: 0.000 
Constant     10.316     0.958     0.343  
FLEX       0.190     3.099     0.003          1.112 
LNSALES      1.442     2.502     0.016          1.112 
 
Results and variables entered in step 3.  
R2: 0.370 
Adjusted R2: 0.329 
F-value: 8.999 
Sig.: 0.000 
Constant     11.033      1.045      0.302  
FLEX       0.200      3.313      0.002         1.122 
LNSALES      1.145      1.937       0.059         1.216 
MULT        7.028      1.715       0.093         1.094 
 
Variables excluded from equation. 
LEV           0.856          0.396         1.137 
AGE          -0.748      0.458         1.152 
PROF            1.495          0.142         1.183 
LIQD           -0.448          0.656         1.503 
IND            1.143          0.259         1.132 
LNSHRS          0.291          0.841         1.484 
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Table 4. Regression results. Continued. 
 
5 Conclusions  
This study investigates the effect of corporate culture in addition to company 
characteristics on corporate voluntary disclosures made by companies listed on 
the stock exchange. Earlier literature provides evidence on a relationship between 
cultural aspects and accounting practices (e.g. Jaggi and Low 2000; Sudarwan 
and Fogarty 1996; Salter 1995; Jaggi 1975; Gray 1988; Hofstede 1990; Zarzeski 
Panel C. Results based on the stepwise method with all variables except FLEX. 
 
The table reports the regression results based on the stepwise method for all study variables with the 
exception of FLEX which is measured as Group + Developmental Organizational cultures.  where TD (the 
dependent variable) is the total number of items voluntarily disclosed by the firm, CONT is Rational + 
Hierarchical Organizational cultures, LNSALES is Logarithm of sales, MULT is Foreign sales ratio, LEV 
is Equity/Total assets ratio, AGE is Number of years in operation, PROF is Return on invested capital, 
LNSHRS is Logarithm of shareholder, LIQD is Quick ratio, IND is 1 if manufacturing and 0 otherwise. 
 
    Regression coefficient             t           Sig.            VIF 
Results and variables entered in step 1.  
R2: 0.258 
Adjusted R2: 243 
F-value: 16.725 
Sig.: 0.000 
Constant     60.257    17.943      0.000  
CONT      -0.244     -4.090      0.000         1.000 
 
Results and variables entered in step 2.  
R2: 0.342 
Adjusted R2: 0.314 
F-value: 12.210 
Sig.: 0.000 
Constant     59.603     18.578      0.000  
CONT      -0.240      -4.211      0.000         1.001 
PROF        0.039       2.442      0.018         1.001 
 
Results and variables entered in step 3.  
R2: 0.391 
Adjusted R2: 0.351 
F-value: 9.841 
Sig.: 0.000 
Constant     54.630     13.483      0.000  
CONT      -0.238      -4.211     0.000         1.001 
PROF        0.033       2.115      0.040         1.036 
MULT        7.538       1.924      0.061         1.035 
 
Variables excluded from equation. 
LEV           -1.202         0.236         3.477 
AGE           -0.412     0.683         1.055 
LIQD            -0.916       0.364         1.138 
IND              1.079        0.287         1.139 
LNSALES           1.211         0.232         1.406 
LNSHRS           1.099         0.277         1.125 
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1996). The study by Jaggi (1975) combines findings from these studies and inves-
tigates the relationship that might exist between corporate culture and disclosure 
the corporate annual reports. Moreover, existing literature has documented an 
existence of different organizational cultures associated with particular value 
types (Quinn 1988; Henri 2006; Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983).  
The findings of this study generally indicate that corporate culture affects the ex-
tent of information disclosed by companies in their annual reports. Based on the 
analysis carried out, it is revealed that corporate cultures associated with flexibil-
ity values are positively associated with corporate disclosure while those associat-
ed with control values are negatively associated with corporate disclosure. In oth-
er words, companies with corporate cultures associated with flexibility values 
disclose more information in their annual reports. Contrary, companies with cor-
porate cultures associated with control values disclose less information in their 
annual reports. In short, the results provide further support existing literature on 
an existence of a relationship between culture and accounting. 
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IMPACT OF GENDER DIVERSITY ON THE EXTENT 
OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES IN ANNUAL 
REPORTS* 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of gender diversity on the extent of corporate voluntary disclo-
sures in company annual reports. The study uses data for the fiscal years 2005-2007 of companies 
listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the year 2008 and particularly focuses on the gender 
of Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial Officers and board of directors. The results indicate 
that firms with female Chief Financial Officers are associated with higher voluntary disclosures in 
annual reports. The findings also reveal that the other gender measure of female Chief Executive 
Officer and proportion of female board members have no significant impact on the extent of vol-
untary disclosure in company annual reports. 
  
 Key words: Voluntary disclosure, gender diversity, annual reports, listed companies. 
 
1 Introduction 
The study  of  corporate  disclosures  in  corporate  annual  reports  is  one  of  the  key  
financial accounting research areas that have received a tremendous amount of 
attention over the past years. A vast majority of research in this area has focused 
on corporate characteristics in examining the extent of corporate disclosures in 
annual reports (e.g. Archamdault and Archamdault 2003; Akhtaruddin 2005; 
Wallace and Naser 1995; Inchausti 1997; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Cooke 1989, 
1992; Raffournier 1995; and Owusu-Ansah 1998). Until recently, with the con-
sideration of the fact that disclosure is an “…accounting activity involving both 
human and non-human resources or techniques as well as the interaction of the 
two” (Perera 1994: 268), a number of studies have investigated the effect of man-
agement factors such as corporate governance, culture and management charac-
teristics like directors financial experience on accounting subjects such as disclo-
sure (e.g. Zarzeski 1996; Chau and Gray 2002; and Haniffa and Cooke 2002; 
Matsunaga and Yeung 2008). 
___________________ 
 
*  Revised paper, published in the original form in the Journal of Accounting and Taxation (1:1, 
101-113). The essay was presented at the Global Conference on Business and Finance (re-
ceived an outstanding research award). The essay has been modified (with permission from 
the publishers) to meet the University of Vaasa style requirements of the publication series. 
The author gratefully acknowledges all helpful comments and contributions from Professor 
Erkki K. Laitinen, the anonymous referees, participants at the Global Conference on Business 
and Finance, seminars organized by the Graduate School of Accounting and the Department 
of Accounting and Finance at the University of Vaasa. 
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The primary objective of this study is to examine the impact of gender diversity 
on the extent of corporate disclosures in annual reports. This objective is motivat-
ed by two facts. (1) in practice, the corporate directors are involved in making the 
disclosure decisions for example by engaging in measures of disclosure that help 
in monitoring company management and increasing the value of the company 
(Adawi and Rwegasira 2011). (2) there has been no prior research examining the 
impact of gender diversity in corporate management on the extent of corporate 
voluntary disclosures. It is therefore of interest to examine the impact of the gen-
der of directors on the extent of disclosure in annual reports.  
To investigate the study objective, this study uses a sample of 108 companies 
listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the fiscal year 2008. The results of 
the study reveal that the extent of information voluntary disclosure of information 
by companies is positively associated with gender diversity as measured by fe-
male Chief Financial Officers. These results further show that gender diversity as 
measured by female Chief Executive Officer and number of female board of di-
rectors has no significant impact on the extent of voluntary disclosures in annual 
reports.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior lit-
erature and presents the study hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data used for the 
study and in Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 presents the results 
and discussion of findings while the last section provides the conclusion to the 
study  on  the  effect  of  gender  diversity  on  the  extent  of  voluntary  disclosures  in  
annual reports.  
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Corporate disclosure 
Corporate financial disclosures are made in corporate annual reports to provide 
traditional user groups such as shareholders, creditors, financial analysts, debtors, 
government and security consultants with information useful to them when mak-
ing investment and regulatory decisions. A number of corporate attributes have 
been used in previous studies to explain the extent of disclosure in the corporate 
annual report. These include among others company size, company profitability 
levels, liquidity, leverage, industry type and corporate governance. As predictors 
of the comprehensiveness of disclosure, they have been classified into three cate-
gories (Wallace et al. 1994).  The categories are structure related, performance 
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related and market variables.  Structure related variables describe a firm on the 
basis of its underlying structure (size and gearing).  Performance related variables 
vary from time to time and represent information that may be of interest to ac-
counting information users. These variables include liquidity, earnings return, and 
profit margin. Market related variables are qualitative in nature, unlike the previ-
ous two categories which are quantitative. They refer to a firm’s behavior which 
results from its association with other firms in its operational environment. Varia-
bles identified in this category include industry type, listing status and auditor 
type. In the accounting context these corporate attributes are demand-side varia-
bles because they are a function of the need to report desirable or undesirable re-
sults.  
Prior studies have indicated that the size of a firm has a strong influence on cor-
porate disclosures in corporate annual reports (e.g. Archamdault and Archamdault 
2003; Akhtaruddin 2005; Depeors 2000). The association between corporate dis-
closure and profitability has been the focus of many previous studies (e.g. Wal-
lace and Naser 1995; Inchausti 1997; Akhtaruddin 2005). Empirical results on 
profitability have mixed findings with researchers such as Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
suggesting that highly profitable firms are more likely to disclose more infor-
mation in their reports than those with lower profit levels as a means of signaling 
their superior performance to the market. Wallace et al. (1994) on the other hand 
found no relationship between profitability and corporate disclosure.  
The association between the level of disclosure and industry type also provides 
mixed results. The relationship between industry type and disclosure was not 
found to be significant in the findings of studies by Cooke (1992), Raffournier, 
(1995), Watson, Shrives and Marton (2002) and Owusu-Ansah’s (1998). Howev-
er, a significant relationship was however found in the study by Cooke (1989) 
who reported that manufacturing industries disclose more information in their 
annual reports than other industries. As one of the corporate attributes that have 
an influence on disclosure, capital has had mixed results. Ahmed and Courtis 
(1999: 51), Jaggi and Low (2000) and Wallace et al. (1994) have reported a posi-
tive relationship between leverage and corporate disclosure levels. Zarzeski 
(1996) however argues that disclosure decreases with leverage on the ground that 
debtors would have direct access to information. 
2.2 Gender diversity and disclosure  
Previous studies have indicated that disclosure is a managed activity which can be 
explained by the context in which it occurs ( e.g. Gibbins et al. 1990). The idea of 
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disclosure being a managed activity has been related to disclosure by prior studies 
for example by studies such as those combining corporate governance and direc-
tors’ financial experience with corporate disclosures. The two factors both direct-
ly and indirectly focus on the context in which disclosures occur. Gender diversi-
ty is another human factor identifying the differences between men and women. 
This study therefore considers gender diversity as another factor to be taken into 
account when looking at issues related to disclosure management. The study thus 
identifies gender diversity as another attribute explaining information disclosures 
in annual reports.  
Gender diversity research has evolved into a challenging research issue in aca-
demia for the last two decades with a lot of research investigating issues related to 
women on corporate boards (e.g. Singh et al. 2001; Bernardi et al. 2005; Rose 
2007; Johnson and Powell 1994; Powell and Ansic 1997; Chell and Baines 1998; 
Burke 1999; Peterson and Philpot 2006; Walt and Ingley 2003; Alvarez and 
McCaffery 2000; Watson et al. 1993). This ongoing gender related research has 
commenced from the fact that there are increasing numbers of women in top 
management as well as on corporate boards (e.g. Singh et al. 2001) and that inclu-
sion  of  women  on  corporate  boards  is  considered  an  aspect  of  good  corporate  
governance (Rose 2007). Most of this stream of research indicates that, compa-
nies with good corporate governance practices benefit more than mere average 
financial performance ( e.g. Rose 2007; Bernardi et al. 2005; Catalyst 2004). Ber-
nardi et al. (2005) indicated that, companies signal this aspect of their governance 
structure by including photographs of women board members in the annual re-
ports. 
Related to the above is evidence from related literature on the existence of differ-
ences between men and women regarding decision-making, risk taking, manag-
ing, leading, communicating and general performance in business enterprises (e.g. 
Johnson and Powell 1994; Powell and Ansic 1997; Bernardi et al. 2005; Rose 
2007; Chell and Baines 1998; Burke 1999; Peterson and Philpot 2006; Walt and 
Ingley 2003). Gender diversity literature emphasizes that diversity may benefit 
the board’s decision making process as new perceptions on various issues are 
presented and combined with a mutual exchange of ideas stemming from board 
members with dispersed backgrounds and experience ( e.g. Alvarez and 
McCaffery 2000).  It is also argued that diversity leads to a greater knowledge 
base, creativity and innovation, and therefore becoming a competitive advantage 
(Watson et al. 1993). It is from this background that, prior research has concluded 
an influence of gender diversity on a number of corporate issues like firm perfor-
mance and corporate governance. 
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Literature in financial accounting has examined the importance of gender diversi-
ty in corporate governance (e.g. Walt and Ingley 2003: Huse and Solberg 2006; 
Peterson and Philpot 2006; Schubert 2006; Burke 2000). The findings by Huse 
and Solberg (2006) reveal that the starting point for women on board decision 
making processes is that decision-making does not only take place within the 
boardroom but also before, during and after meetings as well as outside the meet-
ings. This is an indication that women are more prepared for meetings than men 
and are therefore more likely to make better decisions. Schubert (2006) notes that, 
in comparison to their male counterparts, women have better multi-tasking skills, 
and risk management and communicative abilities. These abilities make them 
more competent and willing to take on different responsibilities as well as making 
them better at communicating and managing different situations within and out-
side the organizations. These two studies are in line with the argument raised by 
Burke (2000) that “increasing women’s board presence enriches board infor-
mation, perspectives, debate and decision making”.  
In addition to improving the effectiveness of corporate governance, gender diver-
sity also improves firm performance. A vast amount of literature has examined 
the relationship between gender diversity and performance (e.g. Catalyst 2004; 
Carter et al. 2003; Rose 2007; Chell and Baines 1998; Watson 2002; Erhardt et al. 
2003; Siciliano 1996).  These studies have had mixed findings regarding this rela-
tionship. In the study of Carter et al. (2003), they examined the relationship be-
tween board diversity and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms and found that there 
is a significant positive relationship between the fraction of women or minorities 
on the board and the value of the firm. They argue that firms making a commit-
ment to increase numbers of women on the board also have more minorities on 
their boards and vice versa. Similarly, the studies by Erhardt et al. (2003) and 
Siciliano (1996) both found a positive relationship between gender diversity and 
firm performance when they investigated the relationship between board of direc-
tor diversity and firm financial performance for large US companies and the rela-
tionship of board member diversity to organizational performance respectively. 
Contrary to the above studies, the studies by Watson (2002), Chell and Baines 
(1998) and Rose (2007) found no relationship between gender diversity and per-
formance. In his study based on the argument that female entrepreneurs are more 
likely to establish maximum business size thresholds (smaller than those of their 
male counterparts) beyond which they would prefer not to expand, Watson (2002) 
hypothesizes that female controlled businesses will generate lower outputs com-
pared to male controlled business. His findings reveal that after controlling for 
business age, industry and period of operation of businesses, there were no differ-
ences in the performance of male and female-controlled businesses. Interestingly 
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however, before the control variables, evidence suggested outperformance of fe-
male-controlled businesses. The study by Chell and Baines (1998) using a sample 
of micro businesses in business service in the UK, and the study by Rose (2007) 
using a sample of listed Danish firms also reveal no relationship between gender 
and firm performance. 
Considering the findings highlighting that gender diversity leads to improved firm 
performance (e.g. Erhardt et al. 2003; Siciliano 1996) and also that better perfor-
mance by companies leads to an increase in the amount of information voluntarily 
disclosed by companies (e.g. Owusu-Ansah 1998), it is reasonable to expect that 
gender diversity has a positive influence on voluntary disclosure levels. This 
study acknowledges gender diversity of directors to play an important role during 
both the communication and decision-making process by the firm directors as to 
which information to disclose in the reports. This assumption is based on two 
grounds. (1) based on previous findings of a positive relationship between differ-
ences between men and women as well as gender diversity in terms of female 
representation and the effectiveness of corporate boards. (2) corporate directors 
have the responsibility of making corporate decisions which include among others 
disclosure decisions. Moreover, based on the above discussion and the advantages 
revealed from earlier studies with regards to having diverse corporate manage-
ment, this study expects that companies with more females in management will 
disclose more information in their annual reports. This study therefore hypothe-
sizes as below: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between gender diversity of corporate direc-
tors and the extent of information disclosed in annual reports. 
3 Data 
The data for this study are based on companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Ex-
change during the year 2008. The initial sample of the study is 132 companies. 
Following prior research such as Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Akhtaruddin (2005), 
this study is limited to non-financial companies and therefore excludes 13 finan-
cial institutions as these by law have different disclosing requirements. Further-
more,  the  study  eliminates  11  companies  with  insufficient  data  for  carrying  out  
the study analysis. The remaining 108 companies (Table 1) representing a signifi-
cant proportion of 91.5% and 80% of the total population of non-financial com-
panies and companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange respectively com-
prise the final sample for this study. The data used in this study cover the fiscal 
years 2005 to 2007. 
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Table 1.  Industry group classification by directors representation for the sam-
ple firms.  
 
 
The two main data sources for the study are the company annual reports for the 
years 2005 to 2007 and the Thomson Financial Worldscope database. The annual 
reports are used for collection of data on gender diversity and items voluntarily 
disclosed by the sample companies. The Thomson Financial Worldscope database 
is used for collection of the study control variables data such as firm size, lever-
age, liquidity and profitability. This study employs the use of annual reports be-
cause as stated by Gray (1995), the annual report is viewed as the major official 
and legal document that a firm produces on a regular basis and acts as a signifi-
cant forum for the presentation of the firm’s communication with political, social 
and economic systems. 
The study uses three variables for measuring gender for each firm as follows: (i) 
female Chief Executive Officer is set to 1 if Chief Executive Officer is female and 
0 if otherwise, (ii) female Chief Financial Officer is set to 1 if Chief Financial 
Officer is female and 0 if otherwise, and (iii) female board members which is the 
proportion of female board members. In addition to the gender test variables, the 
study further controls for the effects of five firm characteristic variables and one 
corporate governance variable that have been found in prior research to have an 
influence on the amount of information voluntarily disclosed by companies. 
These control variables are, firm size which is measured by logarithm of assets at 
the end of year t, firm leverage measured by ratio of equity to total assets at the 
end of year t, firm liquidity measured by the quick ratio at the end of year t, firm 
profitability  measured  by  the  return  on  assets  at  the  end  of  year  t, board size 
measured by the total number of board members for each company and industry 
measured as 1 if the company falls under the manufacturing industry and 0 if oth-
erwise. 
 
       
SIC code Industry description Sample in industry Firms with FCEO Firms with FCFO Firms with FBOD 
      2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
15-17 Construction 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 
20-39 Manufacturing 64 2 4 4 15 15 15 30 25 34 
40-47 Transportation 5 0 1 1 1 2 2 5 3 3 
48 Communications 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
49 Utilities 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 
50-51 Wholesale trade 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 3 
52-59 Retail trade 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 
70-88 Services 24 4 1 1 5 5 6 7 10 9 
Total  108 7 7 7 26 24 25 47 46 55 
%     6.48 6.48 6.48 24.07 22.22 23.15 43.52 42.59 50.93 
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Table 2.  Operational definitions of variables. 
 
4 Methodology  
4.1 The disclosure score 
In related accounting research, both weighted (Botosan 1997; Buzby 1974; Eng et 
al. 2001) and unweighted (Akhtaruddin 2005; Archambault 2003; Cooke 1989; 
Owusu-Ansah 1998; Raffournier 1995) disclosure indexes have been used to 
measure the extent of disclosure in annual reports. Both approaches to measuring 
disclosure have their weaknesses for example, using an unweighted disclosure 
index has been criticized for its fundamental assumption that all items are equally 
important to all information users and the use of a weighted disclosure index has 
been criticized because it may introduce a bias towards a particular user-
orientation. 
Following the view by Wallace (1988) that all disclosed items are equally im-
portant to the average users, this study uses the unweighted disclosure index ap-
proach. Under this approach, attention is given to all users of annual reports rather 
than particular user groups. It has also been argued that unweighted scores reduce 
subjectivity and may be considered the norm in annual report studies (Ahmed 
1999: 36). In this study therefore, voluntary information disclosures in annual 
reports for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 are considered and items are numerical-
ly scored on a dichotomous basis. A score of one is assigned if a company dis-
closes a voluntary item and 0 for non-disclosure of the item. The total disclosure 
score for each company is therefore: 
 
Notation          Variable investigated Measurement                     Expected sign 
Dependent variable 
TD          Total Disclosure score Number of items disclosed 
         in the annual report. 
Independent variables 
Gender diversity (DGEN) 
FCEO           Female CEO  1 if female and 0 if otherwise       (+) 
FCFO           Female CFO  1 if female and 0 if otherwise       (+) 
FBOD           Female board members Proportion of females on board   (+) 
 
Corporate characteristics 
BSIZE          Board size  Total number board members       (+) 
CSIZE          Total assets  Logarithm of total assets      (+) 
LEV         Leverage  Equity/Total assets ratio      (-) 
LIQD          Liquidity  Quick ratio                   (-)  
PROF           Profitability  Return on invested capital          (+) 
IND         Industry   1 if manufacturing and  
       0 otherwise                            (+) 
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where di is 1 if an item is disclosed and 0 if not; m is the number of voluntary 
items disclosed in the annual reports (here m=73). 
4.2 Statistical analysis 
In order to examine the effect of gender diversity on the extent of voluntary dis-
closure and thus test the study hypotheses, the model below is used: 
 
TDj = Į + ȕ1BSIZE + ȕ2LEV+ ȕ3IND + Ǻ4LIQD + ȕ5PROF +  
  ȕ6CSIZE + Ǻ7DGEN + İi  (2)        
where TD is the firm total number of items voluntarily disclosed, BSIZE is the 
size of the board, LEV is company leverage, IND is industry in which the compa-
ny operates,  LIQD is company liquidity,  PROF is company profitability,  CSIZE 
is the size of the firm and DGEN is the gender diversity variable. 
Separate statistical models are run in order to illustrate the effects of the different 
gender measurement variables as well as to avoid multicollinearity problems be-
tween these variables. The multicollinearity problem is detected by the variance 
inflation factor (VIF). VIF measures the degree to which each explanatory varia-
ble is explained by the other explanatory variable and “very large VIF values in-
dicate high collinearity and a common cut-off threshold is VIF value above 10” 
(Hair et al., 1995). In illustrating the effects of the different gender measurement 
variables, TD is regressed on all control variables and one gender measure for 
each  different  regression.  It  is  realized  in  this  study  that  the  kinds  of  panel  data  
may cause problems due to stable characteristics of cases for example consistency 
in disclosure. However, when the models are estimated separately  for each year, 
the conclusions remain unremarkably changed.  
5 Results and discussions 
Descriptive statistics on disclosure for the total sample and firms with gender 
presentation are provided in Table 3, panels A and B to G respectively. There are 
small differences in the means of the disclosure score from all the descriptive 
panels with means ranging between 47 and 50.467 suggesting high levels of vol-
untary disclosure by listed companies in Finland. The disclosure score results for 
firms  with  FCFOs  and  those  with  more  FBODs  are  higher  than  those  with  
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MCFOs and MBODs (50.467 and 49.135 vs. 47.000 and 47.802) suggesting that 
disclosures are higher for those firms with female representation as measured by 
MCFOs and FBODs. The mean difference between the disclosure score between 
FCFO and MCFO is statistically significant at a 1% level. The results further re-
veal that mean scores for profitability are higher for firms with FCFOs and 
FBODs as compared to MCFOs and MBODs (10.202, 9.799 and 6.939, 7.694 
respectively). 
 
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics. 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics of the study variables where TD (the dependent variable) is the 
total number of items voluntarily disclosed by the firm, BSIZE is total number of board members, LEV is 
ratio of equity to total assets, IND is 1 if the company is in the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise, 
LIQD is the quick ratio, PROF is return on invested capital, CSIZE is logarithm of assets, FCEO is set to 1 
if Chief Executive Officer is female, FCFO is set to 1 if Chief Financial Officer is female and FBOD is the 
proportion of female board members (at least 1 female board member). 
 
             Mean                Median        Maximum       Minimum          Std. Dev. 
Panel A. Summary statistics for the entire sample (n=324 observations) 
TD 47.802 47.000 71.000 28.000 9.275 
BSIZE 5.978 6.000 11.000 2.000 1.858 
LEV 46.086 46.365 93.380 -219.290 22.827 
IND  0.315 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.465 
LIQD 1.157 0.880 7.960 0.230 0.909 
PROF 7.694 8.120 125.010 -75.900 12.637 
CSIZE 19.287 18.991 26.045 14.921 2.001 
      
Panel B. Summary statistics for the firms with FCEO (n=21 observations) 
TD 47.333 50.000 62.000 33.000 8.169 
BSIZE 6.905 6.000 11.000 3.000 2.606 
LEV 45.008 44.650 72.240 18.650 14.731 
IND  0.286 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.463 
LIQD 0.890 0.810 2.520 0.260 0.554 
PROF 7.606 5.660 24.770 -15.260 8.442 
CSIZE 19.355 18.708 23.595 16.169 1.878 
 
Panel C. Summary statistics for the firms with MCEO (n=303 observations)  
TD 47.835 47.000 71.000 28.000 9.357 
BSIZE 5.914 6.000 11.000 2.000 1.783 
LEV 46.161 46.650 93.380 -219.290 23.299 
IND  0.317 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.466 
LIQD 1.175 0.890 7.960 0.230 0.927 
PROF 7.700 8.270 125.010 -75.900 12.887 
CSIZE 19.282 19.002 26.045 14.921 2.012 
      
Panel D. Summary statistics for firms with FCFO (n=75 observations)  
TD 50.467 53.000 67.000 33.000 7.813 
BSIZE 5.800 6.000 11.000 3.000 1.931 
LEV 48.041 46.730 82.450 18.410 14.413 
IND  0.267 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.445 
LIQD 1.108 0.840 3.160 0.260 0.624 
PROF 10.202 9.050 125.010 -10.120 15.203 
CSIZE 19.217 18.865 23.439 15.339 1.938 
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Table 3. Continues 
 
The correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables is presented in 
Table 4. The results indicate that voluntary information disclosure is as expected 
positively and significantly correlated with one gender measurement variable of 
female Chief Financial Officers and four of the control variables of industry type, 
board size, profitability and company size (all significant at a 1% level). The re-
sults also indicate that firms with female Chief Financial Officers and a bigger 
proportion  of  females  on  the  board  perform better  (significant  at  a  5% level)  as  
indicated by the positive and significant relationship with profitability. The find-
ing is consistent with results from earlier studies that have documented a relation-
ship between corporate performance and gender diversity both in top management 
in general and female representation in particular (e.g. Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt 
et al. 2003; Catalyst 2004).   
 
  
 
Panel E. Summary statistics for firms with MCFO (n=249 observations) 
TD 47.000 46.000 71.000 28.000 9.541 
BSIZE 6.032 6.000 11.000 2.000 1.836 
LEV 45.497 45.450 93.380 -219.290 24.803 
IND  0.329 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.471 
LIQD 1.171 0.890 7.960 0.230 0.980 
PROF 6.939 8.100 36.110 -75.900 11.685 
CSIZE 19.308 19.010 26.045 14.921 2.023 
      
Panel F. Summary statistics for firms with FBOD (n=148 observations) 
TD 49.135 50.000 67.000 30.000 8.918 
BSIZE 6.196 6.000 11.000 2.000 1.933 
LEV 47.962 47.510 93.380 6.970 14.958 
IND  0.318 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.467 
LIQD 1.069 0.855 5.560 0.230 0.703 
PROF 9.799 9.340 125.010 -22.010 12.638 
CSIZE 19.387 18.885 26.045 14.921 2.201 
      
Panel G. Summary statistics for firms with MBOD (n=324 observations) 
TD 47.802 47.000 71.000 28.000 9.275 
BSIZE 5.978 6.000 11.000 2.000 1.858 
LEV 46.086 46.365 93.380 -219.290 22.827 
IND  0.315 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.465 
LIQD 1.157 0.880 7.960 0.230 0.909 
PROF 7.694 8.120 125.010 -75.900 12.637 
CSIZE 19.287 18.991 26.045 14.921 2.001 
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Table 4.  Correlations matrix of variables. 
 
 
Table 5 summarizes the regression results for the study variables. In regression 
Model A, only the control variables are included in the analysis. In regression 
Model B, C and D, disclosure is regressed against all control variables and gender 
diversity variables of FCEO, FCFO and FBOD respectively. In all models, the F 
values are significant at the 0.1% level a result indicating that these models are 
highly significant and hence have a good explanatory power of disclosure. The 
results of the VIF (not included in the regressions) in all the models also indicate 
that there are no collinearity problems as indicated by VIFs below 2. The varia-
bles in the models (A, B, C and D) when regressed on TD produce adjusted R2s of 
0.196, 0.194, 0.222 and 0.198 respectively. The results from Model C show that 
the variable FCFO is positive and significantly associated with voluntary disclo-
sure (at 0.1% level). In Model B, the coefficient for the FCEO variable is not in 
the expected direction as the results indicate a negative but insignificant relation-
ship between FCEO and voluntary disclosure while Model D results show a posi-
tive but insignificant relationship with voluntary disclosure. The negative result 
on FCEO and disclosure can be explained by CEO preferences towards corporate 
information disclosure. This is in line with the report by Amernic and Craig 
(2007) who reported that “some CEOs have found the communication of public 
information to be troublesome”. 
All corporate characteristic variables in the regression contain the signs predicted 
by this study although board size (BSIZE) and profitability (PROF) are not statis-
tically significant in the regression results. The three control variables of leverage 
(LEV), industry (IND), and firm size (CSIZE) are found positive and statistically 
significant at 5% and 0.1% levels for all models. Company liquidity is also signif-
icant at 5% in all the models but has a negative relationship with disclosure.  
 
  
The table presents Pearson correlations for the study variables where TD (the dependent variable) is the total number of items voluntarily disclosed by 
the firm, BSIZE is total number of board members, LEV is ratio of equity to total assets, IND is 1 if the company is in the manufacturing industry and 0 
otherwise, LIQD is the quick ratio, PROF is return on invested capital, CSIZE is logarithm of assets, FCEO set to 1 if Chief Executive Officer is 
female, FCFO set to 1 if Chief Financial Officer is female and FBOD the proportion of female board members (at least 1 female board member). ** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
  TD FCEO FCFO BSIZE FBOD LEV IND LIQD PROF 
FCEO -0.013         
FCFO 0.158** 0.004        
BSIZE 0.155** 0.131* -0.053       
FBOD 0.127* -0.044 0.085 0.107      
LEV 0.108 -0.012 0.047 0.090 0.100     
IND 0.235** -0.016 -0.057 -0.067 0.022 -0.086    
LIQD -0.179** -0.077 -0.030 -0.070 -0.067 0.337** -0.117*   
PROF 0.144** -0.002 0.109* 0.088 0.134* 0.496** -0.075 0.045  
CSIZE 0.310** 0.009 -0.019 0.304** 0.058 -0.019 -0.120* -0.243** 0.128* 
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Table 5.  Regression results. 
 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
This study has investigated whether voluntary information disclosure in annual 
reports of 108 firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange for the period of 2008 
is associated with gender diversity represented by three groups of variables: fe-
male Chief Executive Office, female Chief Financial Officer and the proportion 
The table presents estimates of the versions of the following regression model: TDi =  Į +  ȕ1BSIZEi + 
ȕ2LEVi+ ȕ3INDi + Ǻ4LIQDi + ȕ5PROFi + ȕ6CSIZEi + Ǻ7DGENi + İi where TD is the total number of items 
voluntarily disclosed by the firm, BSIZE is total number of board members, LEV is ratio of equity to total 
assets, IND is 1 if the company is in the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise, LIQD is the quick ratio, 
PROF is return on invested capital, CSIZE is logarithm of assets, DGEN is the gender diversity variable 
measured as follows: FCEO set to 1 if Chief Executive Officer is female, FCFO set to 1 if Chief Financial 
Officer is female and FBOD the proportion of female board members (at least 1 female board member). 
The standard errors are as reported in parenthesis with ***, ** and * denoting statistical significance at the 
0.1%, 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D 
constant 16.663*** 16.784*** 14.897** 16.432*** 
 (5.016) (5.026) (4.960) (5.011) 
     
Firm characteristics    
BSIZE 0.292 0.312 0.344 0.262 
 (0.263) (0.266) (0.259) (0.264) 
LEV 0.059* 0.060* 0.059* 0.057* 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
IND 5.518*** 5.505*** 5.731*** 5.473*** 
 (1.016) (1.017) (1.001) (1.015) 
LIQD -1.259* -1.283* -1.157* -1.197* 
 (0.567) (0.570) (0.559) (0.568) 
PROF 0.041 0.041 0.027 0.036 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
CSIZE 1.351*** 1.344*** 1.380*** 1.350*** 
 (0.254) (0.255) (0.250) (0.254) 
     
Female representation    
FCEO  -1.032   
  (1.903)   
FCFO   3.721***  
   (1.090)  
FBOD    5.397 
    (3.894) 
     
R2 0.211 0.211 0.239 0.215 
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.194 0.222 0.198 
F-statistic 14.091*** 12.093*** 14.150*** 12.387*** 
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of females on the board of directors. Results based on the analysis indicate that 
only one variable namely female Chief Financial Officer (FCFO) is positive and 
significantly associated with voluntary disclosure in annual reports. The results 
therefore suggest that while voluntary disclosure of information is higher for 
those firms with a female Chief Financial Officer, those that are highly leveraged, 
bigger in size and falling under the manufacturing industry, it is lower for firms 
with female Chief Executive Officers and higher liquidity levels.  
The negative sign revealed by the results on the gender diversity measurement 
variable of FCEO could be explained by the differences in the roles played by 
company CEO in the disclosure process. This finding may indicate, therefore, that 
company CEOs as compared to CFOs are more involved in corporate strategic 
planning matters than they are with preparation of company reports and therefore 
have less influence on the information disclosed in the reports. Overall, the results 
suggest that gender diversity is one of the attributes influencing the extent of vol-
untary information disclosures in annual reports as indicated by the positive re-
sults from the two gender diversity variables of FCFO and FBOD. 
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ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DISCLOSURE, 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND GENDER DIVERSITY: 
FINNISH EVIDENCE* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this study is to analyze the relationships between disclosure, gender diversity in 
management, and financial distress. Three research hypotheses are presented. First, a negative 
relationship between annual statement information disclosure and financial distress is assumed. 
Second, it is assumed that a negative relationship exists between gender diversity and financial 
distress. Third, a positive relationship between gender diversity and disclosure is assumed. The 
hypotheses are presented in the form of a structural equation model (SEM). The model is estimat-
ed by the maximum likelihood (ML) method using AMOS 16. The sample consists of firms listed 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the year 2008. The data include 208 firm-year observa-
tions. Financial distress is measured by the probability model of payment default estimated by a 
logistic regression analysis for a large sample of firms. The results show that disclosure is affected 
by board size and industry. It is also strongly negatively affected by financial distress. The female 
CEO dummy has a positive effect on distress probability, which contradicts the research hypothe-
sis. However, female members on the board and female CFOs have a positive effect on disclosure 
as hypothesized. In addition, female members on the board diminish distress probability. Thus, 
what holds for a female CEO, may not hold for female participation on the board. 
 
Key words: disclosure, distress, gender diversity, SEM, Finnish firms 
 
 
 
1 Introduction  
The need for corporate transparency and information disclosure has been on the 
rise in the last decades. This need has significantly followed the rise of corporate 
failures during this period as it is important that the stakeholders of firms get 
timely and reliable information to identify any signs of failure. Beller (2003) at-
tributes this rise to lack of liquidity by companies hence causing them to become 
bankrupt and thereby endangering their continued operations. For decades, corpo- 
 
 
___________________ 
 
*  The essay is under review in the Journal of Accounting and Economics. The essay was pre-
sented at the Global Conference on Business and Finance, 2010 Workshop on Auditing and 
Financial Accounting and the 2010 International Journal of Arts & Sciences Conference. The 
author is thankful for the statistical analysis help and valuable comments provided by Profes-
sor Erkki K. Laitinen, helpful comments by the anonymous referees and the participants at the 
conferences/workshops where this work was presented.  
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rate financial distress1 as a business failure phenomenon has received tremendous 
attention from academia, legal entities, creditors, investors and other corporate 
stakeholders (e.g. Altman 1993; Wruck 1990; Laitinen 2005; Whitaker 1999; Bel-
ler 2003; Laitinen and Kankaanpää 1999; Altman and Hotchkiss 2006; Balcaen 
and Ooghe 2006; Lensberg et al. 2006; Holder-Webb and Cohen 2007). Financial 
distress arises when a company is unable to meet its debts resulting in the demand 
for repayment of the company’s debts by its creditors. In such undesirable situa-
tions, the implications are increases in default risk, bankruptcy risk and uncertain-
ty risk about the firm’s future cash flows (Holder-Webb and Cohen 2007).  
The prospect of financial distress has powerful constraints for management as it 
presents restrictions in their abilities during information disclosures. This is relat-
ed to the fact that, despite the existence of disclosure laws for example, company 
and stock market laws that require companies to disclose information representa-
tive of their operations, company managers may overlook these laws and regula-
tions when disclosures may signal negative or undesirable information to the ex-
ternal users and thus resort to disclosing inadequate and or misrepresentative in-
formation (Holder-Webb and Cohen 2007). With such a background on financial 
distress, most studies have focused on failure prediction with little attention on 
what happens to information disclosures during periods when companies are dis-
tressed. 
 
Corporate management is responsible for company success and failure in general. 
This is partly evidenced in the penalties management has faced as a result of cor-
porate financial difficulties. Company successes and failures have been linked to 
management characteristics such as gender diversity (du Rietz and Henreksen 
2000). In fact, there exists a vast amount of corporate governance literature exists 
which investigates aspects related to corporate disclosure, gender diversity of 
directors and firm performance (e.g. Huafang and Jianguo 2007; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2002; Rose 2007; Erhardt et al. 2003). Most of this literature has revealed 
that existence of significant relationships exist between the studied characteristics. 
Despite this development in financial accounting literature, no study has been 
conducted on the relationship that may exist between corporate distress, disclo-
sure, and the important governance issue of gender diversity within company 
management.  
                                               
 
1  Wruck (1990) defines financial distress as cash flow insuffiecient to cover obligations. As-
quith et al (1994) define financial distress as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EDITDA) less than 80 percent of interest expense. The definition by Asquith et 
al. (1994) does not incorporate scheduled principal reduction. 
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This study is therefore motivated by this prevailing research gap and the increas-
ing emphasis on the disclosure of accurate and adequate information by regula-
tion. The objective of this study is twofold. First, the study investigates the rela-
tionship that might exist between corporate financial distress and disclosure2. 
Secondly, the study investigates how gender diversity of directors is connected 
with financial distress and disclosure. This study particularly investigates volun-
tary disclosures in annual reports of the sample companies.  
 
To investigate the association between disclosure, financial distress and gender 
diversity of company management, the study uses a sample of firms listed on the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange during the year 2008. The results of the study indicate 
that disclosure is negatively affected by financial distress, the Chief Executive 
Officer female measure has a positive effect on financial distress and a negative 
effect on disclosure, female representation on the board of directors has a nega-
tive effect on financial distress, female representation on the board of directors 
and female Chief Financial Officer have a positive effect on disclosure and board 
size and industry positively affect disclosure. These results indicate that disclo-
sure is affected by these study variables as mentioned above in addition to the 
factors examined in previous studies such as firm size, culture and auditor type to 
mention a few. 
 
The study is organized as follows. In Section 1, the objective and background of 
the  study  were  presented.  Section  2  presents  a  brief  discussion  of  the  Finnish  
business and regulatory environment, reviews prior literature and presents the 
three research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and methods used in the 
study and in Section 4 the results and a short  discussion of the findings are pre-
sented. The last section provides the summary of the effect of gender diversity 
and financial distress on the extent of voluntary disclosures in annual reports.  
                                               
 
2  The study particularly focuses on voluntary disclosure which is the information provided over 
and above that required by regulations governing disclosure. 
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2 Literature review and hypothesis development  
2.1 Disclosure and distress 
The information disclosure decision is one of the ways in which companies com-
municate corporate information to their internal and external environment. One of 
the reasons for information disclosure is to provide traditional information user 
groups such as shareholders, creditors, financial analysts, debtors, government 
and security consultants with information useful to them when making investment 
and regulatory decisions (Cooke 1989). Globally, legislations governing compa-
nies (for example in Finland the Helsinki Stock Exchange rules and the Finnish 
Companies Act) require that company disclosures represent a true and fair view 
of company operations so as to facilitate future investment decision making by 
the stakeholders. It is however evident that in many situations companies fail to 
comply with the prevailing legal requirements leading to corporate problems 
some of which have resulted into corporate failures as evidenced in the last dec-
ades.  
Existing literature documents that in the last decades corporate failures have oc-
curred at higher rates after the decade of the 1930s (Charitou et al. 2004). A good 
and prominent example of these failures is that of Enron whose disclosures were 
not adequate and transparent enough to represent the economic reality of the 
company (Cunningham and Harris 2006). Although an economic system as de-
fined by Altman (1993) is the continuous entrance and exit of production entities 
as natural components, business failures present unfavorable costs to society such 
as the establishment of laws and procedures for reasons such as the protection of 
contractual rights of interested parties and (2) prior evidence shows that the mar-
ket value of the distressed firm declines substantially (Warner 1977) hence, inves-
tors, creditors, suppliers, management and company employees are severely af-
fected 
 
The onset of corporate distress affects the information asymmetry between com-
pany directors and information users. For example, investors face estimation risk 
as the future cash flows become more uncertain, managerial reputations suffer, 
suppliers risk the loss of a customer, customers may seek other suppliers, and 
lenders are likely to increase the cost of borrowing to combat increasing default 
risk (Wruck 1990; Whitaker 1999). In situations where information is negative or 
performance is poor, management is faced with difficulties in abiding by the eth-
ics of their obligation to disclose sufficient and full information (Holder-Webb 
and Cohen 2007). Managers therefore tend to influence this information in order 
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to meet their financial obligations and abide by the debt agreements that are set by 
lenders (Lambert 2001). This breach of debt agreements would be a negative sig-
nal to the performance of the company and hence have negative implications for 
the reliability of the firm. For example, the Enron corporation scandal revealed 
that the company provided insufficient disclosures with respect to its debts and 
losses causing doubt to not only investors who were in significant need of reas-
surance but also other information users such as analysts regarding the true repre-
sentation of the company performance.  
 
The behavior of managers may sometimes be opportunistic implying that their 
corporate goals may be in contradiction to stakeholders’ interests (Weil et al. 
2006). It is further alleged that company annual reports do not always comply 
with disclosure requirements stipulated by regulatory bodies, resulting in insuffi-
cient disclosures by companies (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Hossain 2000). It is 
thus clear from such evidence as well as from regulatory and practitioner litera-
ture that during situations when firms are undergoing difficulties, they are most 
likely to communicate information that is not representative of the companies. It 
is therefore assumed that during these difficult situations, companies are less like-
ly to increase or provide a lot of information in excess of what is required. On the 
contrary, sometimes managers may attempt to provide a more complete set of 
information as a function of ethical considerations (Holder-Webb and Cohen 
2007: 304). Based on the above discussion, this study hypothesizes as below: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the extent of information disclosure 
and financial distress.  
2.2 Gender diversity and distress 
There is a large amount of gender related research in financial accounting litera-
ture with much of it focusing on the influence of gender diversity and female rep-
resentation on performance, contribution of female directors to company boards 
and financial decision-making issues (e.g. Meier-Pesti and Penz 2008; Huse and 
Solberg 2006; Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003; Eckel and Grossman 2002; 
Watson 2002; Powell and Ansic 1997). Company performance is generally con-
sidered to be depicted as, “success or failure” and sometimes “good or poor” as 
companies can either perform as one of each of the two. Poor or failing company 
performance can be measured by company ratios such as profitability, liquidity 
and leverage ratios all of which are indicators of corporate financial distress.  
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Gender diversity and female representation at corporate management levels have 
received a tremendous amount of attention. An important question is why diversi-
ty? There are theoretical arguments as to why diversity can be related to the agen-
cy theory which relates to the moral obligation by boards to shareholders (Carver 
2002) and stakeholders (Keasey et al. 1997). This theory presents the board’s 
monitoring role in its stewardship capacity in protecting shareholders’ interests 
(like shareholders’ value) from management self-interests. The theory highlights 
the issue of the influence of board composition on organizational performance 
and the impact of corporate leadership style. Moreover, prior research highlights 
that corporate managers and other parties interested in good governance believe 
in the existence of a positive relationship between board diversity and shareholder 
value (e.g. Carter et al. 2003). In addition to the evidence in existing psychology 
literature justifying the existence of gender differences in decision making, Carter 
et al. (2003) argue that gender diversity produces more effective problem-solving 
as the variety of perspectives that emerge cause decision-makers to evaluate more 
alternatives and carefully explore the consequences of these alternatives during 
the decision-making process. 
Studies investigating the relationship between board diversity and firm value as 
well as firm performances have had mixed results. The study by Erhardt (2003) 
finds a positive relationship between the percentage of women and minorities on 
boards of directors and return on assets and return on investment. Catalyst (2004) 
examines corporate performance and gender diversity in top management teams. 
The Catalyst (2004) focuses on a sample of 353 Fortune 500 companies and finds 
that companies with a higher representation of women on their top management 
teams had higher total return to shareholders and return on equity. On the contra-
ry, some studies have found no significant relationship between gender diversity 
as well as female representation on the board and firm performance (e.g. Watson 
2002; Rose 2007).  
Another stream of psychology research has been directed to the differences that 
exist between men and women in risk perceptions and tolerance. Most of these 
studies have stemmed from psychology literature and examined relationships be-
tween gender differences in relation to financial decision-making, revealing that a 
difference exists between women and men. Many of the studies report that wom-
en to have lower risk preferences than men, for example when making investment 
decisions than men (e.g. Meier-Pesti and Penz 2008; Eckel and Grossman 2002; 
Powell and Ansic 1997; Johnson and Powell 1994; Stinerock et al. 1991), report 
lower willingness to accept financial risk (Barsky et al. 1997), have a higher de-
gree of anxiety when making financial decisions and a stronger desire to use fi-
nancial advisors (Stinerock et al. 1991).  
 Acta Wasaensia     93 
On the basis of prevailing literature, this study assumes that gender diversity is 
likely  to  have  an  influence  on  distress.  For  example,  the  risk  aversion  nature  of  
women depicted during financial decision-making and investment will reduce the 
chances of a company taking on risky financial decisions and engaging in risky 
business choices, thereby reducing the company’s probability of distress. Moreo-
ver, considering the advantages that come with diversity and/or female represen-
tation in management, reductions in distress situations of companies are likely to 
be witnessed. This study hypothesizes as below 
H2: There is a negative relationship between gender diversity and financial dis-
tress. 
2.3 Gender diversity and disclosure 
Over the past years, studies in financial accounting have investigated issues relat-
ed to gender diversity and female representation sometimes referred to as female 
participation both on board and in top management. These studies have examined 
themes such as the importance of gender diversity in corporate governance (e.g. 
Huse and Solberg 2006; Burke 2000) and the relationship between gender diversi-
ty and performance (e.g. Erhardt et al. 2003; Peni 2011; Siciliano 1996). The 
findings by Huse and Solberg (2006) reveal that the starting point for women on 
board decision-making processes does not only take place only within the board-
room but also before,  during and after meetings as well  as outside the meetings.  
This indicates that women spend more time preparing for company meetings and 
are therefore more prepared than men and consequently more likely to make bet-
ter decisions and improve timely information flow. This study is in line with the 
argument raised by Burke (2000) that “increasing women’s board presence en-
riches board information, perspectives, debate and decision making”. In the stud-
ies by Erhardt et al. (2003) and Siciliano (1996) both found a positive relationship 
between gender diversity and firm performance when they investigated the rela-
tionship between board of director diversity and firm financial performance for 
large US companies and the relationship of board member diversity to organiza-
tional performance respectively. Peni (2011) reveals that whereas female CEOs 
and board chairs have a positive impact on the overall quality of corporate gov-
ernance, CFO gender has no influence on the general governance practices of the 
firm. The findings from her study suggest that CEOs and chairwomen have the 
largest influence on those governance attributes related to the board of directors.   
Prior literature on gender diversity and female participation in top management 
goes beyond documenting the existence of  differences between men and women 
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for example in terms of skills related to communication, decision-making and risk 
taking to highlighting the benefits arising from diversity. This literature empha-
sizes that diversity may benefit the board’s decision making process as new per-
ceptions on various issues are presented and combined with a mutual exchange of 
ideas stemming from board members with dispersed backgrounds and experience 
(e.g. Alvarez and McCaffery 2000). In relation to practitioner-oriented and social 
psychology literature, Ginsberg (1994) highlights that female participation in sen-
ior management leads to better firm performance. He attributes this to the female 
management style that encourages collaboration and fosters creativity. He further 
adds that the female participation effect should be significant when collaboration 
and creativity are important and thus more relevant to the activities of the top 
management team. Moreover, Wajcman (1988) points out that in addition to 
women having better multi-tasking skills than men, they seem to have better 
communicative capabilities. These communication capabilities in particular can 
be used to justify women as being more aware of the importance of good commu-
nication and more successful in making communication effective during infor-
mation disclosure decision-making processes.  
Given that diversity and female participation are important aspects in corporate 
governance and affect performance, and also that disclosure is an “…accounting 
activity involving both human and non-human resources or techniques as well as 
the interaction of the two” (Perera 1994: 268), it can be assumed that the ad-
vantages arising from diversity for example communication skills, team-working 
and mutual exchange of ideas among directors of different backgrounds improve 
disclosure decision-making and thereby influence information disclosure deci-
sions. It is therefore hypothesized as below:  
H3: There is a positive relationship between gender diversity and the extent of 
disclosure. 
3 Data and methods  
3.1 Data 
The population of this study is made up of companies listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange during the year 2008. The initial sample of the study is 132 companies. 
Following prior research such as Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Akhtaruddin (2005), 
this study is limited to non-financial companies and therefore excludes 13 finan-
cial institutions as, by law, these have different disclosure requirements. Further-
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more the study eliminates 49 companies with insufficient data for carrying out the 
study analysis. The remaining 70 companies representing a proportion of 58.8% 
and 53% of the total population of non-financial companies and companies listed 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, respectively, comprise the final sample for this 
study. The data used in this study is for the fiscal years 2005 to 2007 and covers 
208 firm-year observations. It is realized that these kinds of panel data may cause 
problems due to stable characteristics of cases (fixed effects). However, when 
estimating the model for each year separately, the conclusions were not notably 
different.  
The two main data sources for the study are the company annual reports for the 
years 2006 and 2007 and the Thomson Financial Worldscope database.  The an-
nual reports are used for collection of data on gender diversity, board size and 
items voluntarily disclosed by the sample companies. The Thomson Financial 
Worldscope database is used for collection of other study variables data such as 
firm industry, leverage, liquidity and profitability used in the distress measure. 
This study uses annual reports because as stated by Gray (1995), the annual report 
is viewed as the major official and legal document that a firm produces on a regu-
lar basis and acts as a significant forum for the presentation of the firm’s commu-
nication with political, social and economic systems. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Disclosure 
In related accounting research, both weighted (Botosan 1997; Buzby 1974; Eng et 
al. 2001) and unweighted (Akhtaruddin 2005; Archambault 2003; Cooke 1989; 
Owusu-Ansah 1998; Raffournier 1995) disclosure indexes have been used to 
measure disclosure in annual reports.  Both approaches to measuring disclosure 
have their weaknesses for example, using an unweighted disclosure index has 
been criticized for its fundamental assumption that all items are equally important 
to all information users and the use of a weighted disclosure index has been criti-
cized because it may introduce a bias towards a particular user-orientation.   
Following the view by Wallace (1988) that all disclosed items are equally im-
portant to the average users, this study uses the unweighted disclosure index ap-
proach. Under this approach, attention is given to all users of annual reports rather 
than particular user groups.  It has also been argued that unweighted scores reduce 
subjectivity and may be considered the norm in annual report studies (Ahmed and 
Courtis 1999: 36).  In this study therefore, voluntary information disclosures in 
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annual reports for the years 2006 and 2007 are considered and items are numeri-
cally  scored  on  a  dichotomous  basis.   A  score  of  one  is  assigned  if  a  company  
discloses a voluntary item and 0 for non-disclosure of the item.  The total disclo-
sure (TD) score for each company is therefore 
 
 
¦
 
 
m
i
ij dTD
1
                                             (1) 
where di is 1 if an item is disclosed and 0 if not; m is the number of voluntary 
items disclosed in the annual reports (here m=73). 
3.2.2 Gender diversity and control variables 
The study uses three variables for measuring gender diversity for each firm as 
follows: 1) female Chief Executive Officer (FCEO) is set equal to 1 if Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer is female (0 otherwise), 2) female Chief Financial Officer (FCFO) 
is set equal to 1 if Chief Financial Officer is female (0 otherwise), and (3) female 
board members (FBOD) is the proportion of female board members. In addition 
to the gender test variables, the study further controls for the effects of board size 
(BSIZE) and industry (IND) variables that have been found in prior research to 
have an influence on the amount of information voluntarily disclosed by compa-
nies. BSIZE is measured as the number of board members, IND is set equal to 1 if 
manufacturing company (0 otherwise).  
3.2.3 Financial distress 
In this study, financial distress is expressed as payment default probability 
(DPROB). It is measured as a function of the three traditional distress dimensions 
of profitability, leverage, and liquidity (Laitinen and Kankaanpää 1999; Altman 
and Hotchkiss 2006; Balcaen and Ooghe 2006; Lensberg et al. 2006). In addition, 
size  is  used  to  control  for  the  size  effect  on  the  distress  estimate  which  is  im-
portant in this study (see below). Profitability is here measured by the return on 
investment ratio3, leverage by the equity to total assets ratio, liquidity by the 
quick ratio, and size by the logarithm of total assets. Empirically, these ratios 
have proved to be the most significant measures for the dimension in question 
                                               
 
3  The ratio indicates relative profitability that is to say return, which has been obtained for the 
capital invested in the company and requiring interest or other returns. The ratio is independ-
ent from lines of business. 
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(Laitinen and Kankaanpää 1999; Altman and Hotchkiss 2006; Balcaen and Ooghe 
2006; Ugurlu and Aksoy 2006; Lensberg et al. 2006). Moreover, additional di-
mensions or measures did not bring incremental value for distress measurement. 
The distress measure is estimated by the (binary) logistic regression analysis 
(LRA). LRA makes it possible to create a score (logit) L for every firm. It is as-
sumed that the independent variables are linearly related to L4. This score is used 
to determine the conditional probability of distress (default) p(i,X) for a firm i as 
follows: 
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   (2) 
where bj (j=0,…,n) are coefficients and n is the number of independent variables 
xj (j=1,…, n). The logistic regression (LR) model is estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method in  SPSS.  The  significance  of  the  coefficients  is  tested  by  the  
Wald test statistic. 
 
The data extracted from the Helsinki Stock Exchange are too small to derive a 
statistically reliable measure for distress. Therefore, large random data from Finn-
ish firms are applied to estimate the coefficients in (2)5. For estimation, a random 
sample of 1500 default firms and 1500 non-default firms are selected to make the 
weights of non-default and default firms equal6. The total classification accuracy 
of the LR model estimated for the last (available) annual statements before default 
is 72.5% in the estimation sample and 71.3%7 in the holdout sample. Table 1 pre-
sents the coefficients of the estimated model. This logistic model is applied to 
calculate DPROB for the disclosure sample firms according to (2).  
                                               
 
4  It is important to note that the Hosmer and Lemeshow test shows that the relationship is not 
linear (p value0.001). However, in validity tests with test data and in cross validation 
(Lachenbruch) it did not affect the validity of the risk measure (probability of default). In con-
clusion, the probability of default provides very good measure of risk to fail. 
5  These data include a representative sample of Finnish firms that published their annual finan-
cial statements during the accounting years 2002-2003. The original data included annual fi-
nancial statements from 64164 firms supplied by Suomen Asiakastieto Oy (http://www. 
asiakastieto.fi) for research purposes. The (registered) payment default used as an event here 
is emerged after the end of 2003 but before 31 December 2004 (event period).  
6  For the equal groups, the cut-off value is 50% which is technically desirable, since the LRA 
assumes that midranges of probability are more sensitive to changes of values in independent 
variables. 
7  Although the majority of firms in the sample are small and middle-sized firms, statistical tests 
show that the classification accuracy was at the same level also for larger firms such as in our 
sample from Helsinki Stock Exchange firms. 
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Table 1.  The logistic financial distress measurement model (N= 1500+1500). 
 
3.2.4 Hypothesis testing 
In order to test the three research hypotheses, the study employs the use of struc-
tural equation modelling (SEM). This model is credited for its ability to analyse 
relationships for many variables in a single analysis, and to provide significance 
of variables in the model as well as provide overall model fit measures (Baines 
and Langfield-Smith 2003).  Figure 1 shows the structural model to be estimated. 
The first research hypothesis H1 assumes that distress probability has a negative 
effect on disclosure measured by TD. The second hypothesis H2 assumes that 
gender diversity has a negative effect on the distress probability. Finally, the third 
hypothesis H3 assumes that gender diversity has a direct positive effect on disclo-
sure. Thus, it is assumed that gender diversity has both a direct and indirect effect 
on disclosure.  
 
BSIZE is the number of people on the board, FBOD is the proportion of female board members, 
FCEO is Female Chief Executive Officer dummy (1 if yes, 0 if no), FCFO is female Chief Finan-
cial Officer dummy (1 if yes, 0 if no), IND is industry dummy (1 if manufacturing firm, 0 if oth-
erwise), TD is the Total Disclosure Score, DPROB is the probability of default (distress measure) 
and lnDPROB is the natural logarithm of DPROB. 
 
Figure 1. The research hypotheses as a structural equation model (SEM).  
 
Variable Coefficient St. Deviation Wald stat. Significance 
Logarithm of total assets -0.22704 0.02499 82.56076 0.00000 
Return on investment -0.00324 0.00104 9.69094 0.00185 
Quick ratio -0.03153 0.01100 8.21486 0.00415 
Equity ratio -0.02353 0.00146 260.87561 0.00000 
Constant 3.51636 0.30923 129.30496 0.00000 
 
-H2 
+H3 
TD 
lnDPROB 
FBOD 
FCFO 
FCEO 
BSIZE 
 
IND 
-H1 
 Acta Wasaensia     99 
The statistical estimation of the SEM in Figure 1 is made with the AMOS 16 sta-
tistical package. In this estimation, the maximum likelihood (ML) method is used. 
The significance of the relationships is statistically tested by the test on the basis 
of the critical ratio (parameter estimate divided by standard error). The goodness 
of fit of the SEM in explaining TD and lnDPROB is assessed by the minimum 
sample discrepancy for the model. In addition, the multiple coefficients of corre-
lation between TD and lnDPROB and their predictors are used (for statistical 
tests, see Baines and Langfield-Smith 2003: 686-687). Many authors regard the 
significance level of 0.05 for discrepancy as an adequate fit of overall model (Ba-
gozze and Yi 1988; Bentler 1989). The fit can be assessed also by the ratio of 
discrepancy to the degrees of freedom (normal chi-square). Matsueda (1982) has 
recommended that a ratio less than 4 should be considered a good fit. However, 
some researchers allow as large as 5 as being an adequate fit. Because the data do 
not conform to a joint multivariate normal distribution, the chi-square test statistic 
of overall model fit may be inflated, and the standard errors used to test the signif-
icance of parameter estimates may be deflated. Therefore, the SEM was also es-
timated by the generalized least squares (GLS) method for comparison. It gave 
almost identical results (not reported here). 
4 Results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Panel  1  of  Table  2  presents  descriptive  statistics  for  the  variables  TD,  FCEO,  
FCFO, FBOD, BSIZE, IND, and DPROB. In general, the variables do not have a 
skew distribution except for FCEO and DPROB. The distributions of these varia-
bles also show a high kurtosis. FCEO is a binary dummy variable that is highly 
skewed if the frequency of events in the sample is small. In order to normalize 
DPROB a natural logarithmic transformation is made to get lnDPROB (see Table 
2). This transformation leads to a symmetric distribution. Therefore, lnDPROB is 
applied in estimations instead of DPROB.  
Panel 2 of Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the model varia-
bles. The correlations are generally small and below 0.10. The highest correlation 
0.898 is found between DPROB and its transformation lnDPROB. The next high-
est correlation is 0.396 and it is found between FBOD and FCEO. DPROB and 
lnDPROB also have high negative correlations between BSIZE and TD. As ex-
pected, all variables except FCEO have the expected signs and are strongly and 
significantly correlated with TD. 
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables. 
 
4.2 Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) results 
Table 3 presents the statistical significance of the relationships and the goodness 
of fit measures for the model. The normal chi-square (discrepancy divided by 
degrees of freedom) exceeds 6 and does not refer to a good fit with the data. Fig-
ure 2 shows the estimated SEM with statistically significant relationships between 
the variables. The control variables IND and BSIZE have a significant effect on 
TD as expected. In addition, empirical evidence to some degree supports the re-
search hypotheses. However, there are a couple of exceptions. First, evidence 
strongly  supports  H1,  since  lnDPROB  has  a  significant  negative  effect  on  TD.  
Second, FBOD has a negative effect on lnDPROB, which supports H2. However, 
FCFO has no statistically significant effect on lnDPROB. Furthermore, FCEO has 
a positive effect on lnDPROB at the 0.1 level, which contradicts with H2. Third, 
FBOD and FCFO have a significant positive effect on TD conforming H3. On the 
 
Table 2 panels 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in the study 
respectively. BSIZE is the number of people in board, FBOD is the proportion of female board members, 
FCEO  is  Female  Chief  Executive  Officer  dummy  (1  if  yes,  0  if  no),  FCFO  is  Female  Chief  Financial  
Officer dummy (1 if yes, 0 if no), IND is industry dummy (1 if manufacturing firm, 0 if otherwise), TD is 
the Total Disclosure Score, DPROB is the probability of default (distress measure) and lnDPROB is the 
natural logarithm of DPROB. **, * represent correlation significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level 
respectively. 
 
Panel 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
BSIZE  2.0000 11.0000  5.9400 1.7820 0.4340  0.5920 
FBOD  0.0000  0.6667  0.0957 0.1212 1.2230  1.7520 
FCEO  0.0000  1.0000  0.0400 0.1930 4.8350 21.5840 
FCFO  0.0000  1.0000  0.2400 0.4280 1.2240 -0.5070 
IND  0.0000  1.0000  0.3200 0.4680 0.7670 -1.4260 
TD 29.0000 71.0000 47.8900 9.1480 0.0570 -0.8280 
DPROB  0.0200  0.6700  0.1307 0.0822 2.8850 13.7770 
lnDPROB -3.9600 -0.4100 -2.1840 0.5404 0.0300  0.8100 
 
Panel 2. Correlation coefficients. 
 Variable BSIZE FBOD FCEO FCFO IND TD DPROB 
FBOD 0.127        
FCEO 0.133 0.396**       
FCFO -0.039  0.079  0.005      
IND -0.036 -0.088  0.023 -0.051    
TD  0.233** 0.195** -0.041  0.208** 0.236**    
DPROB -0.360** -0.169*  0.011 -0.020 0.134 -0.305**  
lnDPROB -0.351** -0.143*  0.049  0.024 0.191** -0.297** 0.898** 
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contrary, FCEO has a negative effect on TD, which contradicts to H3. The stand-
ardized total  effects of both FBOD and FCFO on TD are positive but for FCEO 
this effect is negative (and almost of the same size as the direct effect). The signs 
of the FCEO effect on TD and lnDPROB are robust. They did not change the sign 
on the 90% confidence interval in bootstrapping when 200 subsamples were used 
to test the parameter value. 
 
Table 3.  ML estimation results for the SEM. 
 
  
Table  3  reports  the  ML  results  for  the  SEM.  BSIZE  is  the  number  of  people  in  board,  FBOD  is  the  
proportion of female board members, FCEO is Female Chief Executive Officer dummy (1 if yes, 0 if no), 
FCFO  is  Female  Chief  Financial  Officer  dummy  (1  if  yes,  0  if  no),  IND  is  industry  dummy  (1  if  
manufacturing firm, 0 if otherwise), TD is the Total Disclosure Score, DPROB is the probability of default 
(distress measure) and lnDPROB is the natural logarithm of DPROB. *** represents significance at the 
0.001 level. 
 
Panel 1. Regression weights (ML). 
Variable Direction 
of effect Variable Estimate 
Standard 
error 
Critical 
ratio Sig. 
Standardized 
estimate 
lnDPROB ĸ FCFO 0.049 0.086 0.570 0.569 0.039 
lnDPROB ĸ FCEO 0.355 0.209 1.701 0.089 0.125 
lnDPROB ĸ FBOD -0.876 0.333 -2.632 0.009 -0.194 
TD ĸ FCFO 4.732 1.263 3.746 *** 0.216 
TD ĸ FCEO -6.452 3.092 -2.086 0.037 -0.132 
TD ĸ lnDPROB -4.688 1.100 -4.262 *** -0.272 
TD ĸ BSIZE 0.762 0.327 2.332 0.020 0.144 
TD ĸ IND 6.376 1.175 5.426 *** 0.318 
TD ĸ FBOD 15.220 4.942 3.080 0.002 0.196 
 
Panel 2. Standardized total effects. 
Variable FBOD FCEO FCFO IND BSIZE lnDPROB 
lnDPROB -0.194 0.125 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TD 0.249 -0.166 0.205 0.318 0.144 -0.272 
 
Panel 3. Goodness of fit measures. 
R2 : lnDPROB 0.055 
R2 : TD  0.3234 
Discrepancy     79.4955 
Discrepancy/DF       6.6246 
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BSIZE is the number of people in board, FBOD is the proportion of female board members, 
FCEO is Female Chief Executive Officer dummy (1 if yes, 0 if no), FCFO is Female Chief Finan-
cial Officer dummy (1 if yes, 0 if no), IND is industry dummy (1 if manufacturing firm, 0 if oth-
erwise), TD is the Total Disclosure Score, DPROB is the probability of default (distress measure) 
and lnDPROB is the natural logarithm of DPROB. ***, **, *,† represent effect significance at 
0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
Figure 2.  The estimated structural equation model with significant effects.  
There are a number of possible explanations for the negative effect of FCEO on 
TD. First, the tension that arises as managers must balance their personal desires 
to avoid “looking bad” with their ethical obligations to provide stakeholders with 
the information they require in order to make informed decisions (Holder-Webb 
and Cohen 2007: 02). For a female CEO, the desire to avoid “looking bad” may 
be stronger than for a male CEO, since she may have more stress to manage the 
firm successfully. Second, the possibility of a disappearance of the female man-
agement style that lies in encouraging working together among peers in the CEO 
position which can be argued to have no peer. Lastly, because of the existence of 
different forms of discrimination, women need to be “that much better” relative to 
men in order to make it to top executive positions (Eagle and Johannessen-
Schmidl 2007). FCEOs may, in this case prefer to disclose less information in 
order  to  favor  their  position  abilities  to  avoid  replacement  by  the  board.  This  is  
possible in situations where the CEO has greater power to influence decisions 
during the decision-making process as compared to other company executives. 
 
 
+0.14* +0.20** 
+0.13† 
-0.13* 
-0.19** 
+H3 
TD 
lnDPROB 
FBOD 
FCFO 
FCEO 
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IND 
-H1 
+0.32*** +0.22*** 
-0.27*** 
R2 = 0.32 
R2 = 0.06 
-H2 
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The  positive  effect  of  FCEO  on  lnDPROB  can  be  explained  by  (1)  the  female  
underperformance hypothesis8 although it is often rejected (Du Rietz and Henrek-
son 2000). In fact, evidence on this hypothesis is not unanimous. 2. the “glass 
cliff” literature that argues that women are often more likely to be appointed into 
leadership positions in periods when organizations are already facing poor per-
formance (Bujaki and McConomy 2010; Ryan and Haslam 2005, 2007). In addi-
tion, women on the board may diminish distress probability as is shown by the 
strong  negative  effect  of  FBOD  on  lnDPROB.  Thus,  what  holds  for  a  female  
CEO, may not hold for female participation on the board. 
5 Summary 
This study examines the association between disclosure, financial distress and 
gender diversity. The data of the study were from companies listed on the Helsin-
ki Stock Exchange for during the year 2008. The results of the study provide evi-
dence that information disclosure decreases during times when companies are 
financially distressed. This result partly provides an explanation for the inade-
quate disclosures that have been evidenced around some corporate failures in the 
past years9.  The results also show that gender diversity measured by FBOD and 
FCFO increases disclosure while disclosure decreases when a female is company 
FCEO. With regards to gender diversity and distress, the result on FBOD reveals 
that distress reduces with more females on the board. FCEO has a negative but 
insignificant effect on distress. 
It is important to note that if the results on the positive effect of FCEO on distress 
and the negative effect on disclosure are explained by the issue of the centraliza-
tion of power in the hands of the CEO which was discussed earlier in the paper, 
these results present implications on decision-making10. Consistent with Sah and 
Stiglitz (1986, 1991), these results suggest that group decision-making is affected 
by power centralization. This is one of the reasons as to why governance literature 
advocates for the separation of the positions of CEO and board chairperson. 
                                               
 
8  According to Du Rietz and Henrekson (2000), the female underperformance hypothesis is 
stated as follows “all else being equal, female entrepreneurs tend to be less successful than 
their male counterparts in terms of conventional economic performance measures”. 
9  See for example The fall of Enron (Healy and Palepu 2003). 
10  As power becomes centralized that is, as the decision making power becomes centralized in 
the hands of few people, it becomes crucial to make clear-cut decision because of the pressure 
of time (Hage and Aiken 1967). 
104      Acta Wasaensia 
This study focused on public companies, and it would be interesting to conduct a 
study using data on private and small-sized companies to see whether the results 
are  consistent  with  a  sample  of  companies  of  a  different  size.  It  would  also  be  
interesting to investigate changes in disclosure before and during distress as well 
as during recovery from distress and compare what happens to disclosure during 
all the three periods.  
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ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AUDIT COMMITTEE 
COMPOSITION AND THE EXTENT OF 
DISCLOSURE: UK EVIDENCE* 
 
Abstract 
 
Drawing on prior empirical research on disclosure practices, this study examines the association 
between audit committee composition and disclosures pertaining to audit committees of a sample 
of UK listed companies. Audit committee composition is characterized by committee member 
independence and financial expertise. Disclosure is characterized by total, required and voluntary 
disclosure proxied by aggregate disclosure scores. The results show that in general the sample 
companies have responded adequately to the disclosure requirements by the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance and the Financial Services Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules. 
The results further show that committee member independence is associated with increases in 
total, required and voluntary disclosures. Committee member expertise is associated with total and 
required disclosures but not related to voluntary disclosure. In particular, the results reveal that 
audit committee independence and expertise improve conformity with regulation on audit commit-
tee disclosures. 
 
Key words: audit committees, corporate governance, disclosure. 
 
1 Introduction 
Corporate governance in general and audit committees (hereafter ACs) in particu-
lar have become an increasingly interesting area of focus for researchers (e.g. 
Bradbury 1990; Abbott et al. 2000; Archambeault and DeZoort 2001; Raghunan-
dan et al. 2001; Bédard et al. 2004; Anderson et al. 2004; DeZoort and Salterio 
2001; Beasley et al. 2000) and practitioners. The increasing focus was triggered 
by  the  corporate  scandals  in  the  early  years  of  the  century  (e.g.  Enron,  World-
Com), for which the response world-wide was regulatory oversight. It is evident 
that following these scandals, the regulatory oversight and the continuing interna-
tional call for transparency, there have been global regulatory developments on 
actions to improve corporate governance in general and “best practice” for ACs in 
particular. These developments have been based on the theoretical assumption 
that a relationship exists between corporate governance and “best practice” for 
ACs as well as between these two and information disclosures. Good examples of 
these regulatory developments include requirements set for all public companies 
to comprise ACs for example in the European Union (see Directive 2006/43/EC 
of the European Parliament  and  of  the council,  Article 41)  the  introduction  of 
__________________ 
 
*  The essay is under review in the Accounting and Business Research Journal. 
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corporate governance codes for example, the Financial Reporting Council (here-
after FRC) issued the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (hereafter 
CCCG) in the United Kingdom (hereafter UK) whilst  in the USA the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX) was introduced and the final New York Secu-
rities Exchange (hereafter NYSE) Corporate Governance Rules approved by the 
Securities Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC) on November 20031. The con-
cerns in governance codes such as that issued by the FRC are to promote corpo-
rate reporting and governance to improve company performance and facilitate 
efficient, effective and entrepreneurial management that can deliver higher share-
holder value. It is with such concerns that AC composition requirements are em-
phasized  for  all  companies  listed  on  the  Main  Market  of  the  London Stock  Ex-
change. 
While numerous studies have examined information disclosures in general (e.g. 
Chen and Jaggi 2000; Archamdault and Archamdault 2003; Akhtaruddin 2005; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2002) as well as relationships between disclosure and corpo-
rate governance actors such as board of directors (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke 2002; 
Lim et al. 2007), there is limited research linking ACs to disclosure (Carcello and 
Neal 2003; Carcello et al. 2002; Ho and Wong 2001). In particular, there is lim-
ited research examining the relationship that may exist between disclosures per-
taining to ACs and AC composition (Carcello et al. 2002). Considering the in-
creasing focus on ACs, and taking into account the financial reporting perspective 
that disclosures relating to ACs are important signals to the market about the 
company’s monitoring of their financial reporting and audit process, it is im-
portant to investigate the relationship that may exist between AC composition and 
AC related disclosure2.  
One  question  arising  is  why  AC  composition?  Prior  literature  has  revealed  the  
benefits corporate boards derive from having independent and financially experi-
enced directors. For example, according to Fama and Jensen (1983) higher pro-
portions of independent directors on corporate boards result in more effective 
board monitoring, hereby limiting managerial opportunism. Related to this, is the 
reason provided by Forker (1992) that inclusion of independent directors is seen 
                                               
 
1  The NYSE corporate governance rules are codified in sec. 303A of the Stock Exchange’s 
Listed Company Manual. 
2  Since earlier disclosure research has been conducted on all three information types namely; 
mandatory disclosure (e.g., Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Wallace et al. 1994), voluntary disclo-
sure (e.g., Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Botosan 1997; Depoers 2000) or both ( e.g., Buzby 
1975; Cooke 1992; Inchausti 1997; Naser and Nuseibeh 2003; Hassan et al. 2009), this study 
examines all three in order to get a broad  picture of the subject under investigation. 
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to improve firm’s compliance with regulation regarding disclosures and hence the 
comprehensiveness and quality of disclosures. Regarding director expertise, di-
rectors with financial experience are viewed to be more proactive in their moni-
toring, control and oversight activities. This in turn puts experienced directors in a 
better position to reduce information asymmetry occurrences as well as leading to 
improvements in the quality of information flow between corporate owners and 
managers, especially in the financial reporting environment where the two have 
disparate information levels. The above can be attributed to the fact that the fi-
nancial experience attained by these members enables them to not only better 
understand the risks and benefits involved with financial reporting but also put 
them in better positions of  providing oversight of financial reporting. The above 
advantages attained from board member independence and expertise motivate this 
study into investigating whether the same benefits are portrayed by AC composi-
tion in disclosures pertaining to ACs in the UK. 
The objective of this study is to examine how AC composition, in terms of mem-
ber financial expertise and independence, affects disclosures pertaining to AC 
membership, activity and findings. To investigate the study objective, the study 
uses a sample of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the fiscal year 
2008. The results of the study indicate that AC independence has a positive effect 
on total disclosure, required disclosure and voluntary disclosure. The results fur-
ther reveal that AC expertise has a positive effect on total disclosure and required 
disclosure. Among the independent variables employed in the study, profitability 
has a positive effect on total disclosure, required disclosure and voluntary disclo-
sure. Company size has a positive effect on total disclosure and voluntary disclo-
sure. AC meetings have a positive effect on required disclosure. Leverage has a 
negative effect on total disclosure and required disclosure. 
The study is organized as follows. In Section 1, the study objective and back-
ground to the study were presented. Section 2 presents a brief discussion of UK 
corporate governance. In Section 3, a review of prior literature and the study hy-
potheses are presented. Section 4 presents the methodology employed in the 
study, and in Section 5 the results and discussion of the findings are presented. 
The last section provides the conclusion to the study. 
2 Corporate Governance in the UK 
As the focus of this study is particularly on ACs, the discussion will focus on AC 
developments and regulation in the UK rather than the details of the entire corpo-
rate governance law. As is the development worldwide, excellence regarding to 
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corporate governance continues to gain prominence in UK business. Corporate 
governance developments in the UK as many countries reflect the impact of US 
experiences which date back to the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. During this peri-
od corporate scandals emerged as a result of concerns relating to financial report-
ing. This drew attention on corporate governance causing regulators to establish 
the Cadbury Committee in 1992 and thus the beginning of a decade of reviews 
and recommendations. This committee was formed by the London Stock Ex-
change, FRC and the accountancy profession. in its report on financial aspects of 
corporate governance, the Cadbury Committee (1992: 28) recommended that all 
companies listed in the UK should establish an AC. Compliance to the above rec-
ommendation was not mandatory but the London Stock Exchange (1993: 128) 
required listed companies to disclose their level of compliance in their annual 
reports and accounts. 
Following the above development, the Cadbury Committee issued its first report 
(the Cadbury Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance) with a code of 
best  practice.  In this code, ACs were seen to play an important role in the com-
mittee’s proposals on improving corporate governance. This was followed by the 
Rutteman Guidance in 1994, the Greenbury Report in 1995, and then in 1995 the 
Hampel  Committee  whose  role  was  to  examine  levels  of  compliance  with  the  
Cadbury Code and a need to update it was established. In 1998, the Hampel Re-
port on corporate governance was released. After consolidations and amend-
ments, the Hampel Report was then added to the Cadbury and Greenbury Codes. 
This update led to the 1998 Combined Code that applied to all listed companies. 
The Turnbull Report followed in 1999, Internal Control: Guidance for Directors 
on the Combined Code and in 2003 the Higgs Report was issued on the review of 
the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. Developments continued in 
2003 and later in 2005 when the FRC published an update of the Turnbull Guid-
ance after reviewing its suitability for the changing corporate scene. Table 1. Il-
lustrates the above changes in guidance in the order of occurrences. 
ACs have long been viewed as a crucial component of corporate governance, spe-
cifically  as  an   important  tool  that  assists  the  board  of  directors  with  improving  
the transparency and integrity of financial reporting (Public Oversight Board 
1994; SOX 2002). Notwithstanding corporate concerns internationally, the roles 
of ACs in the UK have not only increased by importance but also in scope. Spe-
cific roles of the AC include ensuring that the objectives of the board are fol-
lowed, improving financial reporting quality through reviews of financial state-
ments, maintaining and reviewing internal control adequacy and enhance the ef-
fectiveness of external auditors regarding financial reporting quality.  
 Acta Wasaensia     115 
Some of the important players in developing and supporting the effective imple-
mentation of the corporate governance framework in the UK are the FRC (an in-
dependent regulator that promotes confidence in corporate governance and report-
ing) and the Audit Committee Institute (ACI) created to serve AC members as 
well  as  help  familiarize  them with  their  changing  role.  The  FRC promotes  high  
standards of corporate governance through the Combined Code, sets corporate 
reporting standards, and monitors and enforces accounting and auditing standards. 
The ACI, on the other hand communicates with AC members and enhances their 
awareness and ability to implement effective AC processes. In ensuring that ACs 
effectively discharge their responsibilities, the FRC through its guidance on ACs 
(last revised 2008) assists boards in general and ACs in particular when imple-
menting the relevant provisions of the Combined Code (Section C3) on AC com-
position, activity and further regulation regarding AC disclosures in company 
reports. 
The UK regulation on AC director independence and experience is emphasized in 
both the CCCG and in the Financial Services Authority’s Disclosure and Trans-
parency Rules. The Financial Services Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency 
Rules require at least one independent member on the AC and at least one mem-
ber with competence in accounting and/or auditing. On the other hand, the CCCG 
under its comply or explain recommendations requires  that the AC comprises at 
least three independent non-executive members or two in the case of smaller 
companies and at least one member of the AC has to have recent and relevant 
financial experience. It is important to note that on the basis of the definition of 
smaller company provided in footnote 4 of the CCCG, the sample of this study 
falls outside this definition and therefore the requirement for at least three inde-
pendent non-executive directors applies. Furthermore, it is crucial to note that 
both the CCCG and Financial Services Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency 
Rules set no definition of financial experience and, therefore, each board deter-
mines its own criteria. For example, most companies considered the financial 
expertise definition by the SEC also applied in this study. Under this definition, 
financial expertise could include accounting and finance experience or any expe-
rience in supervising employees with financial responsibilities and overseeing 
company performance. 
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Table 1. Changing guidance for audit committees in the UK 
 
Period   Occurrence   
   
May 1991 Establishment of the Cadbury Committee 
December 1992 Publication of the Cadbury Report and associated Code  
April 1993 UK Stock Exchange amended the Listing Rules to reflect 
the recommendations in the Cadbury Report  
December 1994 Publication of the Rutteman Report on Internal Control and 
Financial Reporting 
July 1995 Publication of the Greenbury Report 
October 1995 UK Stock Exchange amended the Listing Rules to reflect 
the recommendations in the Greenbury Report  
November 1995 Establishment of the Hampel Committee 
January 1998 Publication of the Hampel Report on Corporate Govern-
ance 
June 1998 UK Stock Exchange issued the Hampel Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance  
December 1998 Establishment of the Turnbull Committee  
September 1999 Publication of the Turnbull Report on internal Control 
February 2002 Establishment of the Higgs Committee 
September 2002 Establishment of the Smith Committee 
January 2003 Publication of the Higgs Report  on review of the role and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors 
January 2003 Publication of the Smith Report on Audit Committee 
July 2003 Publication of the New Combined Code 
3 Theoretical framework  
In many organizations, corporate governance is characterized by the agency theo-
ry defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This theory, defines an agent relation-
ship which involves the delegation of decision-making authority between the 
principal (shareholders) and the agent (manager). In this relationship, the agent 
performs  services  on  behalf  of  the  principal  to  enable  effective  corporate  man-
agement and thereby acts according to the best interests of the principal. This del-
egation of authority however leads to agency problems which are considered 
threats to corporate financial reporting, creating a need for effective corporate 
governance structures. Furthermore, the same separation of ownership leads to 
agency costs. These were categorized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as follows. 
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(1) monitoring costs, which include expenses incurred by the principal to limit 
deviant activities of the agent, (2) bonding costs, characterized by expenses in-
curred to ensure that the agent does not undertake actions outside the principal’s 
interests, and (3) residual loss due to sub-optimization by the agent of the welfare 
maximization objective. 
In the context of the firm, a number of ways have been identified to mitigate 
agency problems: for example, negotiation of formal contracts as a means of ad-
dressing principal-agent conflicts, and employment of non-executive independent 
directors to monitor and control the actions of management. It is in relation to this 
that academics such as Fama and Jensen (1983) have argued that non-executive 
independent directors are experts in decision control. Moreover, it is also evident 
that the agency theory predictions and empirical evidence relating to director in-
dependence appear to be shared by regulators: for example, the arguments raised 
by the Public Oversight Board (1994) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) that 
AC performance would be of high quality when members are independent. Simi-
larly, in the United Kingdom, among other countries, regulation has mandated 
corporate boards to include independent directors on their committees in general 
and ACs in particular, a recommendation designed to strengthen AC effectiveness 
as well as enhance their oversight role and responsibility over the financial report-
ing process. 
Furthermore, for the board of directors to ensure that the shareholders interests 
are achieved, the board appoints an AC whose members are drawn from the com-
pany’s board of directors, thus making the AC a subcommittee of the board. Be-
cause the board of directors is founded to see that shareholders benefits are at-
tained, similarly the AC is founded to make sure that the objectives of the board 
are  followed.  In  this  way,  two  kinds  of  governance  control  relationships  are  
formed: namely, (1) the shareholder and     board of director’s relationship,  and 
(2) the shareholder,  board of directors and AC relationship.  It  is  assumed in this 
study that since the AC is a subset of the board of directors, the AC behaves indif-
ferent towards the benefits of the shareholders. In other words, the AC continues 
with the responsibility of seeing to it that shareholders benefits are achieved.  
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4 Literature review and hypotheses development  
4.1 Audit committee literature  
Audit committee importance has gained increasing concern within corporate gov-
ernance and has been, therefore, of increasing interest to many researchers and 
practitioners over the past years. Regulations in a number of countries (e.g., in the 
European Union as a whole and the United States) have required companies listed 
on the main stock markets to comprise ACs. These regulations have raised con-
cerns about ACs effectively discharging their responsibilities3 and have therefore 
placed a lot of emphasis on AC composition along with other emphasized areas in 
their laws (e.g. the CCCG and SOX 2002).  
Over the past year, regulators and academicians have continued with their quest 
in AC related issues hence the existence of a vast amount of literature on ACs. 
Focusing on the AC’s monitoring role, prior studies have viewed ACs as monitor-
ing mechanisms that enhance the audit attestation function of external financial 
reporting (e.g. Bradbury 1990) in addition to enhancing transparency. Many of 
these studies have shown that AC efficacy is dependent on its composition and 
have thus investigated such committee characteristics as independence (Abbott et 
al. 2000; Archambeault and DeZoort 2001; Raghunandan et al. 2001;, expertise 
(Bédard et al. 2004), size (Anderson et al. 2004; DeZoort and Salterio 2001) and 
number of meetings held (Beasley et al. 2000). Most of the above investigations 
have been related to issues such as external auditing, AC existence, AC effective-
ness and financial reporting quality (Archambeault and DeZoort 2001; Stewart 
and Munro 2007). The study by Archambeault and DeZoort (2001), revealed that 
companies with less independent directors were characterized by more suspicious 
auditor switches than those with more independent directors. Further still, 
Raghunandan et al. (2001) found that ACs composed of entirely independent di-
rectors were more likely to have stronger relationships with internal auditors as 
compared to those with one or more inside directors. In the study by Abbott et al. 
(2000), the relationship between AC characteristics, particularly independence 
and fraudulent financial statement actions was examined. Abbott et al’s study 
showed that “ACs which are composed of independent directors and which meet 
at least twice per year are less likely to be sanctioned for fraudulent or misleading 
reporting”.  
                                               
 
3  See Section 2.2 of the 2008 Guidance on audit committees by the Financial Reporting Council 
regarding the main aspects of AC responsibilities that have been focused on in regulation. 
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Several similar studies have investigated AC expertise (Bédard et al. 2004; 
Archambeault and DeZoort 2001; DeZoort and Salterio 2001) based on the 
grounds that expertise obtained by AC members places them in better positions to 
discharge committee responsibilities, thereby contributing significantly to com-
mittee effectiveness. The study by DeFond et al. (2005) highlights the importance 
of experts by arguing that companies with strong corporate governance are more 
likely to value accounting experts on ACs because the expertise the members pos-
sess is argued to compliment the effectiveness of strong corporate governance 
settings. Bédard et al. (2004) in their study investigating the effect of AC exper-
tise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management found that 
ACs with more AC experts are more equipped to restrict earnings management, 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) found that AC expertise was positively associated 
with the likelihood of supporting auditors in financial reporting disputes with 
management. Recall that Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) further found that 
AC expertise is negatively associated with suspicious auditor switches, an indica-
tion that experts better safeguard auditors from unfair dismissals. 
4.2 Disclosure literature 
The advantages of information disclosure extend from those enjoyed by the com-
panies themselves (See e.g. Botosan 1997) to those enjoyed by the other parties 
interested in the disclosed information such as regulatory, tax and supervisory 
authorities. Companies benefit from disclosure in such a way that increases in 
disclosure for example lower the company’s cost of equity capital, while other 
parties for example benefit through the reductions in uncertainty and information 
asymmetry (brought about by increases in information disclosure and thus 
smoothening their communication with managers of the company. It is partly be-
cause of these benefits and many more that the demand for information disclo-
sures is on the rise. Prior literature has documented a number of factors influenc-
ing these disclosures. These studies have provided evidence stretching from influ-
ences by corporate characteristics to corporate governance issues and others. 
A few studies have investigated ACs in relation to disclosure (Carcello and Neal 
2003; Carcello et al. 2002; Ho and Wong 2001). In their study investigating the 
relationship between AC independence and disclosure choice for financial dis-
tressed US firms, Carcello and Neal (2003) reported that for firms experiencing 
financial distress, there is a significant positive relationship between the percent-
age of affiliated directors on the AC and the optimism of the going-concern. Car-
cello et al. (2002) examined disclosures in AC charters and reports. The main 
purpose of their study was to understand AC activities. They reported high levels 
120      Acta Wasaensia 
of compliance with required AC disclosures and particularly high voluntary dis-
closure levels for larger companies, depository institutions, companies listed on 
the NYSE and those with more independent ACs. Ho and Wong (2001) examined 
the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of volun-
tary disclosure. They reported a significant positive association between corporate 
disclosure practices and the existence of an AC.  
Several studies have examined the relationship between disclosure and corporate 
governance (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Cheng and Courtenay 2005; Haniffa 
and Cooke 2002; Chen and Jaggi 2000). Most of these and related studies have 
particularly investigated corporate boards of directors as their main corporate 
governance focus. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examine the relationship between 
corporate governance, culture and disclosure. They find that voluntary disclosure 
is associated with non-executive directors and domination of family members on 
boards. Chen and Jaggi (2000) in their study examine the association between 
financial disclosures and independent non-executive directors, and family control 
in Hong Kong and find a positive association between the ratio of independent 
directors and mandatory disclosure. Cheng and Courtenay (2005) also provide 
evidence of higher extents of voluntary disclosure by companies with higher pro-
portions of independent directors as compared to those with balanced boards. In 
their study investigating the association between corporate boards, ACs and man-
agement earnings, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) found that effective corporate 
governance is associated with higher financial disclosure quality. Since the board 
and AC behave consistently towards shareholders benefits, findings from research 
on disclosure and corporate boards also hold for characteristics of the AC on dis-
closure. 
In addition to studies examining corporate governance related issues and disclo-
sure, other empirical studies have examined the association between company 
characteristics and disclosure. Most studies have provided support for the associa-
tion between a number of the firm characteristics examined and disclosure levels 
(e.g. Archamdault and Archamdault 2003; Akhtaruddin 2005; Jaggi and Low 
2000; Hossain 2000; Belkaoui and Kahl 1978). The most robust findings of these 
studies  have  been  of  the  propensity  for  disclosure  levels  to  be  associated  with  
company size, company leverage and profitability. Contrary to the above find-
ings, some studies provide contradicting results on disclosure and the same firm 
characteristics (Wallace et al. 1994; Zarzeski 1996; Watson et al. 2002; Cooke 
1989). Wallace et al. (1994) found no relationship between profitability and dis-
closure. Zarzeski (1996) provides an argument that disclosure decreases with lev-
erage in situations when debtors have direct access to information especially if 
firms have private debt rather than public debt. Watson et al. (2002) found no 
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positive relationship between disclosure and industry despite the finding by 
Cooke (1989) in which it was reported that manufacturing industries disclose 
more information in their annual reports than other industries. 
4.3 Hypothesis development 
Existing literature has documented an association between corporate governance 
and disclosure (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Chen and Jaggi 2000; Cheng and 
Courtenay 2005) and positive effects of AC independence and expertise (e.g. Bé-
dard et al. 2004; Archambeault and DeZoort 2001; DeZoort and Salterio 2001; 
Fama and Jensen 1983). This literature has provided support for the views pre-
sented by practitioners regarding corporate governance in general and AC compo-
sition in particular (Public Oversight Board 1994; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000) 
as well as agency theory postulation on director independence. In particular, sup-
portive empirical evidence suggests that a board’s monitoring effectiveness is 
related to its  composition and should therefore be evident in the firm’s transpar-
ency levels. This study therefore assumes that since ACs are miniatures of corpo-
rate boards, the same characteristics in favor of board efficiency should apply for 
AC efficiency. Based on the above, it is of interest to examine whether AC com-
position in terms of member independence and expertise influences disclosures 
pertaining to ACs. These views are captured by the hypotheses below. 
 
H1:  A positive relationship exists between the independence of AC members 
and the extent of disclosure. 
H2:  A positive relationship exists between the expertise of AC members and         
the extent of disclosure. 
5 Data and method  
5.1 Sample selection and data sources 
This study initially covers a sample of the FTSE 350 largest companies by market 
capitalization having their primary listing on the London Stock Exchange during 
the fiscal year 2008. Eighteen companies with insufficient data to estimate the 
study variables are excluded from the study. Due to the unique disclosure re-
quirements by financial companies, most previous disclosure studies are limited 
to non-financial companies (e.g. Akhtaruddin 2005; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; 
Chau and Gray 2002; Raffournier 1995; Chen and Jaggi 2000). This study does 
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not exclude companies in the financial industry because there are no industry re-
lated exemptions by regulation regarding disclosure relating to ACs examined in 
this study. This leaves the study with a sample of 332 companies. The final sam-
ple used in the study represents at least 95% of the entire FTSE 350 population, 
hence providing strong grounds for generalization of the results. 
AC attributes data are gathered from the sample company annual reports for the 
year 2008 while the Thomson Financial Worldscope database is used for the col-
lection of other variables data such as financial and industry data. The study uses 
the annual report  for a number of reasons.  First,  it  is  one of the major source of 
corporate governance information as recommended by the listing rules for listed 
companies. Secondly, annual reports are considered the main source of disclosing 
information for different parties (Akhtaruddin 2005; Deegen and Rankin 1997).  
5.2 Variables and methods 
5.2.1 The disclosure index construction and application 
The study uses a self-constructed disclosure index related to AC membership and 
activities to analyze disclosure practices and measure disclosure levels by the 
sample companies. The disclosure index employed in this study includes infor-
mation  items  on  AC membership  and  activity  which  are  both  required  (AC dis-
closures mandated by regulation under the CCCG and Financial Services Authori-
ty’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules (FSA’s DTR)) and voluntary (provided 
over and above the required information. The Combined Code recommendations 
considered fall within the “comply or explain” regime in which companies are 
required to disclose or give explanations for non disclosure. The steps followed 
when constructing the index were as follows. First, required information (high-
lighted as mandatory and/or “comply or explain”) was identified and gathered 
from the Combined Code and the FSA’s DTR. This was supplemented by infor-
mation from the guidance on ACs (Financial Reporting Council 2008) from 
which both required and voluntary items were further identified.  Additional vol-
untary items were then identified from the sample company reports on ACs. The 
preliminary list of selected items was sent out for screening to three individuals. 
These individuals were identified and selected based on their knowledge and ex-
pertise in UK AC related issues in addition to working with or being members of 
institutions influencing corporate governance in the UK. The results from the 
screening brought about an improvement in the list in such a way that, recom-
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mendations on including information required by the FSA’s DTR were given and 
a revised list as well as web-links (for reference)  were provided for consideration 
This disclosure index contains 37 items which are divided into two main infor-
mation types, that is, required disclosures and voluntary disclosures. Each infor-
mation type consists of two information sections: the AC membership and the AC 
activity sections. The AC membership section consists of information on the 
committee composition and other membership related aspects. The activity sec-
tion consists of the AC roles and, other related activities undertaken by the AC 
and further incorporates the results from these roles and related activities. The 
two sections on disclosures pertaining to ACs are considered important and of 
interest in this study for two reasons. First, the membership section is perceived 
as crucial for ACs in achieving effectiveness and thus enabling them to make 
judgments that are in the best interests of not only the company but also the 
shareholders. Secondly, in relation to the agency costs theory, disclosures about 
AC activities and findings are important as they signal to the public in general and 
the shareholders in particular the AC oversight role, hence reducing agency costs.  
Accounting research has employed both the weighted (e.g. Raffournier 1995; 
Owusu-Ansah 1998) and the unweighted (e.g. Eng et al. 2001; Botosan 1997; 
Buzby 1974) disclosure scoring approaches. In this research, the unweighted dis-
closure index is applied based on the assumption that all items in the checklist are 
of equal importance in promoting corporate reporting and governance to improve 
company performance thereby providing equal importance levels for information 
users. Using company annual reports for the fiscal year 2008, a score 1 is as-
signed if  an item in a group is disclosed and 0 for item non-disclosure.  The dis-
closure scores for each company are calculated as follows: 
 
 
¦
 
 
m
i
ij dDISC
1
        (1) 
where DISC represents disclosure, i.e. total, required and voluntary disclosure; di 
is 1 if an item is disclosed and 0 if not; m is the number of voluntary items dis-
closed in the annual reports (here m=37). 
5.2.2 Hypotheses testing and definition of variables 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is used to test the association 
between the dependent variable disclosure and the independent variable AC com-
position expressed as AC independence and AC expertise (DEXP). In addition to 
AC composition, the study controls for a number of variables commonly used by 
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previous disclosure and AC related studies (Archamdault and Archamdault 2003; 
Akhtaruddin 2005; Jaggi and Low 2000; Hossain 2000; Beasley et al. 2000). The 
regression model used in the study is as below:  
 
DISCi  = Į + ȕ1INEDi + ȕ2DEXPi + ȕ3MEETi  + ȕ4CSIZEi  +  
  ȕ5PROFi  + ȕ6LEVi  + ȕ7LIQDi + İi                                 (2) 
Where DISC is the disclosure score represented by TD (total disclosure), RD (re-
quired disclosure) and VLTD (voluntary disclosure), INED is AC independence, 
DEXP is  AC expertise,  MEET is  committee  meetings,  CSIZE is  the  size  of  the  
firm, PROF is profitability, LEV is leverage and LIQD is liquidity. Table 1 pre-
sents a summary of the operational definitions of the variables used in the study. 
To evaluate whether multicollinearity is of any concern, Variance of Inflation 
Factors (VIF) calculation is used. The highest VIF result for the independent vari-
ables from all the models is 1.634. As suggested by Lardaro (1993: 446) that mul-
ticollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem if VIF scores are less than 10 and 
none of the VIF scores exceed 10, the VIF results from the three regression mod-
els indicate that there are no multicollinearity problems. The presence of het-
eroskedasticity is analyzed using the general test by White (1980). For situations 
in which the test reveals the presence of heteroskedasticity, the White’s Het-
eroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance are used.  
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Table 2. Operational definitions of variables 
 
 
6 Results and discussion  
6.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Table 2 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for all sample firms. As 
reported in the table, the highest and lowest disclosure score for TD, RD and 
VLTD are 30, 9, 21 and 16, 6, 10 respectively. The means for the sample firms 
are, 20.229, 7.000 and 13.229 for TD, RD and VLTD respectively. The means for 
TD and RD suggest high levels of disclosure and compliance with disclosure re-
quirements pertaining to ACs among the listed companies. The mean result on 
RD is consistent with that in the study by Carcello et  al.  (2002).  Over 91% and 
96% of the sample companies had three or more independent and one or more 
financial  experts on their  ACs respectively.  In addition, over 50% of the sample 
companies were committed to more effective AC governance because they ex-
ceeded the minimum requirement for the number of independent directors. The 
result for VLTD reveals that on average the companies disclosed slightly above 
60% on voluntary items.  
 
 
Notation                          Variable investigated         Measurement                  Expected sign 
Dependent variable (DISC)  Disclosure 
TD                   Total Disclosure               Total number of items                
              disclosed by a firm 
RD                    Required disclosure          Total number of required 
            items disclosed by a firm                
VLTD                                 Voluntary disclosure         Total number of voluntary       
                           items disclosed by a firm 
          
Audit committee composition variables 
INED                   Independence of               proportion of independent  
  AC members                non-executive directors to audit           
                                         committee size             (+) 
DEXP                    Financial Expertise          proportion of directors with  
                  of AC members                financial expertise to audit  
             committee size                                 (+) 
 
Control variables 
MEET                    AC meetings                    Total number of meetings held   
                                                                         during the fiscal year       (+) 
CSIZE                    Total assets             Natural logarithm of total assets       (+)              
PROF                    Profitability               Return on invested      
            capital                                               (+) 
LEV                   Leverage              Equity to total assets ratio                 (-) 
LIQD                    Liquidity                           Current ratio                                     (-) 
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Table 3.  Descriptive statistics for all study variables (n=332 observations) 
 
Table 3 reports the correlations between the study variables. The results show that 
there are significantly positive associations (at 0.01 significance level) between 
the disclosure proxies TD, RD and VLTD and the committee composition proxies 
INED and DEXP. A significant positive association (at 0.01 significance level) is 
revealed between all the disclosure measures and CSIZE. These results indicate 
that bigger firms, and firms with more independent and financial experts are asso-
ciated with higher disclosures. In addition, the results indicate that TD and RD are 
positively correlated with MEET and negatively correlated with LEV and LIQD. 
On the other hand, TD and VLTD have a positive significant association (at 0.05 
significance level) with PROF and a negative significant association with LEV.  
 
  
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the entire sample of the study. DISC is the disclosure score 
represented by TD (the total number of items disclosed by a firm), RD(the total number of required items 
disclosed by a firm) and VD (the total number of voluntary items disclosed by a firm), INED is AC 
independence measured by the proportion of independent non-executive directors to AC size, DEXP is AC 
expertise measured by the proportion of directors with financial expertise to AC size, MEET is committee 
meetings measured as the number of AC meeting held during the fiscal year, CSIZE is the size of the firm 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, PROF is profitability measured by return on invested 
capital, LEV is leverage measured by the equity to total assets ratio and LIQD is liquidity measured by 
current ratio. 
 
Variable Mean  Std.dev. Max Min 
TD 20.229 3.241 30.000 16.000 
RD 7.000 0.968 9.000 6.000 
VD 13.229 2.944 21.000 10.000 
INED 0.979 0.080 1.000 0.500 
DEXP 0.464 0.267 1.000 0.000 
MEET 3.792 1.017 8.000 2.000 
CSIZE 21.316 1.832 28.500 15.110 
PROF 9.152 16.191 76.000 -74.090 
LEV 41.587 226.969 99.880 -31.850 
LIQD 1.182 1.252 13.970 0.000 
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Table 4.  Correlations matrix of variables 
 
 
6.2 Regression results 
Following other disclosure studies (e.g. Akhtaruddin 2005; Chau and Gray 2002; 
Chen and Jaggi 2000; Owusu-Ansah 1998), this study uses regression analysis to 
test the hypotheses developed in the study. Table 4 presents results from the re-
gression analysis run using ordinary least squares (OLS). Three different regres-
sion  models  A,  B  and  C  are  estimated  to  examine  the  relationship  of  the  study  
independent variables on each of the three different measures of disclosure. The 
results from the regressions are reported in models A, B and C each reporting 
results of the dependent variables TD, RD and VLTD respectively. 
The F-statistics for all the models are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
These F-statistic values indicate that the models used in this study significantly 
explain variations in disclosures by the sample companies. The R2’s are 0.232, 
0.175 and 0.173 for models A, B, and C respectively. The first hypothesis H1 
relating to AC independence and disclosure is statistically validated in all models 
as the INED variable is positive and statistically significant at 0.01, 0.01 and 0.05 
significance levels in models A, B and C respectively. This result is consistent 
with the argument by Forker (1992) regarding the inclusion of independent direc-
tors on corporate boards and improvements in compliance with regulation relating 
The table reports correlations for the study variables where DISC is the disclosure score represented by TD 
(the total number of items disclosed by a firm), RD(the total number of required items disclosed by a firm) 
and VD (the total number of voluntary items disclosed by a firm), INED is AC independence measured by 
the proportion of independent non-executive directors to AC size, DEXP is AC expertise measured by the 
proportion of directors with financial expertise to AC size, MEET is committee meetings measured as the 
number of AC meeting held during the fiscal year, CSIZE is the size of the firm measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets, PROF is profitability measured by return on invested capital, LEV is leverage 
measured by the equity to total assets ratio and LIQD is liquidity measured by current ratio. ** and * 
represent 0.01 and 0.05 significance level respectively. 
 
 TD  RD  VD INED DEXP MEET CSIZE PROF LEV 
RD  0.442**         
VD  0.959**  0.158**        
INED  0.335**  0.341**  0.257**       
DEXP  0.246**  0.208**  0.203** 0.275**      
MEET  0.126*  0.166**  0.085 0.022 -0.027     
CSIZE  0.333**  0.218**  0.294** 0.366** 0.321** 0.133*    
PROF  0.125*  0.064  0.117* -0.059 -0.039 0.026 -0.150**   
LEV -0.262**  -0.059  -0.272** -0.056 -0.140* -0.129** -0.463** -0.045  
LIQD  -0.111* -0.119*  -0.083 -0.179** -0.010 -0.052 -0.014** 0.161** 0.154** 
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to disclosure. The second hypothesis H2 relating to expertise of AC members and 
disclosure is partially supported as reported in the models. The DEXP variable is 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level in Models A and B while in 
Model C it is positive but not statistically significant. Overall, the results suggest 
that committee member independence leads to increases in TD, RD and VLTD 
while member expertise particularly leads to increases in TD and RD.  
 
Table 5. OLS regression results  
 
The table presents estimates of the regression results (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors  
and Covariance) for the models used in the study where DISC is the disclosure score represented by TD 
(the total number of items disclosed by a firm), RD (the total number of required items disclosed by a firm) 
and VD (the total number of voluntary items disclosed by a firm), INED is AC independence measured by 
the proportion of independent non-executive directors to AC size, DEXP is AC expertise measured by the 
proportion of directors with financial expertise to AC size, MEET is committee meetings measured as the 
number of AC meeting held during the fiscal year, CSIZE is the size of the firm measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets, PROF is profitability measured by return on invested capital, LEV is leverage 
measured by the equity to total assets ratio and LIQD is liquidity measured by current ratio. A coefficient 
for each variable is shown with t-statistics in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variable 
     Model A  
     (TD) 
   Model B  
   (RD) 
    Model C 
    (VD) 
constant      10.632     4.137     6.495 
      (4.566)***     (5.538)***     (3.053)** 
    
Control variables   
MEET       0.254     0.144     0.110 
       (1.548)     (2.765)**     (0.716) 
CSIZE       0.265     0.052     0.214 
       (2.371)**     (1.414)     (2.132)** 
PROF       0.033     0.007     0.027 
      (3.361)***     (2.336)**     (2.881)** 
LEV       -0.017     0.002     -0.019 
       (-2.468)**     (1.196)     (-2.855)** 
LIQD       -0.122     -0.059     -0.063 
       (-1.006)     (-1.649)     (-0.570) 
    
Committee composition variables   
INED       0.788     0.262     0.526 
       (4.567)***     (4.204)***     (2.779)** 
DEXP       0.375     0.111     0.264 
       (2.228)**     (2.061)**     (1.644)  
    
R2        0.232     0.175     0.173 
Adjusted R2        0.215     0.157     0.155 
F-statistic      13.966***     9.791***     9.661***  
n    332 332 332 
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The results from the control variables are also reported in the same models as 
above. The results in the models reveal that with the exemption of LEV in model 
RD, all other control variables have the predicted signs. As indicated in Model A, 
CSIZE and PROF are positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 
levels respectively while that of LEV is negative and statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. These results indicate that TD is positively associated with bigger and 
more profitable firms while negatively associated with leverage. The results in 
Model B show that only the MEET and PROF are significant. Both variables are 
positive and significant at the 0.05 level. These results suggest that more profita-
ble firms and firms that hold more AC meetings are associated with more RD. 
Overall, the results in this model indicate that CSIZE, LEV and LIQD have insig-
nificant effects on required disclosures pertaining to ACs and are thus not im-
portant in explaining these particular disclosures. Finally, the results in model C 
indicate that the coefficients of CSIZE and PROF are positive and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level while that of LEV is negative and statistically signifi-
cant at the 0.05 level. In other words, firm size and profitability lead to increases 
in VLTD pertaining to ACs while, in contrast leverage leads to reductions in 
VLTD. 
6.3 Robustness checks 
Additional test  have been run to ensure the robustness of the empirical  findings.  
In order to ascertain that the reported findings are not driven by industry related 
factors, the analysis is estimated separately for financial industry firms to confirm 
that there are no differences between financial and non-financial industries. The 
findings not report tabulated reveal generally similar results as those from the 
original data. These results therefore indicate that there are no differences be-
tween the two sample samples, thus suggesting that the results reported in Table 5 
are not driven by industry. 
Further still, the AC committee variables (AC independence and AC expertise) 
are considered separately and sensitivity analyses are run to ensure that analyzing 
the two together did not impact the results reported in Table 5. The results not 
tabulated  are  consistent  with  regression  results  reported  in  Table  5.  It  is  worth  
noting that some of the variables lose a part of their explanatory power as com-
pared to the main results reported in Table 5. 
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7 Conclusion  
This study examines the relationship between disclosures and AC composition. 
The main focus is on two AC composition characteristics namely, committee in-
dependence and expertise and disclosures pertaining to AC membership, activity 
and findings. The study has been conducted on a sample of the 332 FTSE compa-
nies listed on the London Stock Exchange during the fiscal year 2008 and on a 
self-constructed disclosure score. The research hypothesizes a positive relation-
ship between the AC composition characteristics and disclosures pertaining to 
ACs.  
The findings of the study show that AC composition measured by AC member 
independence leads to increases in total disclosure, required disclosure and volun-
tary disclosure while AC composition measured by AC member expertise leads to 
increases in total disclosure and required disclosure. Specifically, companies with 
more independent and financial experts in their ACs disclose more required in-
formation regarding their AC membership and activity. In particular, the results 
reveal that the AC composition characteristics employed in the study are more 
closely associated with required disclosures than voluntary disclosures. This re-
sult indicates that companies listed on the London Stock Exchange place a lot of 
emphasis on the requirements stipulated by the laws on disclosures pertaining to 
ACs.  It can be concluded from the findings of the present study that: (1) the in-
clusion of independent directors and financial experts on ACs is likely to improve 
the effectiveness of the AC members in carrying out their responsibilities and  
also to improve compliance with the existing disclosure regulation and conse-
quently increases the comprehensiveness of disclosures as well as improving the 
transparency  of  corporate  boards,  and  (2)  AC  disclosures  in  relation  to  compli-
ance with disclosure regulations will certainly lead to strengthening trust and con-
fidence in corporate governance, the financial reporting process and the audit 
functions. 
The study results are important to institutional investors, existing and new boards 
as well as AC members, and disclosure and corporate governance policy makers 
as they provide important insights into some important aspects on improving the 
effectiveness of boards and their committees, the characteristics of UK listed 
companies, their corporate governance structures, disclosure practices and com-
pliance levels. This study particularly provides brief highlights to UK policy 
makers on the impact that the different disclosure and governance policies in 
place have on corporate practices and indirectly sheds light on where improve-
ments and efforts are required.  The results revealed by this study may partly be 
attributed to the efforts by the assisting bodies which work hand-in-hand with the 
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ACs; for example, through the issuing of guidance with matters related to the 
code among others. This study therefore suggests that, policy makers and regula-
tors should not only focus on policy and regulation setting but also identify ways 
of working together with corporate management in implementing the existing 
regulations on information disclosures as well as attaining the aims of the regula-
tions. 
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